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Abstract 
Examining the Impacts of Bank Competition and Stock Market Liquidity on Bank 
Liquidity Creation: Evidence from Malaysia 
 
by 
Moau Yong Toh 
 
Standard bank liquidity creation theory asserts that banks create liquidity by issuing credit for 
liquidity-constrained agents who have production opportunities with returns increasing on the 
investment horizon, and in the meantime, allowing prompt deposit withdrawals by agents who wish 
to invest their excess liquidity, but face random future consumption shocks. By holding illiquid non-
monetary assets on behalf of the public, banks bestow upon the economy new liquidity created for 
economic development activities. A well-functioning liquidity creation role of banks is thus of vital 
importance in promoting the long-run economic growth of a country, particularly a country that 
adopts a bank-oriented financial system.  
 
Commercial banks in Malaysia have faced a formidable increase in competitive pressure exerted 
from both within the banking industry and the domestic stock market since the 1990s, a process 
triggered by financial liberalisation, innovation and disintermediation. These developments have 
drawn attention to the influences of bank competition and stock market liquidity on the liquidity 
creation role of commercial banks in the country. The extant theoretical literature has enhanced our 
understanding of the relationships between bank competition and bank liquidity creation and 
between stock market liquidity and bank liquidity creation, and very often, the relationships come 
from two contradictory directions and are empirically inconclusive for countries that remain 
unexamined. Hence, this study aims to examine the relationship of bank competition and stock 
market liquidity on liquidity creation by Malaysian commercial banks. The study also investigates 
how the bank competition-liquidity creation relationship differs by bank size, given consideration of 
the discernible differences in the type of lending technology specialisation and capacity between 
large and small banks. To address the research objectives, a fixed effects estimator is employed on a 
panel dataset of Malaysian commercial banks for the period 2001 to 2013. 
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This study documents several key findings. First, when facing a rise in bank competition small banks 
cut down their liquidity creation through both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet activities. 
Credit rationing is more severe for small banks that have lower market power, in particular, by 
reducing their specialised soft lending arrangements to informationally-opaque or risky customers to 
avoid bearing costly information production and customer monitoring. Second, large banks that 
encounter greater competition tend to increase liquidity creation mainly through on-balance sheet 
activities. The specialisation in hard lending technologies and the strong capacity of large banks, for 
example, in terms of extensive branch networks, technology diffusion and capital, provide possible 
explanations for the ability of the large banks to tolerate a lower interest spread to leverage their 
liquidity creation business in existing and new market segments. Third, this study finds that a 
negative bank competition-liquidity creation relationship dominates the Malaysian commercial 
banking industry, which implies that banks take informational asymmetry-related costs into greater 
consideration in their lending decisions when competition increases. Another possible explanation 
for the moderation of bank liquidity creation is greater income diversification from interest-based 
towards fee-based activities in the midst of rising bank competition. Finally, the result shows that 
increased stock market liquidity does stimulate bank liquidity creation, and such an impact is carried 
through to both on- and off-balance sheet liquidity creation.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Research background 
The importance of banks’ liquidity creation role in economic development has long been recognised 
by economists and can be dated back at least to Smith (1776). According to the standard bank 
liquidity creation theory, banks create liquidity by issuing credit for liquidity-constrained agents who 
have production opportunities with returns increasing on the investment horizon, and in the 
meantime, allowing prompt deposit withdrawals by agents who wish to invest their excess liquidity, 
but face random future consumption shocks (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Diamond & Rajan, 2001; 
Dutta & Kapur, 1993; Fulghieri & Rovelli, 1998). Contemporary bank liquidity creation theories 
developed by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Kashyap et al. (2002) suggest that banks also create 
liquidity off the balance sheet through commitment-based lending activities that allow liquidity-
constrained agents to withdraw liquidity from banks upon demand. By holding illiquid non-monetary 
assets on behalf of the public, banks bestow upon the economy new liquidity created for economic 
development activities, such as household consumption and business investment.  
 
It is well known that regulators favour and implement pro-competition initiatives in the banking 
industry to enhance access to bank products and services by the public and thus the public welfare. 
Such thought can be translated to the “price channel” view which contends that there is a positive 
relationship between bank competition and bank liquidity creation (Horvath et al., 2013, 2016). The 
“price channel” view, which is in fact underpinned by the standard industrial organisation theory, 
argues that banks that face increased competition are likely to adjust the pricing and other contract 
terms of their products and services in order to attract more demand for their liquidity creation 
undertakings such as loan and deposit contracts (Beck et al., 2004; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2009; Hainz 
et al., 2013; Love & Martinez Peria, 2012). 
 
However, existing bank competition-liquidity creation studies have reported the opposing view, that 
is, the “fragility channel” hypothesis that purports a negative relationship between bank competition 
and bank liquidity creation, for banks in OECD, the U.S. and European countries (Horvath et al., 2013, 
2016; Jiang et al. (2016), Joh & Kim, 2012; Xu, 2010). The hypothesis incorporates asymmetric 
information justifications of financial intermediation and argues that increased bank competition 
breaks lending relationships down more easily, making it more difficult for banks to internalise the 
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benefits of lending relationships and weakening the banks’ incentive to invest in soft information 
acquisition, particularly through relationship lending with informationally-opaque customers 
(Petersen & Rajan, 1995; Dell’Ariccia & Marquez, 2004; Hauswald & Marquez, 2006). As a result, less 
credit is made available to the public and the amount of liquidity creation falls. Further, the finding of 
Carletti and Leonello (2011) also provides a possible explanation for the “fragility channel” 
hypothesis. Carletti and Leonello found that an increase in competition makes bank lending less 
profitable and banks create less liquidity by maintaining more reserves within the system and issuing 
fewer loan contracts in order to increase the buffer against the credit and liquidity risks.  
 
Given that there are two opposing hypotheses related to the relationship between bank competition 
and bank liquidity creation, the existing empirical evidence remains debatable for other countries 
that have not been examined, for example, Malaysia. Other unexamined questions arise: Does the 
relationship between bank competition and liquidity creation follow bank size? If it does, then how 
does the relationship differ? While a number of empirical studies have shown that the determinants 
of bank liquidity creation vary by bank size, for instance, studies by Berger and Bouwman (2009), 
Berger et al. (2010) and Joh and Kim (2012), no study has presented explicit evidence related to the 
effect of competition on bank liquidity creation by bank size. It is possible that the “fragility channel” 
hypothesis and the “price channel” hypothesis coexist in a country because bank competition does 
not affect large banks and small banks uniformly.  
 
A large body of literature has documented that small banks have a comparative advantage over large 
banks in the use of soft information in lending technologies, such as relationship lending and 
judgement lending, because the flat organisational structure of small banks allows processing and 
communication of information across hierarchy levels and delegation of decision making authority, 
which cannot be replicated by large banks without distortion (Berger & Black, 2011; Berger & Udell, 
2006; Berger et al., 2005b; Cole et al, 2004; Stein, 2002). In contrast, large banks specialise in hard 
lending technologies, such as asset-based lending and credit-scoring, that help in mitigating the 
agency problem within the banks. Further, Berger and Bouwman (2016) show that the balance sheet 
undertakings of large banks in the U.S. are distinguishably different from those of small banks. For 
example, large banks tend to maintain a greater portion of commercial and industrial loans in their 
loan portfolios than small banks due to their larger capability such as funding resources and 
economies of scale in hard lending technology adoption. Further, large banks typically maintain 
lower capital ratio than small banks, reflecting their risk taking behaviour endorsed by the “too big to 
fail” doctrine. Hence, the influence of bank size on bank activities raises the important issue of 
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whether large banks behave differently from small banks in liquidity creation when facing increased 
competition. 
 
The current global trend toward a market-based financial system also raises concerns about the 
influence of stock market liquidity on bank liquidity creation, which is another subject of interest that 
has received marginal attention from empirical researchers. A liquid stock market indicates that 
investors are able to trade their shares quickly at low cost without affecting the share prices 
substantially (Chordia et al., 2005; Levine et al., 2005; Sarr & Lybek, 2002). Early theoretical studies 
have predicted that a liquid stock market will reduce the significance of the liquidity creator role of 
banks in the economy, which this present study refers to as the “market-bank liquidity crowding out” 
hypothesis. For example, Bencivenga et al. (1995), Diamond (1997), Levine (1991) and Wallace (1988) 
collectively found that a liquid stock market allows investors (or savers) to reallocate their claims 
efficiently in the market when their desired holdings change unexpectedly (possibly due to 
consumption shocks). Thus, investors’ concerns about long-term capital commitment in the 
securities are alleviated, motivating investors to reallocate their savings from banks to the market. 
Moreover, Bencivenga et al. (1995), Diamond (1997) and Levine (1991) reported that increased stock 
market liquidity attracts firms to raise capital for longer-term and higher-return investments through 
the market as firms are able to issue securities at attractive prices and low costs. As an increase in 
stock market liquidity leads to less savings being placed with banks and less loan demand from 
banks, the liquidity creation of banks is hampered.    
 
However, there exists another set of theories in recent years, to which this present study refers 
collectively as the “market-bank liquidity enhancement” hypothesis, predicting that stock market 
liquidity improves bank liquidity creation (Mattana & Panetti, 2014; Rajan, 1998; Song & Thakor, 
2010). Mattana and Panetti (2014) theoretically found that a liquid stock market provides ready exit-
options for investors that face consumption shocks and diverts some demand for liquidity away from 
the banks, which in turn encourages the banks to shift their asset portfolio from liquid reserves 
towards illiquid assets. Song and Thakor (2010) argue that increased stock market liquidity enhances 
the magnitude of liquidity creation by publicly-listed banks by making equity raising from the market 
cheaper to meet the higher capital requirements associated with greater lending scope to potentially 
creditworthy yet previously unserved borrowers. Besides, a liquid stock market may also stimulate 
greater use of off-balance sheet credit commitments that provide a primary backup source of 
corporate financing in the case that the firms fail to raise equity up to their expectation (Dinc, 2000; 
Rajan, 1998). Despite the rich theoretical predictions in this field, empirical evidence in favour of 
either the “market-bank liquidity crowding out” hypothesis or the “market-bank liquidity 
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enhancement” hypothesis is very limited. The only empirical study was conducted by Chatterjee 
(2015) who examined the influence of stock market liquidity on liquidity creation by the U.S. 
commercial banks from 1984 to 2010 and advocated the “market-bank liquidity enhancement” 
hypothesis. More empirical studies are needed. 
 
1.2 Research problem and objectives  
Inspired by the research gaps highlighted in the previous section, this study aims to provide empirical 
evidence on how bank competition and stock market liquidity are linked to the liquidity creation of 
commercial banks in Malaysia. Specifically, this study aims to achieve four research objectives:   
i. To examine and compare the relationship between bank competition and the liquidity creation of 
Malaysian commercial banks by bank size; 
ii. To identify the dominant relationship between bank competition and liquidity creation in the 
Malaysian commercial banking industry; 
iii. To examine the relationship between stock market liquidity and the liquidity creation of 
Malaysian commercial banks; and 
iv. To provide policy implications related to bank competition and stock market liquidity in the 
context of liquidity creation by Malaysian commercial banks. 
 
This study addresses the objectives in the context of the Malaysian commercial banking industry for 
several reasons. First, the operational disparities between the large and small commercial banks in 
Malaysia are apparent. The commercial banking market is highly concentrated, with the largest three 
banks dominating almost half of the total bank assets (47%) over the years 2001 to 2013 (based on 
our calculation). Large commercial banks have generally established extensive branch networks 
throughout the country’s thirteen states and three federal territories, as compared to small 
commercial banks operating only three branch offices on average, usually based in developed cities 
such as Kuala Lumpur (The Association of Banks in Malaysia, 2016). These small banks generally 
target a market based on high value corporate clients by providing personalized products and 
services, as opposed to the the mass consumer and corporate customers served by the large, 
geographically diversified banks at arm’s length (BNM, 2001). The existence of the credit bureau in 
Malaysia may imply that the banking market is more challenging for small banks that also rely on soft 
information when making lending decisions for information-opaque customers. This is because the 
credit bureau has been found to restrain banks’ ex post monopoly of information and ability to retain 
customers, which diminishes their incentive to extend loans to informationally-opaque customers 
(Pagano & Jappelli, 1993; Padilla & Pagan, 1997). 
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The second reason is that the Malaysian government (instead of private sectors) remains the major 
player in the country’s financial system and economic development, both directly and indirectly 
(World Bank, 2013). Several large commercial banks are indirectly linked to the government through 
government investment arms. Although the government allegedly does not interfere with the 
management of government-linked banks and all the banks are subject to the same regulation 
standards, products offered by these banks may carry a perceived implicit guarantee that may lead 
to an imbalanced development of the banking system (World Bank, 2013). In addition, to enhance 
small and medium enterprises’ (SMEs) access to external financing and to boost the growth of SMEs, 
the national Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC) has continually forged strategic alliances with 
leading banks to provide guarantees for bank loans obtained by the SMEs, under various guarantee 
schemes such as the Portfolio Guarantee (PG) scheme (CGC Malaysia, 2014)1. Owing to the 
nationwide spread of branch operations, large banks have benefited mostly from these CGC 
initiatives, which does not only enhance the banks’ capacity for liquidity creation, but also presents 
an unequal playing field for smaller bank players. 
 
Third, unlike most bank-based financial systems, Malaysia adopts a dual-banking system in which 
commercial banks and Islamic banks operate side-by-side but under two different regulatory 
frameworks (BNM, 2015). Islamic banks, which comply with Sharia law, are locally oriented and 
compete directly with commercial banks in consumer lending and deposit activities. Owing to the 
government’s supportive initiatives for Islamic banks, for instance, a favourable tax regime, the 
number of Islamic banks in Malaysia surged from two banks to 16 banks over the period 2001-2013. 
The Islamic banking market share increased to account for 23 percent (2007: 8 percent) of total 
assets, 21 percent (2007: 7 percent) of total loans and 23 percent (2007: 9 percent) of total deposits 
of the banking system at the end of 2013 (http://www.bnm.gov.my/). The backdrop of a dual 
banking system in Malaysia offers an interesting context to study the effect of bank competition on 
the liquidity creation role of commercial banks.  
 
Lastly, it is interesting to examine how stock market liquidity is related to the liquidity creation of 
commercial banks in Malaysia, because the Malaysian stock market has been highly illiquid for a long 
time (based on stock market turnover ratio) as compared to the ASEAN (Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations) peer average, the world average and that of the U.S., despite its large capitalisation 
                                                          
1 The Credit Guarantee Corporation was established on July 5, 1972 to assist SMEs in obtaining funds from 
financial institutions by offering loan guarantees, financing facilities and advisory services to SMEs (CGC 
Malaysia, 2014).   
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(Author’s calculation; Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 1996a). The phenomenon in the Malaysian stock 
market is rare as compared to the typical stock market development in the U.S. and the U.K., that is, 
a large stock market is accompanied by high market liquidity, because, theoretically, a large stock 
market is more attractive to investors as the market enhances the ability of investors to mobilise 
capital and diversify risk (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 1996a). 
 
1.3 Research contribution 
The contributions of this study are from two perspectives – a research perspective and a policy 
perspective. From a research perspective, the research objectives one to three of this study fill the 
gaps in the literature. Pertaining to our first objective, this study may represent the first empirical 
study that directly examines the relationship between bank competition and liquidity creation by 
bank size. Abundant literature has focused on the bank competition-liquidity creation relationship 
and the bank size-lending relationship in separate strands. Thus, by shedding new light on how banks 
of different sizes may behave differently in liquidity creation undertakings when facing increased 
competition, our findings will contribute to these literature strands. For the second objective, we 
have identified only four empirical studies that explicitly investigated the relationship between bank 
competition and liquidity creation. These studies were conducted by Horvath et al. (2013, 2016), 
Jiang et al. (2016), Joh and Kim (2012) and Xu (2010) for banks in the Czech Republic, the U.S., 25 
OECD countries and 26 European countries, respectively. Our study is the first empirical study for 
Malaysia in this field. Besides, theories that link stock market liquidity to bank liquidity creation can 
generally be referred to as the “market-bank liquidity crowding out” hypothesis and the “market-
bank liquidity enhancement” hypothesis, with both predicting opposite directions (Bencivenga et al., 
1995; Diamond, 1997; Levine, 1991; Wallace, 1988; Mattana & Panetti, 2014; Rajan, 1998; Song & 
Thakor, 2010). Despite the rich theoretical predictions, the empirical evidence in this field is very 
limited. Chatterjee’s (2015) study for the U.S. is the only work to our knowledge. Thus, this study 
regards the third research objective as imperative to test the theoretical predictions in the Malaysian 
financial environment and to fill the gap in the literature. 
 
Besides, this study contributes to the literature by providing more detailed analyses than previous 
relevant studies in several ways. First, our liquidity creation measures are calculated using both the 
category and maturity classification approaches, unlike previous studies that usually employ a 
selected classification approach only. For example, Horvath et al. (2013, 2016) employed only total 
liquidity creation and on-balance sheet liquidity creation measures based on maturity classification, 
and both Joh and Kim (2012) and Xu (2010) employed only total liquidity creation based on category 
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classification. This present study provides more detailed analyses than these prior studies because 
we employ four liquidity creation measures, which are total liquidity creation and on-balance sheet 
liquidity creation measures based on both the category and maturity classification approaches. We 
also use an additional measure of bank liquidity provision through off-balance sheet components 
only to offer a different perspective on the empirical relationships of interest.  
 
Second, this study employs a non-structural competition measure, the Lerner Index, to measure 
competition at bank-level. This measurement approach is consistent with Horvath et al’s (2013, 
2016) and Joh and Kim’s (2012) studies, but different that of from Xu (2010) who employed the 
market share of individual banks to indicate bank competition, which can be problematic because 
the structural measure has been criticised for not reflecting competition faced by banks and it is 
difficult to compare results across bank markets and time periods (Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009; 
Claessens & Laeven, 2004; Degryse & Ongena, 2008). Similarly, a large body of early bank 
competition-bank lending empirical studies that resorted to market structural measures to indicate 
bank competition, for example, Beck et al. (2004), Berger and Hannan (1989), Corvoisier and Gropp 
(2002), Hannan (1991) and Heitfield and Prager (2004), cannot offer unambiguous implications for 
the bank competition-liquidity creation literature strand. 
 
Third, this study applies various alternative stock market liquidity measures to offer a deeper insight 
into whether the choice of stock market liquidity measure may alter the findings for the stock market 
liquidity-bank liquidity creation relationship. This approach is slightly different from Chatterjee’s 
(2015) study for the U.S. that measures stock market liquidity by proportional quoted bid-ask spread, 
Amihud’s illiquidity ratio and Roll’s implied spread. Our study also uses quoted bid-ask spread and 
Amihud’s illiquidity ratio, and is different from the previous study by including turnover ratio, 
frequency of trading days with zero returns and our own computation of aggregate stock market 
illiquidity index score2. 
 
From a policy perspective, this study informs policy makers and practitioners about the 
developments of bank competition and stock market liquidity in Malaysia and the influences of these 
developments on the liquidity creation of commercial banks. The findings of this study have direct 
policy relevance for the future viability of small banks and all banks in general because undue 
financial liberalisation and other competition efforts can hurt the competitive edge and profitability 
                                                          
2 We do not use Roll’s implied spread because the underlying assumptions of the measure, such as  an 
informationally efficient stock market and stationary price change of stocks, are not satisfied in Malaysia’s 
illiquid stock market. 
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of these banks. Besides, the use of various stock market liquidity measures in this study allows an 
assessment of the usefulness of turnover ratio in measuring stock market liquidity in Malaysia. 
Academics have criticised the turnover ratio for not reflecting changes in the transaction costs on the 
financial market, but the measure remains widely used by regulators and some international 
research units, such as the research departments at the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), for simplicity reasons (Fleming, 2003; Karpoff, 1987; Lesmond, 2005; Rouetbi & 
Mamoghli, 2014). Supporting the finding of the academics implies that it is important for policy 
makers to employ a broad set of indicators when gauging stock market liquidity conditions and 
designing policies. Since the Malaysian economy relies on its banking system to provide and, thus, to 
create liquidity to stimulate economic growth, if the liquidity creator role of the banks is weakened 
due to the implementation of improper policies, there will be catastrophic real effects on the 
economy, such as investment and production output contraction, which may consequently impede 
achievement of the state of a developed economy by the year 2020, as envisaged by “Vision 2020”3. 
Hence, the findings of this study bear significant policy implications for the bank-based financial 
system in Malaysia to support a robust monetary system and liquidity condition and economic 
development. 
 
1.4 Thesis outline  
The remainder of this thesis is structured in the following way. Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of 
the financial system in Malaysia, including the structure and development of the banking sector and 
stock market. Chapter 3 reviews literature on bank liquidity creation theories, the relationship 
between bank competition and bank liquidity creation and the relationship between stock market 
liquidity and bank liquidity creation. The chapter also reviews how banks of different sizes can 
possibly have different relationships between bank competition and bank liquidity creation. Chapter 
4 explains the data and research method used in the study, and Chapter 5 presents and discusses the 
empirical findings of the study. Chapter 6 concludes the study with the main research findings and 
policy implications as well as the limitations of the study and potential future study areas.  
                                                          
3“Vision 2020” refers to Malaysia’s vision to reach the state of a developed economy by the year 2020. The 
vision was launched by the former Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad in 1991 
(Economic Planning Unit, 2013). 
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Chapter 2 
Overview of the Financial System in Malaysia 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Since Malaysia’s independence in 1957, the domestic financial system has been playing an important 
role in the economic transformation from a predominantly agrarian economy to an upper middle-
income economy today (BNM, 2011a; Randhawa, 2011). The Malaysian financial system mainly 
encompasses the financial sector and capital market. The financial sector is large and well diversified 
with commercial and Islamic banking institutions, investment banks, development financial 
institutions (DFIs) and insurance and Takaful (insurance based on Sharia or Islamic religious law) 
companies (IMF, 2014; World Bank, 2013). These financial institutions are supervised by the Central 
Bank of Malaysia (BNM thereafter) which sits at the apex of the financial system to ensure financial 
and monetary stability is conducive to the sustainable growth of the Malaysian economy (World 
Bank, 2013). The financial sector also includes pension and provident funds, fund management 
companies and the Labuan International Business and Financial Centre (IBFC)4. Owing to the 
operations of investment banks that involve trading and brokerage services on capital market 
products, investment banks are co-regulated by the Securities Commission Malaysia (SCM) that also 
supervises fund management companies, broker-dealers and the domestic stock, bond, derivatives 
and other securities market (IMF, 2014; World Bank, 2013).  
 
In the 1990s, Malaysia experienced a rapid economic expansion where the country’s real gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rate peaked at 10 percent in the year 1996. However, the Malaysian 
financial system was not robust and resilient to the stress built up during the period of rapid growth 
as a result of easy liquidity access and increasing asset prices (Randhawa, 2011). The capital market 
was relatively narrow, illiquid and unsophisticated, thus, the financing of the domestic industrial 
projects was largely reliant on the banking sector. However, the banking sector was fragmented and 
fragile, with excess banking institutions in operation (Randhawa, 2011). There were no economies of 
scale in the banking sector as resources were wasted due to bank surplus and duplication of 
branches in the same locality. As a result of the uncontrolled credit expansion, most notably in a 
speculative and highly leveraged property sector, coupled with neglect of prudential lending norms 
and regulatory oversight, the financial system was badly hit in the wake of the collapse of the Thai 
                                                          
4 Labuan IBFC, which is supervised independently by the Labuan Services Authority, specialises in offshore 
banking, insurance, trust, fund management and other activities carried out in foreign currencies 
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baht on 2 July 1997. Between the years 1997 and 1999, about 18 domestic banks were recapitalised 
and/or injected with liquidity by BNM or absorbed by another bank (Malaysian Loan, 2011). The 
Malaysian stock market also experienced a depression, as was evident by a 53 percent drop in 
market capitalisation from MYR 807 billion at the end-year 1996 to MYR 376 billion at the end-year 
1997 and a 52 percent fall in the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index from 1,238 points to 594 points 
over the same period (http://www.bnm.gov.my/). 
 
Soon after the country made a swift recovery from the crisis, BNM and SCM jointly initiated 
progressive, phased financial sector and capital market reforms with the ultimate objective of 
developing a resilient, competitive and dynamic financial system with internationally compliant best 
practices (BNM, 2001). The impetus towards the financial reforms mainly came both internally and 
externally from the pressing need to address structural and regulatory weaknesses in the domestic 
financial system, the growing and diversifying financial needs of the local economy, the global trend 
towards financial globalisation and deregulation, the rapid technological advances and the 
implementation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) accord on financial services in the end-
1990s (BNM, 2001; Randhawa, 2011). The financial reforms in Malaysia were guided by the Financial 
Sector Masterplan (FSMP) and the parallel Capital Market Masterplan (CMP) 1 that covered the 
period from 2001 to 2010, which have now been succeeded by the Financial Sector Blueprint and 
CMP2 that cover the period 2011 to 2020. The reforms have, thus far, placed the domestic financial 
system on a stronger foundation with greater competitiveness and resilience, efficient financial 
infrastructure and robust regulatory and governance regimes.  
 
For the past six decades, the concentrated banking sector in Malaysia has played the dominant role 
in allocating resources for the economy. In other words, Malaysia has had a bank-based financial 
system. Over the years 2007 to 2015, the domestic banking sector extended over 46 percent of new 
external financing raised by the private sector each year, followed by 24 percent of capital raising in 
the market (http://www.bnm.gov.my/). Other forms of financing for the Malaysian economy are 
foreign direct investment, external loans and credit issued by domestic financial intermediaries. It is 
worth noting that, at the end-year 2015, the size of the Malaysian banking sector, as indicated by 
banks’ total assets, reached MYR 2,354 billion, which was about two times larger than the country’s 
GDP. The Malaysian equity market is also substantially large, given by its capitalization valued at 
MYR 1,695 billion in 2015. The domestic corporate bond market is small and is at least three times 
smaller than the stock market, however. The outstanding amount of domestic corporate bonds was 
about MYR 513 billion at the end-year 2015 (http://www.bnm.gov.my/).  
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Chapter 2 is divided into three sections. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the Malaysian banking 
system, while Section 2.3 reviews the stock market which is of interest to this study. Lastly, Section 
2.4 shows the key financial and monetary development in Malaysia over the past fifteen years, with 
the aid of graphical presentation of data.  
 
2.2 Overview of the Malaysian banking system 
BNM is a statutory body which began operations on 26 January 1959 under the Central Bank of 
Malaysia Act 1958 (now known as the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009) (BNM, 2014a). Currently, 
the main objectives of BNM focus on two pillars: monetary stability and financial stability, both 
aiming at establishing a conducive environment for the sustainable growth of the Malaysian 
economy. To establish the core foundations of these objectives, BNM supervises nearly all the 
financial institutions that have played a crucial role in the development of the domestic financial 
sector.  
 
Since the enactment of the Islamic Banking Act 1983 that has been repealed by the Islamic Financial 
Services Act 2013, Malaysia has practised a dual-banking system in which conventional banks and 
Islamic banks operate side-by-side, but under two different regulatory frameworks (BNM, 2015). 
Commercial and investment banks are regulated under the Financial Services Act 2013 (FSA, 
previously the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989)5. Whereas, licensed banking institutions 
that are interested in offering Islamic banking services have a choice of operating as standalone 
Islamic banks under the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 or participating in the Islamic Banking 
Scheme (IBS) under their existing infrastructures, branches and brand name (BNM, 2007). Islamic 
offerings must comply with Sharia principles of which a key feature is that interest charging that is 
commonly practised in commercial banking is strictly banned.  
 
The Malaysian banking system consists of 27 commercial banks, 16 Islamic banks and 11 investment 
banks as at the end-year 2015 (http://www.bnm.gov.my/). In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the 
banking system experienced considerable changes in its players, following reform initiatives 
implemented under the FSMP. One of the initiatives was a consolidation program that mandated all 
domestic commercial banks, merchant banks and finance companies to revolve around ten anchor 
banks in order to form ten financial conglomerates by the early 2000s (BNM, 2001). As shown in 
                                                          
5 Both FSA and the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 give BNM oversight powers over financial 
intermediaries, which allows BNM to react to new risks emerging for the financial system in time to preserve 
public confidence in the financial system and thus the financial system’s stability (BNM, 2015). 
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Table 2.1, the number of domestic commercial banks decreased significantly from 22 banks in 1998 
to 10 anchor banks in 2003, while the absorption exercise of finance companies into anchor banks 
was completed in 2005. Besides, liberalisation of the country’s banking rules for foreign banks, such 
as more issuance of licences and relaxation of branching restrictions, has successfully attracted 
greater foreign investment in the domestic market, as evidenced by an increase in the number of 
locally-incorporated foreign commercial banks from 13 in 1998 to 19 banks at present. Local 
incorporation is a regulatory requirement for the Malaysian operations of foreign financial 
institutions, which creates a legal separation between the domestic entity and its foreign parent 
company (BNM, 2009). Table 2.1 shows the rapid surge of fully-fledged Islamic banks from one bank 
in 1998 to 16 banks in 2015, which partly reflects the achievement of the FSMP initiatives in 
promoting the Islamic financial system as well as the competiveness of the domestic banking sector. 
 
The Malaysian banking system has been dominated by commercial banks which enjoy the largest 
market share in terms of bank assets, loans and deposits. As shown in Figure 2.1, commercial banks 
controlled about 75.5 percent of total assets in the banking system at the end of 2015, a 
substantially higher market share compared to the 22.4 percent of Islamic banks and the 2.2 percent 
of investment banks (http://www.bnm.gov.my/). By controlling about 72.6 percent of the total bank 
lending and 74.8 percent of the total deposits in the market, commercial banks are the primary 
liquidity creators in the country. Commercial banks face direct competition with Islamic banks which 
have about one quarter of market share in bank loans and deposits. Investment banks, on the other 
hand, have a minimal share in the bank loan and deposit markets owing to the different nature of 
their business activities (http://www.bnm.gov.my/). 
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Table 2.1 List of banking institutions in Malaysia from 1998 to 2015 
Number of 
institutions 
As at the end of  
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
2014 
2015 
2015 Commercial 
banks 35 33 32 25 24 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 23 25 27 27 
 
27 
 
27 
     Domestic 22 20 18 11 11 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 
     Foreign 13 13 14 14 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 14 17 19 19 19 19 
Merchant/ 
Investment 
banks* 
                 
12  
              
12  
              
12  
              
10  
              
10  
              
10  
              
10  
              
10  10 14 15 15 15 15 13 12 
 
 
11 
 
 
11 
Islamic banks 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 6 10 11 17 17 17 16 16 16 16 16 
Finance 
companies 31 23 20 12 11 11 6 4 
                 
-  
              
-  
              
-  
              
-  
              
-  
              
-  
              
-  
              
-  - 
 
- 
Total number 79 70 66 49 47 46 41 43 42 47 54 54 55 56 56 55 54 54 
* The term “investment bank” has been used since 2006. 
Source: BNM website (http://www.bnm.gov.my/) 
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Figure 2.1 Breakdown of bank market shares by bank types as at the end of 2015 
 
 
 
Source: BNM website (http://www.bnm.gov.my/) and author’s calculations 
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Investment banks
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Islamic banks
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0.5%
(b) Breakdown of total bank loans by types of banks
Total loans: 
MYR 1,424 billion
Commercial banks
74.8%
Islamic banks
23.9%
Investment banks
1.3%
(c) Breakdown of total bank deposits by types of banks
Total deposits: 
MYR 1,670 billion
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Figure 2.2 shows the breakdown of the total market share of commercial and Islamic banks by bank 
ownership at the end of year 2015. With reference to the three pie charts, domestic commercial and 
Islamic banks had almost an 80 percent share in the bank asset, loan and deposit markets, while 
locally-incorporated foreign banks controlled about a 20 percent share in these markets 
(http://www.bnm.gov.my/). These findings indicate that, despite domestic commercial and Islamic 
banks in Malaysia being outnumbered by locally incorporated foreign banks (18 domestic banks 
versus 25 foreign banks), the banking market is concentrated in a few large domestic banks. Most 
locally incorporated foreign banks are small relative to the few largest domestic banks, but there are 
some large ones, for example, United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Berhad, OCBC Bank (Malaysia) 
Berhad, HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad and Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad, each with well 
over MYR 50 billion in assets as of 2013 (Bankscope database). 
 
In Malaysia, large commercial banks generally establish extensive branch networks throughout the 
country’s thirteen states and three federal territories. To illustrate, Malayan Banking Berhad 
(Maybank), the largest commercial bank with over MYR 492 billion assets at the end of 2015, had 
393 branches or about 20 percent of the total 1,987 bank branches distributed nationwide, as 
compared to several small commercial banks operating only one branch office, usually based in the 
capital of Malaysia - Kuala Lumpur (The Association of Banks in Malaysia, 2016). On average, small 
banks operate only three branches, against 152 branches operated by large banks. The apparently 
unbalanced distribution of branch locations reveals the fact that the incumbent small banks in 
Malaysia generally target a market based on high value corporate clients, as opposed to the the 
mass and corporate customers served by the large, geographically diversified banks (BNM, 2001). In 
terms of the number of bank branches to the number of the population, the urban areas of Malaysia 
are highly concentrated with bank institutions, while certain rural areas remain underserved (BNM, 
2001). 
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Figure 2.2 Breakdown of bank market shares by bank ownership as at the end of 2015 
 
 
 
Source: BNM website (http://www.bnm.gov.my/) and author’s calculations 
Domestic banks
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Domestic banks
79.2%
Foreign 
banks
20.8%
(c) Breakdown of bank deposits by bank ownership
Total deposits: 
MYR 1,648 billion
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Although the Malaysian government does not have a direct ownership in domestic banks, it has 
been a major player in the banking system through seven principal government-linked investment 
companies (GLICs), such as the Employees Provident Fund (EPF), Retirement Fund Incorporated 
(KWAP), Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (Khazanah), Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), PNB 
Managed Unit Trusts, Armed Forces Fund Board (LTAT) and Boustead Holdings Berhad6 (IMF, 2014; 
World Bank, 2013). Table 2.2 shows that these GLICs have the largest share blocks in Maybank, CIMB 
Group, RHB Capital Berhad and Affin Holdings Berhad, between 46 and 65 percent of total 
shareholdings of the banks in the year 2013. The GLICs also held the shares of the remaining four 
domestic banking groups by up to 16 percent. Despite the government allegedly not interfering with 
the management of the domestic banks and despite all the banks being subject to the same 
regulation standards, products offered by government-linked banks may carry a perceived implicit 
guarantee that may lead to an imbalanced development of the financial system and economic 
sectors (IMF, 2014; World Bank, 2013). 
 
 
 
                                                          
6(i) The EPF is a government agency under the Ministry of Finance which manages the compulsory savings plan 
and provides retirement benefits for legally employed workers in Malaysia 
(http://www.kwsp.gov.my/portal/en/web/kwsp/home).  
(ii) Retirement Fund Incorporated refers to Kumpulan Wang Persaraan (Diperbadankan) (KWAP), an agency 
established on 1 March 2007 under the Ministry of Finance to manage pension funds on behalf of the federal 
government (http://www.kwap.gov.my/en).  
(iii) Khazanah is the investment holding arm of the government entrusted to hold and manage the commercial 
assets of the government and to undertake strategic investment (http://www.khazanah.com.my/Home).  
(iv) PNB was established on 17 March 1978 as a pivotal instrument of the Government's New Economic Policy 
to promote share ownership in the corporate sector among the Bumiputera (son of the soil), and to develop 
opportunities for deserving Bumiputera professionals to participate in the creation and management of wealth 
(http://www.pnb.com.my/). 
(v) PNB managed unit trusts comprise various unit trusts such as Bumiputera fund and Vision 2020 fund 
(http://www.pnb.com.my/).  
(vi)The Malaysian Armed Forces Fund Board refers to Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT), a 
government statutory body incorporated in 1973 to provide retirement benefits and other benefits to 
members of other ranks in the armed forces and a savings scheme for officers of the armed forces and 
members of volunteer forces (http://www.ltat.org.my/webltat/index.html).  
(vii) Boustead Holdings Berhad is a government-linked investment holding company that has an active interest 
in six primary sectors of the Malaysian economy, namely plantation, property, pharmaceuticals, heavy 
industries, trading and industrial, and finance and investment. Its largest shareholder is LTAT 
(http://www.boustead.com.my/). 
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Table 2.2 Shareholding by Government-Linked Institutions and Funds (GLICs) 
Source: Banking groups’ annual reports for the financial year 2013 
 
To ensure monetary and financial stability in the country, BNM has consistently reviewed the 
effectiveness of the existing regulations on banking institutions and implemented regulatory reforms 
in accordance with domestic financial development and international standards. Important 
regulatory frameworks introduced or amended by BNM after the country recovered from the Asian 
crisis in the late 1990s include: 
 
(i) The New Liquidity Framework which took effect from 2 January 2001 to 1 June 2015 (BNM, 
2016a). The New Liquidity Framework was developed in 1998 to replace the previous liquid asset 
ratio requirement and offer a more effective way for banking institutions to measure and manage 
their liquidity position in meeting all maturing obligations7 (BNM, 1998a). For commercial banks, the 
framework requires the banks to classify all balance sheet items and off-balance sheet items into six 
maturity buckets of “less than a week”, “between a week to a month”, etc., until the last bucket of 
“greater than a year”. To ensure banks hold sufficient liquidity to survive an acute stress scenario 
lasting a month, the framework also required commercial banks to maintain a minimum surplus 
liquidity of three percent of the net maturity mismatch for the “one week” bucket and five percent 
of the net maturity mismatch for the “one week to one month” bucket (BNM, 1998a). Effective from 
1 June 2015, the New Liquidity Framework has been superseded by the Basel Accord III liquidity 
coverage ratio to strengthen the existing liquidity framework for the Malaysian banking sector 
(BNM, 2012).   
 
                                                          
7 The liquid asset ratio required commercial banks to hold a minimum of 17 percent of their eligible liabilities 
(BNM, 1998b). 
Banking Groups Principal GLCs (% of equity held) Total % of 
equity held 
Affin Holdings Berhad LTAT (35.2); Boustead (20.7); EPF (7.9) 63.8 
Alliance Financial Group EPF (14.4); KWAP (0.58) 15.0 
AmBank Group EPF (14.1); KWAP (0.77) 14.9 
CIMB Group EPF (16.9); Khazanah (28.31); KWAP (3.36); LTAT 
(0.33) 
48.9 
Hong Leong Group EPF (1.11); EPF (14.9); KWAP (0.58) 16.6 
Maybank EPF (14.11); PNB Managed Unit Trust (42.34); PNB 
(5.68); KWAP (1.99); LTAT (0.61) 
64.73 
Public Bank Berhad EPF (14.8); KWAP (0.62) 15.41 
RHB Capital Berhad EPF (41.3); KWAP (3.78); LTAT (0.58) 45.7 
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(ii) The New Interest Rate Framework which was introduced on 26 April 2004 (BNM, 2005). The most 
significant change brought by the framework to the domestic monetary operations was the 
introduction of a new policy rate of BNM, or known as the Overnight Policy Rate (OPR). OPR is a key 
monetary policy instrument that allows BNM to quickly transmit its monetary policy stance to other 
market rates and ultimately to macroeconomic variables. This implies that, with OPR, BNM can 
effectively manage liquidity creation for private sector activity while maintaining monetary stability 
and inflationary pressure in the economy. To reflect the unchanged stance of BNM’s monetary 
policy, OPR was set at the prevailing overnight interbank rate of 2.70% at its introduction (BNM, 
2005). The New Interest Rate Framework also involved the removal of the ceiling on the base 
lending rates (BLR) of banking institutions, as part of the pricing deregulation initiatives under the 
FSMP8. The removal of the ceiling on BLR enhances the efficiency of banking institutions in the 
pricing and allocation of resources based on their respective cost structures and business strategies 
(BNM, 2005).  
 
(iii) Statutory Reserve Requirement (SRR) is another monetary policy instrument of BNM that 
influences liquidity and credit creation by the banking system (BNM, 2011b). Depending on the 
liquidity condition in the banking system, the SRR rate is adjusted from time to time. The current SRR 
rate is 3.5 percent effective from 1 February 2016 (BNM, 2016b). Literally, all banking institutions are 
required to maintain balances equivalent to the SRR ratio times the average daily amount of eligible 
liabilities over a fortnight in their Statutory Reserve Accounts (SRA) with BNM9. The SRA balance of 
banks is, nevertheless, allowed to fluctuate daily within a band, currently at 20% of the prevailing 
SRR rate, giving the banks flexibility to manage their liquidity (BNM, 2016b). 
 
(iv) The Deposit Insurance System (DIS) was brought into effect in Malaysia in September 2005 and 
managed by an independent statutory body called the Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(MDIC) under the Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation Act 2005 (BNM, 2006). The establishment 
of DIS aims to strengthen the consumer protection framework in Malaysia and complement the 
roles of BNM in preserving public confidence in the financial system by providing explicit insurance 
against the loss of insured deposits placed with member banks should a member bank fail (BNM, 
2006; PIDM, 2016). Currently, all commercial and Islamic banks, including locally incorporated 
foreign banks, are member institutions of MDIC (PIDM, 2016). Under DIS, all types of depositors, 
                                                          
8 Base Lending Rate (BLR) refers to the lending rates that commercial banks and Islamic banks quote to their 
best customers (BNM, 2016a). 
9 Eligible liabilities include almost all liabilities in a bank and exclude eligible assets such as deposits placed with 
domestic banking institutions. See Appendix 4 of BNM (2011b) for a comprehensive measurement of eligible 
liabilities. 
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regardless of whether they are businesses or individuals, are protected up to MYR 250,000 per 
depositor per member bank, inclusive of both principal amount of deposits and interest. DIS also 
provides separate coverage for both conventional and Islamic deposits.  With the MYR 250,000 limit, 
99% of depositors are protected in full (PIDM, 2016).  
 
Besides, the regulatory framework for the Malaysian banking sector is strongly incorporated with 
the elements of the global regulatory framework developed by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (Basel Committee). In December 2010, the Basel Committee introduced a package of 
bank-level reform measures for capital and liquidity (collectively referred to as Basel III) with the 
ultimate goal of strengthening the regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking 
sector (Bank for International Settlements, n.d.). BNM is strongly supportive of the implementation 
of Basel III standards in Malaysia and has managed the transition of the capital and liquidity 
standards for Malaysian banking institutions towards Basel III following the Basel Committee’s 
recommended phase-in timeline, as outlined in Table 2.3 (BNM, 2012). The minimum capital and 
conservation buffer requirements for Malaysian banking institutions have been gradually raised in 
line with the phase-in arrangements of Basel III. Likewise, with the revised definition of high quality 
regulatory capital, all capital instruments that are no longer compliant with Basel III are subject to a 
gradual phasing-out by 2023. Besides, prior to the formal implementation of Basel III’s standards for 
leverage ratio, liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio in Malaysia, BNM has 
implemented an “observation period” commencing from June 2012. During the “observation 
period”, banking institutions are required to report their capital, leverage and liquidity positions 
calculated according to Basel III rules to BNM, which then comprehensively assesses the impact of 
these Basel III’s standards and fine-tunes the transitional arrangements of these standards in the 
banking sector (BNM, 2012). Based on the current profiles of banking institutions, all banking 
institutions are expected to comfortably meet the Basel III’s capital and liquidity requirements by the 
expected implementation dates10 (BNM, 2012). 
 
                                                          
10 Profiles of banking institutions may refer to risk position and management as well as financial performance 
and position of banking institutions (BNM, 2012).  
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Table 2.3 Basel III phase-in arrangements in Malaysiaa 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Leverage Ratio Observation period reporting Minimum 3% 
Minimum common equity capital ratio 3.50% 4% 4.50% 4.50% 4.50% 4.50% 4.50% 
Capital conservation buffer 
   
0.625% 1.25% 1.875% 2.50% 
Minimum common equity plus conservation buffer 3.50% 4% 4.50% 5.125% 5.75% 6.375% 7% 
         Minimum tier 1 capital 4.50% 5.50% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Minimum tier 1 capital plus conservation buffer 4.50% 5.50% 6% 6.63% 7.25% 7.875% 8.50% 
         Minimum total capital 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 
Minimum total capital plus conservation buffer 8% 8% 8% 8.63% 9.25% 9.875% 10.50% 
         Capital instruments that no longer qualify as 
non-core tier 1 or tier 2 capital 
 
Phased out over a 10 year horizon beginning 2013 
         
Liquidity coverage ratio  Observation period reporting 
60%  
from June 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Net stable funding ratio Observation period reporting Minimum 100% 
Note: 
a All dates are as of 1 January unless otherwise indicated. Shaded areas indicate transition periods. 
Source: Adapted from BNM (2012) and BNM website (http://www.bnm.gov.my/) 
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2.3 Overview of the Malaysian stock market 
Malaysia has a single stock exchange that is currently regulated and operated by Bursa Malaysia 
(formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE)). Bursa Malaysia is an exchange holding 
company established in 1973 when the Stock Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore was split into two 
exchanges, with the other exchange being the Stock Exchange of Singapore (Bursa Malaysia, 2015a; 
Tan, 2000). Today, Bursa Malaysia operates a fully-integrated exchange, offering a diverse range of 
investment products covering equities, derivatives, bonds, Islamic products and offshore financial 
exchange (Bursa Malaysia, 2016). Its core operations such as exchange operations, clearing, 
settlement and depository operations and information services, are run by various subsidiary 
companies. The three main market institutions in the stock market are Bursa Malaysia Securities 
Berhad, Bursa Malaysia Securities Clearing Sdn. Berhad and Bursa Malaysia Depository Sdn. Berhad. 
Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad regulates and operates the listing and trading activities of shares; 
Bursa Malaysia Securities Clearing Sdn. Berhad (formerly Securities Clearing Automated Network 
Services Sdn. Bhd. - SCANS) is the central counterparty that clears and settles share trades, while 
Bursa Malaysia Depository Sdn. Berhad (formerly the Malaysian Central Depository Sdn. Bhd. - MCD) 
operates and maintains the Central Depository System (CDS) by approving and facilitating the 
electronic transfer of securities from one CDS account to another (Bursa Malaysia, 2016). 
 
The Malaysian stock exchange is order-driven, which means that the prices at which orders are 
matched are determined by market forces of supply and demand through a process of bids and 
offers by investors (Bursa Malaysia, 2015b). Six types of orders are allowed under the current 
electronic trading platform, which are limit order, market order, market to limit order, fill and kill 
order, market fill order and kill and minimum quantity order (Bursa Malaysia, 2015b).  The execution 
of investors’ orders on the platform is facilitated by 30 stockbroking firms (or Participating 
Organisations) who act on the behalf of client investors (Bursa Malaysia, 2015a). As part of the Bursa 
Malaysia technology refresh programme, the trading platform of the stock market has been 
consistently upgraded to keep the exchange on a par with the performance and capabilities of the 
leading stock exchanges (Bursa Malaysia, 2013). The latest trading engine in the stock market, Bursa 
Trade Securities (BTS2), is powered by NASDAQ OMX’s X-stream and was launched on 2 December 
2013. The launch of BTS2 provides the necessary headroom for the market to attract a greater 
variety of market participants and trade volume, while enhancing trading experience in terms of 
innovative products and services, efficient trading and transparency (Bursa Malaysia, 2013; NASDAQ, 
2013). Previous trading engines used in the stock market are: (i) BTS developed by NYSE Euronext 
and launched in the market on 1 December 2008, and (ii) SCORE (System on Computerised Order 
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Routing and Execution) which was semi-automated when first launched in 1989 and was upgraded 
to a fully automated system in 1992 (Tan, 2000).  
 
To facilitate efficient delivery and settlement of trades and to minimise investors’ risk exposure, 
Bursa Malaysia has established a T+3 Rolling Settlement System for the stock market (Bursa 
Malaysia, 2015b). The term T+3 indicates that the delivery and settlement for transactions is 3 
trading days after the transaction date (T). Two electronic settlement models offered are the Bursa 
Depository Transfer system and the Institutional Settlement Service (ISS) system (LuxCSD, 2015). 
Under the Bursa Depository Transfer system, settlement of stock transfer is made between brokers 
and custodians via the CSD, and payment of transactions is made between brokers and custodians 
via interbank payment or cheque. ISS is an optional settlement system offered by Bursa Malaysia 
Securities Clearing Sdn. Berhad (Bursa Clearing) to facilitate settlement of trades of institutional 
investors through non-trading clearing participants (NTCP) who clear and settle directly with Bursa 
Clearing on a delivery-versus-payment basis. To initiate ISS settlement, stock brokers have to request 
ISS settlement via the ISS system from T+1 onwards. On T+3, delivery of securities and payment for 
transactions are made directly between Bursa Clearing and the buying and selling NTCP (Bursa 
Malaysia, 2015b; LuxCSD, 2015).   
 
To extend the global relevance, recognition and reach of the stock market, on 26 June 2006, Bursa 
Malaysia Limited joined forces with FTSE Group, a leading global index provider (Bursa Malaysia, 
2006). The joint venture has continuously seen the conversion of the existing stock indices onto the 
FTSE global index standards and the launch of new FTSE Bursa Malaysia indices into the index series, 
in efforts to provide investors with better tools to benchmark the performance of the major capital 
and industry segments of the Malaysian stock market and regional markets and to drive index-based 
product innovation such as ETFs, structured products and index tracking funds (Bursa Malaysia, 
2015c). Presently, FTSE Bursa Malaysia Index Series consist of a broad range of all cap, large cap, mid 
cap, small cap, fledgling, Sharia-compliant and themed series, covering all eligible companies listed 
on the Bursa Malaysia Main and ACE Markets provided that they meet the FTSE international 
standards of free float, liquidity and investability11 (Bursa Malaysia, 2015c; FTSE, 2015). The FTSE 
Bursa Malaysia KLCI, which was previously known as KLCI before adoption of the FTSE global index 
standard on 6 July 2009, is the main index for the Malaysian stock market that reflects the overall 
market performance and investors’ expectations of macro- and micro-economic outlooks (Bursa 
                                                          
11 Refer to Bursa Malaysia (2015c) for detailed information about individual FTSE Bursa Malaysia indexes. 
24 
 
Malaysia, 2015c). The FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI comprises the 30 largest  companies listed on the 
Main Market by market capitalisation (Bursa Malaysia, 2015c). 
 
In addition, the minimum tick size structure of Bursa Malaysia is in line with the current practice of 
global developed markets (Bursa Malaysia, 2009). The tick size was reduced on 3 August 2009 to 
make future stock price movements more predictable, reduce the transaction costs of investors and 
enhance market depth, breadth and resiliency, thereby increasing the stock market liquidity (Bursa 
Malaysia, 2015b). Except for equity-based ETFs, all listed securities traded on Bursa Malaysia are 
subject to the same tick size structure. Table 2.4 compares the previous and current minimum tick 
size structure of Bursa Malaysia. For illustration, a MYR 5.60 stock would be quoted in multiples of 
five cents under the old tick size regime, which means that the next tick up would be MYR 5.65 and 
the next tick down would be MYR 5.55. In contrast, the current tick size regime reduces the 
minimum price movement of the stock by observing a MYR 5.60 stock rising to the next tick which is 
MYR 5.61 or falling to the next tick which is MYR 5.59.  
 
Table 2.4 Tick sizes for securities traded and quoted on Bursa Malaysia 
Securities Price Previous Tick Size (cents) Current Tick Size (cents) 
Below MYR1.00 0.5 0.5 
MYR1.00 to MYR2.99 1 
1 MYR3.00 to MYR4.99 2 
MYR5.00 to MYR9.99 5 
MYR10.00 to MYR24.99 10 
2 
MYR25.00 to MYR99.98 25 
MYR100.00 and above 50 10 
Source: Bursa Malaysia (2015b)  
 
Besides the cost of shares bought or sold, investors bear the transaction costs of trading on Bursa 
Malaysia which encompass commissions charged by brokers, stamp duty and clearing fees (Bursa 
Malaysia, 2015b). In Malaysia, capital gain tax is not imposed on investors from the sale of financial 
securities, and non-Malaysian residents are not subject to withholding tax on dividends paid on 
domestic equities (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited, 2015). 
 
Today, the Malaysian stock market is one of the largest bourses in ASEAN (Bursa Malaysia, 2015a). 
As at the end-year 2015, the stock market hosted 903 listed companies across 18 sectors that 
covered 60 economic activities, of which 794 companies were listed on the Main Market and 109 
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companies on the ACE Market12 (Bursa Malaysia, 2015d). The Main Market provides an ideal 
platform for established companies to raise funds by issuing claims on ownership in the company, 
while the ACE Market is an alternative sponsor-driven market designed for smaller and younger 
companies with growth potential from all business sectors13 (Bursa Malaysia, 2015e). Besides share 
issuances, companies can also issue equity-based securities on the market, such as structured 
warrants, exchange traded funds (ETFs), Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and stapled securities, 
in order to improve the diversification exposure, value and attractiveness of the securities to 
investors (Bursa Malaysia, 2015a).  
 
The stock market is predominantly played by domestic investors. As at end-year 2015, the total stock 
market capitalisation was valued at MYR 1.7 trillion of which domestic investors claimed about 78 
percent (Bursa Malaysia, 2015a). The major investors in the market are domestic institutional 
investors (mutual funds, unit trusts, provident and pension funds and insurance companies) who 
traded about 50 percent of total share trading value of MYR 512 billion in 2015. Whereas, domestic 
retail investors and foreign institutions constituted about 23 percent and 27 percent, respectively, of 
the total share trading value. Besides, the growth in the amount of investor participation of in the 
market has been robust, as evidenced by 153,140 CDS accounts opened in 201514 (Bursa Malaysia, 
2015a). 
 
2.4 Financial and monetary development 
This section briefly reviews the financial and monetary conditions of Malaysia since the year 2001 
and compares the developments across the national border against its ASEAN peers. 
 
2.4.1 Domestic financial and monetary development 
Domestic interest rates in the Malaysian banking system have demonstrated considerable changes 
in the past 15-year span, as shown in Figure 2.3. BNM’s OPR demonstrated an upwards movement 
from 2.76 percent in 2001 to 3.50 percent in 2007 after which the OPR was reduced sharply to two 
percent during the 2008 global financial crisis. The OPR returned to pre-crisis levels and reached 3.25 
percent at the end-year 2015. The rapid rise in OPR before the crisis reflects strong domestic 
                                                          
12 From 3 August 2009, the Main and Second Boards of Bursa Malaysia were unified into the Main Market, 
while the ACE market which stands for “Access, Certainty and Efficiency” was renamed after the MESDAQ 
(Malaysian Exchange of Securities Dealing and Automated Quotation) market (Bursa Malaysia, 2015d). 
13 Refer to Bursa Malaysia (2015e) for qualitative and quantitative listing criteria on the Main Market and ACE 
Market.  
14 Investors who wish to trade in securities listed on Bursa Malaysia market must open CDS accounts with 
Authorised Depository Agents that are stockbroking companies (Bursa Malaysia, 2015b). 
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economic growth and price development. Substantial cuts in OPR during the financial crisis years 
2008 and 2009 were the thrust of the BNM’s monetary policy to boost domestic demand during the 
crisis. OPR was soon raised after the financial crisis to normalise monetary conditions to prevent the 
risk of imbalanced financial developments that could undermine the economic recovery. Figure 2.3 
also shows that average one-month fixed deposit rates set by commercial banks ranged from 2.06 
percent to 3.35 percent from the years 2001 to 2015 and followed the movement in OPR, although 
its changes were not as substantial as OPR’s. Saving depositors with commercial banks also 
benefited from positive savings rates throughout the period. Despite the rebound of OPR after the 
financial crisis, the average lending rate on outstanding loans declined slightly and has remained 
broadly stable in recent years, implying improving credit worthiness of borrowers. 
 
Besides the accommodative interest environment of the banking system, the domestic stock market 
performed considerably well from the year 2001 to the year 2015, as shown in Figure 2.4. The FTSE 
Bursa Malaysia KLCI grew at an annual average rate of 8.6 percent from 696 points to 1,693 points 
over the past 15 years. The underperformance of the stock market in the year 2008, and in the 
recent two years, was mainly and inevitably a result of global economic and financial uncertainties, 
such as the 2008 global financial crisis and the plunge in global oil prices in 2015 – evidence that the 
Malaysian economy and its financial system are internationally connected. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Interest rates in the Malaysian banking system 
 
Source: BNM website (http://www.bnm.gov.my/) 
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Figure 2.4 Performance of FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI 
 
Source: BNM website (http://www.bnm.gov.my/) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Nominal broad money and credit growth 
 
Source: BNM website (http://www.bnm.gov.my/)
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M3 is a useful empirical indicator of the broad monetary aggregate in the non-bank sector as it has a 
greater capability to indicate monetary and financial market liquidity as compared to narrower 
monetary aggregate indicators (ECB, 2012)15. In Malaysia, the broad money (M3) is mainly driven by 
claims on the private sector in the form of bank loans. Figure 2.5 shows the broad money and credit 
growth in Malaysia from the year 2001 to the year 2015. It appears that the overall monetary 
condition was favourable in supporting private sector activities. Nominal broad money (M3) grew 
rapidly from MYR 472 billion in 2001 to MYR 1,595 billion in 2015 at an annual average rate of 8.5 
percent. Aggregate credit growth had tended to move closely in line with M3 growth, with a 
noticeably upward trend, possibly reflecting strong increases in the financial intermediation process. 
Aggregate credit grew at an average of 8.1 percent per annum over the same time span. 
 
Looking closely at the conventional offerings by commercial banks, Figure 2.6 shows that 
outstanding loans extended by commercial banks grew at about 8.1 percent annually from MYR 325 
billion to MYR 1,048 billion over the past 15 years. The lending to individuals and households has 
been increasing and has outstripped business enterprises and other borrowers since the year 2005 
and constituted about 56 percent of the total outstanding loans at the end-year 2015. Besides, 
deposits placed by individuals occupied almost half of the total deposits placed with commercial 
banks, as displayed in Figure 2.7. Deposits of individuals are mostly in the forms of savings and fixed 
deposit contracts. Business enterprises contributed second most to the total deposits placed with 
commercial banks, usually in the form of demand deposits. Total bank deposits rose at an average 
rate of 8.7 percent annually from MYR 350 billion to MYR 1,228 billion over the period from 2001 to 
2015. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 both indicate sharp rises in loans and deposits at commercial banks in the 
year 2004, which were mainly attributed to a high real GDP growth rate of seven percent, a 
facilitative monetary environment and rising consumer and business confidence. 
 
                                                          
15 In Malaysia, monetary aggregates are categorised into M1 that comprises currency in circulation and 
demand deposits, M2 comprises M1 and narrow quasi-money (interest-bearing deposits placed by the non-
bank sector with commercial banks and Islamic banks), and M3 comprises M2 and deposits placed by the non-
bank sector with investment banks (BNM, 2016a). 
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Figure 2.6 Outstanding loans extended by commercial banks by borrowers 
 
Source: BNM website (http://www.bnm.gov.my/) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Contribution to deposits at commercial banks by holders 
 
Source: BNM website (http://www.bnm.gov.my/) 
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2.4.2 Cross-country comparisons of financial system development 
This section specifically compares the depth of broad money, bank lending, bank deposits and stock 
market capitalisation and turnover of Malaysia with its ASEAN peer average, the U.S. and the world 
averages. Figure 2.8 indicates that the liquidity condition in Malaysia was most ample in comparison 
with its ASEAN peer average, the U.S. and the world averages. The monetary liquidity available for 
the Malaysian private sector was consistently greater than the domestic economic output by 1.2 to 
1.4 times throughout the period from 2001 to 2014. In contrast, the liquidity condition of the 
average ASEAN countries was relatively scarce, despite the apparent growth in recent years. The 
broad money of the average ASEAN countries was about 70 percent of their GDP on average from 
2001 to 2014.  
 
Figure 2.8 Comparisons of broad money across countries 
 
Note: Due to data availability, ASEAN peers comprise Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
Source: The World Bank database 
 
Figure 2.9 shows the financial depth, as approximated by private credit extended by banks as a 
percentage of GDP, across countries. It is apparent that the banking sector of Malaysia is relatively 
deeper compared to the world average and the ASEAN countries in general, revealing the fact that 
the reliance on bank credit by the private sector in Malaysia for generating economic outputs is 
more substantial than other nations, in general. The average private credit extended by the banks of 
Malaysia was about 1.12 times greater than the domestic GDP, and its pattern was closely similar to 
the pattern of broad money. The banking sector of the U.S. was not as deep as Malaysia’s, partly 
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because of the U.S.’s market-oriented financial system. Furthermore, the exceedingly above 
international average of Malaysia’s bank deposits to GDP ratio, as demonstrated in Figure 2.10, 
again, confirms the importance of the financial intermediation role of domestic banks in Malaysia. 
 
Figure 2.11 and Figure 2.12 reveal an interesting fact about the stock market development in 
Malaysia, that is, Malaysia has had the largest but most inactive stock market among the countries in 
comparison. Such a phenomenon is rare because capital market size should be positively correlated 
with market turnover, as typically presented by the U.S.’s stock market. Theoretically, a large capital 
market is more attractive to investors as the market enhances the ability of investors to mobilise 
capital and diversify risk (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 1996a). Further, both Figure 2.11 and 2.12 
indicate that stock markets worldwide were heavily affected by the 2008 global financial crisis, 
reflecting financial contagion in today’s globalised and integrated financial system. At the end of 
2008, the world average stock market capitalisation collapsed by about 50 percent from the 
previous year, while the trading turnover of stock markets worldwide was recorded as 
unprecedentedly high, as a wave of panic selling of devaluating shares swept the globe (Wearden & 
Kollewe, 2008).  
 
 
Figure 2.9 Comparisons of domestic credit to the private sector by banks across countries 
 
Note: Due to data availability, ASEAN peers comprise Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
Source: The World Bank database 
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Figure 2.10 Comparisons of bank deposits across countries 
 
Note: Due to data availability, ASEAN peers comprise Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
Source: The World Bank database 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11 Comparisons of stock market capitalization across countries 
 
Note: Due to data availability, ASEAN peers comprise Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
Source: The World Bank database 
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Figure 2.12 Comparisons of stock market turnover ratio across countries 
 
Note: Due to data availability, ASEAN peers comprise Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
Source: The World Bank database 
 
 
 
2.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter provides an overview of the Malaysian banking system and stock market and highlights 
the financial system development in Malaysia in relation to its ASEAN peers, the world average and 
the U.S. The financial system in Malaysia has been highly bank-oriented with the domestic banking 
sector provides about half of new private financing each year. Since the Malaysian economy 
recovered from the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the financial system has undergone a series of 
progressive, phased financial sector and capital market reforms with the ultimate objective of 
developing a resilient, competitive and dynamic financial system with internationally compliant best 
practices. Unlike other countries, the development of a competitive banking sector in Malaysia is not 
only influenced by economic, technological and regulatory factors, but also by the uprising of Islamic 
banks which challenge the dominance of commercial banks in the liquidity creation market. Further, 
the Malaysian stock market is internationally integrated and large but has been illiquid for a long 
time, which sets out a unique context to study the influence of stock market liquidity on bank 
liquidity creation in the Malaysian bank-based financial system. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a review of bank liquidity creation theories and prior studies relevant to the three 
main research objectives of this study. Section 3.2, first, explains bank liquidity creation from a standard 
perspective, and briefly reviews some famous bank liquidity creation theories that have evolved with 
the development of financial systems. Section 3.3 provides a literature review of the impact of bank 
competition on bank liquidity creation, while Section 3.4 synthesises evidence of how such impact can 
be altered by banks of different size classes. This chapter ends with a review of studies related to the 
influence of stock market liquidity on bank liquidity creation. 
 
3.2 Theories of bank liquidity creation 
The role of commercial banks as liquidity creators has long been recognised by economists and can date 
back at least to Smith (1776). The standard view of bank liquidity creation is that banks provide liquidity 
in the form of credit for agents that need additional liquidity in financing illiquid investment projects 
and, at the same time, allow deposit withdrawals at par value by agents who wish to invest their excess 
liquidity, but face random future consumption shocks (Berger & Bouwman, 2009; Deep & Schaefer, 
2004; Longworth, 2007; Niehans & Hewson, 1976). In other words, bank liquidity creation enhances the 
access of the non-bank sectors to money – the economy’s medium of exchange, as the bank holds 
illiquid non-monetary assets on behalf of the non-bank sectors, while allowing contemporaneous 
deposit withdrawals and access to credit for illiquid production projects. Hence, a liquidity mismatch 
between the left and right hand sides of bank balance sheet items is essential for liquidity creation to 
take place. For simplicity reason, maturity of bank assets and liabilities has been used to represent 
liquidity as contractual maturity is binding for most loans and deposits in the absence of any unexpected 
events. However, it should also be emphasized that, in practice, the concept of liquidity is much more 
complex than the concept of maturity can rationalise, because some bank balance sheet items are 
marketable and can be readily liquidated before they mature. For example, residential mortgages can be 
securitised and sold on the secondary mortgage market. In addition, during financial distress periods, 
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maturity does not accurately represent the liquidity stress of banks and the banking system as banks are 
prone to catastrophic fire sale of bank assets and bank runs. 
 
Money creation is often treated as liquidity creation because the economy is more liquid when banks 
create more money through the issuance of loans which are assumedly illiquid. Without the assumption 
of illiquid bank loans, Niehans and Hewson (1976) show that money creation can be a misleading 
indicator of liquidity creation because money supply does not account for the liquidity of banks’ assets16. 
In the theory of money supply, money aggregate, such as M1, M2 and M3, is calculated by summing 
currency in circulation and deposits of non-bank sectors (either including or excluding time deposits) 
(Niehans & Hewson, 1976; Mankiw, 2014). When a bank issues a new loan, it simultaneously creates a 
matching secondary deposit in the borrower’s bank account from which the borrower transfers to his or 
her creditor’s bank (Mankiw, 2014; McLeay et al., 2014). The bank gains the new deposits it has created 
if the creditor’s account is with the bank, but loses the new deposits to its competing banks if the 
creditor’s account is with a different bank. Repeatedly, the second bank creates money when it lends 
out17. As discussed previously, bank creates liquidity through a liquidity mismatch between bank assets 
and liabilities. If loans issued by a bank have the exactly matched liquidity as bank deposits, then the 
bank does not create any liquidity for the economy, despite the fact that money is created based on the 
money supply calculation. Likewise, if bank loans are more liquid than bank deposits, then bank liquidity 
creation is destroyed (Niehans & Hewson, 1976). Thus, care should be taken when treating money 
creation as equivalent to liquidity creation by banks because money creation disregards the liquidity of 
banks’ asset claims.  
 
The role of banks as a liquidity creator in the economy exists predominantly to cater for the needs of 
two agent-types, which are agents who are uncertain about their future cash flows needs for 
consumption and agents who have production opportunities with returns increasing on the investment 
horizon (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Diamond & Rajan, 2001; Dutta & Kapur, 1993; Fulghieri & Rovelli, 
1998). It has been agreed that Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) were the first to 
systematically examine the liquidity creator role of banking intermediaries (Berger & Bouwman, 2009; 
Deep & Schaefer, 2004; Fulghieri & Rovelli, 1998; Hackethal et al., 2010). In these models, the emphasis 
                                                          
16 Niehans and Hewson (1976) treat money creation as gross liquidity creation and liquidity creation as net liquidity 
creation. 
17 At the national aggregate level, money supply will increase several times at the end of the money creation 
process due to the money or deposit multiplier effect (Niehans & Hewson, 1976; Mankiw, 2014). 
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is on the role of demand deposits on the bank’s liability side in facilitating risk sharing among individuals 
who consume at different random times. To smooth the consumption of these individuals, they must be 
granted the power to access their funds immediately and this can generally be attained through demand 
deposits - an essential component of liquidity creation. Both studies assume that illiquidity of assets is 
part of banks’ lending technology and that banks collect deposits from individuals and invest in capital 
on their behalf. The existence of capital markets is not characterized in their models because direct 
investment in illiquid productive assets via capital markets directly exposes individuals to informational 
asymmetry about the risky assets and provides no better liquidity insurance against idiosyncratic 
(random) consumption shocks than banks’ demand deposits. Besides, even if the asset claims can be 
traded in competitive markets with zero transaction costs, early liquidation of illiquid productive 
projects in the case of unexpected consumption shocks can produce low returns for investors. Since 
individuals are uncertain about their future consumption timing, they prefer investment in demand 
deposits, because banks have greater skills and expertise to transform illiquid assets into liquid claims, 
with a smoother pattern of returns depending upon the deposit period.  
 
By pooling the liquidity of depositors and cross-subsidizing them, banks can offer efficient and optimal 
risk-sharing among depositors at an equilibrium where depositors’ confidence in the banks is 
maintained. However, a large proportion of demand deposits underlying the bank’s capital structure 
inevitably exposes the banks to a high risk of bank runs. A bank run is an undesirable equilibrium where 
all depositors panic and withdraw their deposits immediately, including those who are not concerned 
about the bank failing, before banks exhaust all of their assets due to the sequential service constraint. 
Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) also consolidated their models by demonstrating that 
demand deposits backed by reserves, government deposit insurance and suspension of convertibility 
are beneficial and work similarly to a central bank serving as lender of last resort in stopping or 
preventing bank runs. While their models do not suggest a true synergy between lending and deposits 
explicitly, they begin to establish the link between illiquid assets and liquid liabilities of the banks which 
is an essential element of liquidity creation.  
 
The Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model has been followed by a number of investigations, extending or 
testing the model, including studies showing that banks lose their comparative advantages in providing 
risk sharing opportunities to a capital market that is unrestricted and liquid. These studies include 
Haubrich and King (1990), Jacklin (1987), von Thadden (1998) and Wallace (1988), which will be 
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discussed in Section 3.5. Particular famous contemporary bank liquidity creation theories are studies by 
Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Diamond and Rajan (2001), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Kashyap et al. 
(2002).  
 
While demand deposits are essential for liquidity creation, Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and 
Rajan (2001) have demonstrated that demand deposits also serve as an incentive scheme for disciplining 
banks to act in the interests of uninformed depositors. Both studies place great importance on the 
sequential service constraint to compensate those depositors who are willing to invest in information 
and monitor banks, and assume incomplete deposit insurance because otherwise depositors will have 
no incentive to monitor the banks. On the asset side, loans made to entrepreneurs are illiquid because 
production investment is completely irreversible and it is difficult to realise its long-term value quickly. 
This makes it difficult for banks  to extract the full loan value when the banks sell or borrow against the 
loans in the case that the banks require additional funds before the loans mature, since the banks 
cannot commit their specific collection skills to extracting full repayment from borrowers on behalf of 
new claim holders. Demand deposits on the liabilities side, however, satisfy banks’ liquidity needs by 
allowing banks to borrow up to the full loan value if the banks can commit to depositors that the banks 
will deploy their specific collection skills in the future. The fragile capital structure disciplines the banks 
from withholding their collection skills against depositors’ interests because such action will invite a run 
by depositors. Fearing this outcome, banks will commit and create liquidity in the process. Calomiris and 
Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) also show that stabilisation policies, such as capital 
requirements, narrow banking and suspension of convertibility, are costly because each may reduce 
banks’ commitments and liquidity creation and should thus be avoided.  
 
Beyond banks’ balance sheets, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) have demonstrated that an efficient 
liquidity allocation for the private sector can be achieved through provisions of credit lines or loan 
commitment by banks. Their model considers three time periods. At time t = 0, a firm puts initial capital 
investment in a productive project that pays off at time t = 2. However, the firm faces a liquidity shock at 
time t = 1 when an additional capital investment is needed to continue the project or the project will be 
terminated in waste. They show that, unless there is an aggregate liquidity uncertainty in the private 
sector at time t = 1, whereby government supply of liquidity is needed, the private sector can achieve 
self-sufficiency by cross-subsidising liquidity-constrained firms. Issuing new claims on productive assets 
when liquidity shock hits and investing in liquid market securities at time t = 0 and selling them when 
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liquidity shock hits are possible solutions for liquidity-constraint firms. However, such actions are not 
efficient because the former may not be a timely solution and the latter can result in a wasteful 
accumulation of liquidity in the “lucky firm” that faces minimal liquidity shock. A line of bank credit, in 
contrast, offers the socially optimal liquidity allocation because banks pool and redistribute liquidity 
from lucky firms that do not encounter future liquidity shock to unlucky firms that need extra funds.  
 
Similarly to demand deposits, loan commitments allow bank customers to obtain cash from the bank on 
demand to accommodate unexpected liquidity needs. Fulfillment of deposit-taking and commitment-
based lending functions separately by two financial institutions requires maintenance of a large volume 
of liquid-asset stock such as cash and market securities on their balance sheet, which incurs a 
burdensome overhead cost for each institution. For example, the financial institution will forgo interest 
income if it keeps huge cash reserves, or face double taxation imposed on the returns on market 
securities. Kashyap et al. (2002) suggested that, by carrying out both deposit-taking and commitment-
based lending functions within the same institution, the banking institution can attain significant synergy 
and get by with a smaller liquid buffer stock because both functions jointly share some of the costly 
overhead costs associated with the liquid-asset reserves if deposit withdrawals and commitment 
takedowns are less than perfectly positively correlated. In a normal economy state in which only a small 
fraction of deposits are withdrawn at any time, idle liquid-asset stock can be efficiently used to 
accommodate calls for committed lending by incumbent borrowers and insure them against liquidity 
shocks. Disproportionate growth of any part of the economy can otherwise result in financial instability 
and bank runs. Confirming the theory, Kashyap et al. (2002) also documented two key empirical 
observations. First, banks issuing greater amounts of demand deposits are more active in commitment-
based lending. Second, banks offer more commitment-based lending as compared to non-bank 
intermediaries such as finance companies because banks offer deposit accounts.    
 
To summarise, bank liquidity creation theories argue that banks create liquidity by financing illiquid 
assets with liquid liabilities on their balance sheet as well as through loan commitments and similar lines 
of credit beyond their balance sheet (Bryant, 1980; Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Holmstrom & Tirole, 1998; 
Kashyap et al., 2002). Liquidity creation is important because banks hold illiquid non-monetary items for 
the non-bank public and give out liquid monetary items to satisfy their consumption and production 
needs, improving public welfare and economic growth. A liquidity mismatch between bank assets and 
liabilities inevitably makes banks susceptible to a fragile capital structure which, however, acts as an 
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incentive scheme for disciplining the banks to act for the interests of uninformed depositors (Calomiris 
& Kahn, 1991; Diamond & Rajan, 2001).  
 
3.3 Influence of bank competition on bank liquidity creation 
As a comprehensive measure of bank liquidity creation was not developed until the late 2000s, there 
have been limited empirical studies in the bank liquidity creation strand, and most of these studies do 
not focus on the effect of bank competition on liquidity creation. For example, Berger et al. (2010) 
examined the effects of regulatory interventions, capital injections and market discipline on bank 
liquidity creation; Berger and Bouwman (2009) and Lei and Song (2013) focused on the effect of bank 
capital, and Al-Khouri (2012) and Hackethal et al. (2010) focused on the effects of bank characteristics 
and macroeconomic factors. Some of these studies do include bank market concentration - usually 
represented by the bank’s market share in terms of deposits, loans, total assets or the number of 
branches in the local market – to inversely proxy for bank competition. However, the effect of bank 
competition on liquidity creation remains ambiguous because bank market concentration is a misleading 
proxy for bank competition and has been widely criticised18. Our study has identified only four empirical 
studies focusing on the effect of bank competition on liquidity creation. To provide a thorough review of 
this topic, we also review previous studies that examine the impact of bank competition on bank credit 
availability because bank liquidity creation is partly attributed to bank credit which is mainly financed by 
bank liquid liabilities, such as demand deposits. Nevertheless, the empirical effect of bank competition 
on bank credit availability has been reported as mixed (Beck et al., 2004; Jeong & Joh, 2010; Love & 
Martinez Peria, 2013; Petersen & Rajan, 1995). Building on these prior studies, Horvath et al. (2013, 
2016) suggest two opposing hypotheses regarding the effect of bank competition on bank liquidity 
creation, namely the “price channel” and “fragility channel” hypotheses. As such, our literature review 
in this section revolves around these two opposing hypotheses. 
 
                                                          
18 Bank market concentration measures were widely used to inversely infer the degree of bank competition in 
earlier empirical work until the 1990s (Degryse & Ongena, 2008; Hainz et al., 2013). The relationship is 
underpinned by the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis that argues that greater bank market 
concentration allows uncompetitive banks to extract monopoly rents. A main issue of bank market concentration 
measures is that they are confined to the definition of bank market structure and overlook banks’ behaviours that 
drive their market power. Popular bank market concentration measures include the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) and the total market share of the largest n-banks. More details about issues of bank market concentration 
measures are in section 4.3.2. 
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3.3.1 Price channel hypothesis 
The “price channel” hypothesis suggests a positive association between bank competition and liquidity 
creation. This hypothesis coincides with the standard industrial organisation theory that firms (banks in 
our case) with market power earn monopoly rent by providing products and services at below socially 
efficient levels (Chamberlin, 1969; Klein, 1971). This implies that borrowers are worse off from a lower 
equilibrium supply of credit at an inefficiently high price rate; and on the other hand, depositors are 
offered less return on their savings with banks. Thus, according to the theory, bank competition is 
desirable for liquidity creation because a bank that faces intense competition lowers its barriers to 
liquidity access for customers and reduces its intermediation margin by setting lower interest rates on 
loans and higher deposit rates than competing banks to attract more loan demand and deposits 
(Hannan, 1991; Guzman, 2000; Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009). 
 
Guzman (2000) analysed how the equilibrium growth of an economy differs between an economy with a 
competitive banking market and an economy with a monopolistic banking market. The model assumes 
that all fund transfers between borrowers and lenders are intermediated by the banking system in the 
economy. Guzman shows that a competitive bank always offers a higher interest rate on deposits 
or/and a lower interest rate on loans than does a monopolistic bank. Similarly, credit rationing is less 
pronounced in a competitive banking system because, with the sufficiently high rate of return paid on 
deposits, a competitive banking system is able to draw all potential depositors into the system and 
obtain sufficient deposits for their asset investments. A monopolistic bank, on the other hand, views 
attracting deposits as too costly and thus, engages in credit rationing and profits from a huge net 
interest margin.  
 
There are numerous empirical researches examining the impact of bank competition on interest rates 
on loans and supporting the “price channel” hypothesis indirectly. Hannan (1991) examined the 
relationship between commercial loan prices and bank market concentration across U.S. Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs). He found a positive relationship between bank market concentration, 
measured by HHI of deposits, and commercial loan rates, specifically secured and unsecured fixed and 
floating rates, during the periods in which interest rates are stable and in trough. Such influence is not 
significant during interest rate peak because banks adjust the loan price upward more slowly in the 
concentrated market possibly due to the greater loan price rigidity in the market. Similarly, an increase 
in bank competition reduced secured and unsecured floating rates on small business loans in the U.S. 
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market (Hannan, 1997; Cyrnak & Hannan, 1999), the spread of bank loan rates over prime rates charged 
on Italian firms (Sapienza, 2002) and on small businesses in the U.S. (Berger et al., 2007). Using data 
from ten European countries from 1993 to 1999, Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) found an increase in 
interest margin earned by banks in concentrated markets, where the interest margin is calculated for 
each loan type, customer loans, short-term loans, long-term loans or mortgage loans, by deducting 
money market rates from the loan rates.  
 
The influence of bank market power on deposit rates can be traced back at least to Berger and Hannan 
(1989) who found that bank market concentration significantly reduced interest rates on interest 
bearing demand deposits, saving deposits and time deposits based on 195 markets in the U.S. Heitfield 
and Prager (2004) reported a negative relation between bank market concentration and interest rates 
on saving and demand deposits at the local and state levels. Outside the U.S., Fischer and Pfeil (2004) 
have shown that increases in bank market power increase the interest margin earned by German banks, 
where bank market concentration is indicated by the HHI of bank branches, and the interest margin is 
defined as the difference between money market rates and deposit rates on savings of equal maturity. 
Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) found mixed implications of bank market concentration on banks’ deposit 
pricing behaviours in ten European countries. On one hand, bank market concentration leads to less 
competitive pricing of demand deposit, as evidenced by significantly lower demand deposit rates. On 
the other hand, banks in concentrated markets compete intensely for saving and time deposits by 
offering higher rates. Their findings can be interpreted as banks with greater market power are likely to 
create less liquidity for the public as the less liquid deposit contracts are made less attractive for 
depositors. 
 
In summary, bank market concentration is positively linked to a larger interest spread between deposit 
market and loan market (Degryse & Ongena, 2008). In line with the SCP theory that market 
concentration is an inverse indicator of the degree of market competition, previous findings imply that 
bank competition results in a decrease in loan rates and an increase in deposit rates, attracting more 
demand for bank loans and deposit taking by the bank. Based on a sample of bank loans from 70 
countries, Hainz et al. (2013) reported that the lending procedure is made easier for borrowers in a 
competitive bank market, as evidenced by the reduced collateral requirement in the loan contracts. 
With lower barriers to bank credit access, borrowers are more incentivised to use bank credit, thus, 
more liquidity is created by the bank. 
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A number of empirical studies which have found that bank competition increases bank credit availability 
also offer some implications related to the “price channel” hypothesis. Beck et al. (2004) examined the 
impact of bank competition on firms’ access to bank finance for 74 developed and developing countries. 
Their findings indicate that, on average, firms in a concentrated banking market face higher financing 
obstacles, implying a positive link between bank competition and firms’ credit access. Such a positive 
relation is particularly strong in countries with low levels of economic and institutional development.  
 
Using a survey dataset conducted on small business entrepreneurs in the U.S. in 2001, Scott and 
Dunkelberg (2010) found that entrepreneurs’ perception of changes in bank competition over the past 
three years positively improved bank credit availability and non-credit banking outcomes, such as 
service quality. The use of entrepreneurs’ ratings of changes in bank competition is superior over the 
use of bank concentration measures because this measure relies less on the definitions of market share 
of banks, which can be the number of bank branches, size of deposits and size of loans in the market.  
 
Carbó-Valverde et al. (2009) studied the impact of bank competition on the financial constraints of 
Spanish SMEs over the period 1994 to 2002. Using the Lerner index to indicate bank market power, the 
study found that firms situated in less competitive banking markets were more dependent on trade 
credit than on bank credit because of credit rationing and a higher price for credit. Thus, Carbó-Valverde 
et al. (2009) concluded that the financial constraint is greater for firms when banks have greater market 
power. This finding is confirmed by Love and Martinez Peria (2013) who reported that bank competition 
is positively related to firms’ access to bank finance, using cross-country data from 53 countries for the 
period 2002 to 2010.  
 
The “price channel” hypothesis is also implied by the studies of Chong et al. (2013) and Shen et al. 
(2009) that examined the effect of bank competition on credit constraints of Chinese SMEs. Using SME 
survey dataset and bank branch information, Chong et al. (2013) found that bank competition reduces 
the credit constraints of Chinese SMEs by adjusting loan prices downward. The positive association 
between bank competition and SMEs’ financing is not a result of relationship lending in which SMEs 
widely engage. The finding is robust for different measures of bank market concentration and credit 
constraints. A similar finding was reported by Shen et al. (2009) who measured bank competition by the 
43 
 
loan market share of the bank and SMEs’ access to credit by the proportion of loans for SMEs over total 
enterprise loans granted by the bank at the end of the specific year.  
 
Along similar lines, a positive effect of bank competition on bank credit availability can be observed 
indirectly through the growth of external financially dependent industries. For example, Claessens and 
Laeven (2005) examined the effect of bank competition on the growth of external financially dependent 
industries for 16 countries over the period 1980 to 1990. Using the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic to 
measure bank market competition, the result indicates that industrial growth is higher in countries with 
higher bank competition, implying that higher bank competition promotes more efficient allocation of 
bank resources for firms’ investment projects through lower borrowing costs and greater credit 
availability. 
 
Extending this line of reasoning, Cetorelli (2001, 2004) produced evidence that bank concentration 
increases the average firm size of industry sectors, especially those that rely heavily on external 
borrowings, in OECD countries. In other words, the market of the industry sector is more concentrated 
when the bank market is concentrated. Furthermore, the increased competition in the European Union 
(EU) bank markets arising from the EU bank deregulation leads to a decline in the average firm size of 
bank credit-dependent nonfinancial sectors (Cetorelli, 2004). Based on Cetorelli’s findings (2001, 2004), 
banks with high market power are incentivised to preserve close lending relationships with their existing 
firm customers by concentrating funding on these customers at the expense of new entrants who 
possess a threat to the performance of the industry incumbents. The finding implies that bank 
competition promotes new entry of firms into the industry as more credit can be allocated to firms that 
are in need of liquidity. 
 
3.3.2 Fragility channel hypothesis 
The “price channel” hypothesis is quite limited because it ignores the specificity of banks and basically 
reduces banks to ordinary firms (Freixas & Rochet, 2007). The “fragility channel” view incorporates 
asymmetric information justifications of financial intermediation and argues that, in the presence of 
information asymmetries, a high degree of bank competition leads to a reduction in bank liquidity 
creation. A basic idea of this hypothesis is that banks that possess market power are likely to issue more 
credit, even to new, informationally-opaque or riskier borrowers because the market power enhances 
their ability to prevent their borrowers from switching to other banks and alleviates the adverse 
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selection problem of the banks (Petersen & Rajan, 1995; Dell’Ariccia & Marquez, 2004; Hauswald & 
Marquez, 2006). An increase in bank competition implies greater difficulty for banks to internalise the 
benefits of lending relationships, and subsequently eroding their incentive to create liquidity. 
 
The “fragility channel” hypothesis is motivated by the theoretical model of Petersen and Rajan (1995) 
who predicted that banks in a concentrated market are more willing to establish lending relationships 
with young and information-opaque firms and subsidise the initial informational costs because the 
banks expect to share in the future surplus of the firms which survive19. In the presence of information 
asymmetries, a high degree of bank competition makes it more difficult for banks to internalise the 
benefits of lending relationships as the relationships break down easily. This happens because, once the 
firms are established, they will seek the cheapest credit available in the competitive banking market 
where other competing banks free-ride on the screening effort of the first lending bank and offer more 
attractive lending terms. The first bank loses its ability to hold up its borrowing firms and compensate 
for the information acquisition costs they bear at the early stage of the lending relationship. To avoid 
this free-riding problem, banks reduce investment in soft information acquisition through relationship 
lending, particularly with opaque customers, despite these customers being potentially of high quality, 
and reallocate credit toward incumbent captured borrowers with fewer alternatives (Petersen & Rajan, 
1995). Credit availability to the economy falls as a consequence of an increase in competition among 
banks. The theoretical prediction of Petersen and Rajan (1995) can be extended to the liquidity creation 
role of banks, and be interpreted as banks possessing market power create more liquidity, as they are 
motivated to grant more loans through relationship-based banking, and in the meantime, accepting 
more deposits through the relationship. Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2004) also obtained similar results, 
and suggested that banks that face greater competition from outside lenders reallocate credit toward 
borrowers that are locked-in – a situation referred to as a “flight to captivity”. 
 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) also proved their theoretical prediction by examining the impact of bank 
market competition on credit availability for small and fairly young firms operating throughout the U.S. 
in 1987. They focused only on small and young firms because the problem of asymmetric information 
related to creditworthiness of these firms is more acute for banks. They measured local bank market 
                                                          
19 Petersen and Rajan (1995) contribute to a line of literature that focuses on the effect of bank competition on the 
credit access of small, information-opaque borrowers, a topic outside the scope of our study. However, Petersen 
and Rajan’s (1995) findings have been widely applied with reference to the negative impact of bank competition 
on bank lending or credit availability to firms.  
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concentration by HHI of commercial bank deposits, and bank credit access by the percentage of trade 
credit discount taken by the firm20. Their empirical findings show that, irrespective of informational 
opacity measured by the firm’s age, on average, firms in a concentrated banking market enjoy more 
bank credit access than firms of equivalent creditworthiness and credit demand in a competitive 
banking market. Such a finding is slightly inconsistent with their theoretical prediction that 
informationally-opaque firms enjoy greater access to credit in a concentrated banking market than in a 
competitive banking market. Of course, the inconsistency of the empirical findings can be questioned 
from the aspect of the variable measurement, such as the definition of bank credit access.  
 
Consistent with the “fragility channel” hypothesis, Carletti and Leonello (2011) theoretically showed that 
banks behave more prudently in a competitive banking market. In this market, banks have incentive to 
invest more in liquid reserves and less in loans because loans are not very profitable for banks and the 
opportunity costs of holding reserves are low. Sufficient liquid reserves also have a benefit in shielding 
the banks from loan losses and bank runs during economic downturns. In contrast, a low competitive 
banking market makes liquid reserve holding more expensive, encouraging some banks to maintain 
below their optimal reserves and engage in illiquid asset investment.  
 
Our study has identified only four empirical studies that explicitly investigated the relationship between 
bank competition and liquidity creation. These studies conducted by Horvath et al. (2013, 2016), Jiang et 
al. (2016), Joh and Kim (2012) and Xu (2010) support the “fragility channel” hypothesis for banks in the 
Czech Republic, the U.S., 25 OECD countries and 26 European countries, respectively. They argue that 
banks that face greater bank competition are more conservative in issuing loans and taking deposits, 
resulting in a drop in liquidity creation for the economy. These studies adopted the Berger and 
Bouwman liquidity creation measure to measure liquidity creation by individual banks and the Lerner 
Index to measure bank competition, except for Jiang et al. (2016) who applied deregulation-induced 
competition and Xu (2010) who employed the market share of individual banks in terms of liquidity 
creation amount to indicate bank competition.  
 
In addition, some empirical liquidity creation studies that do not focus on bank competition, but do 
control for bank market competition in their estimations also report results consistent with the “fragility 
                                                          
20 The intuition behind the use of the percentage of trade credit discount taken by the firm to proxy for bank credit 
access is that the firm is likely to borrow from trade creditors at the rates implicit in forgoing the early payment 
discount when having been credit-rationed by banks (Petersen & Rajan, 1995).  
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channel” hypothesis. For example, employing annual bank data of China between 1988 and 2009, Lei 
and Song (2013) found that liquidity creation by Chinese commercial banks increases when bank market 
competition falls, featured by a rise in HHI of bank deposits. Berger et al. (2010) reported that higher 
HHI of bank loans led to an increase in liquidity creation by German universal banks over the 1999 to 
2008 period. Despite this, we are not able to derive a conclusive result based on these prior studies 
mainly because market concentration measures are weak proxies for bank competition in a liberalised 
banking era. 
 
Besides, a number of empirical studies investigating the effect of bank competition on bank lending or 
firms’ credit access have implied the “fragility channel” view. Fischer (2000) provided evidence on the 
influence of bank market power on bank’s information acquisition activity and credit access by German 
manufacturing firms. Using HHI and other bank market concentration measures to proxy for bank 
market power, their study reveals two key findings. First, concentrated banking markets require firms to 
transmit not only more firm- and project-specific information but also more soft information that is in 
qualitative form. Second, credit availability, indicated by the frequency of early payment trade credit 
discounts taken by the firms, is greater in concentrated banking markets because of systematic 
information acquisition by the lending banks in the normal course of a lending relationship. Bank 
competition has an inverse relationship with firms’ credit access because banks with low market power 
are less willing to subsidise loans for informationally-opaque firms that are costly to screen and monitor 
for fear of information spill-over, the free riding problem and switching behaviour of borrowing firms, as 
these firms may be taken over by competing banks as they grow. These findings are in consistent with 
Petersen and Rajan’s (1995) theoretical prediction. 
 
The “fragility channel” view is also implied by Zarutskie (2006) who investigated the impact on firm 
borrowing and investment of bank market competition resulting from the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act 
1994, using a panel of U.S. privately held firms from 1987 to 1998. The years 1994 to 1998 are defined 
as a period of increased bank market competition following the Riegle-Neal Act. The study found that, 
under a competitive banking environment, young firms are financed less by bank loans and more by 
inside debt and equity because they are more informationally-opaque for banks. As the external debt 
and equity raised by young firms are very limited, these firms are accompanied by lower investment. 
Such a negative relation between bank competition and firms’ borrowing diminishes as the firms 
become older.  
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Using aggregate banking market data from Korea, Jeong and Joh (2010) showed that bank lending is 
positively related to market concentration because banks are more aggressive in lending when they face 
less competition. The study employed the HHI as well as the total market shares of the top four largest 
banks to measure bank market concentration. 
 
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) adopted a different empirical approach to demonstrate that the growth of 
external financially dependent industries is faster in countries that have an uncompetitive banking 
market, based on industrial data from 41 countries between 1980 and 1990. The study reports that bank 
market concentration facilitates credit access by industries that require bank financing most, implying 
that bank market concentration encourages the establishment of lending relationships with firms that 
struggle for external borrowing. The finding is reinforced by Patti and Dell'Ariccia (2004) who presented 
evidence that bank competition hinders new firm entrants in Italian non-financial industrial sectors 
where informational asymmetries are greater as a consequence of limited credit availability to these 
firms. 
 
Suffice to say, the existing relevant empirical literature yields very ambiguous evidence on the effect of 
bank competition on liquidity creation. Often, prior studies use structural competition measures to 
inversely proxy for bank competition, which could produce misleading results. Some may use the non-
structural competition measure, but test limited components of bank liquidity creation, for example, 
bank lending. Thus, more empirical studies that directly address the relationship of interest are needed.  
 
3.4 Bank size effect on the influence of bank competition on bank liquidity 
creation 
It is likely that the effects of the “fragility channel” and the “price channel” coexist in the Malaysian 
banking sector, as the effect of bank competition on liquidity creation may not be uniform for 
commercial banks of varying sizes. For example, the kinds of information used in lending decision 
making, borrowers served and loan portfolios adopted by big and small banks are different (Berger et 
al., 2001, 2005b; Brickley et al., 2003; Cole et al., 2004; Stein, 2002; Strahan, 2008). In addition, size 
offers the possibility of realising economies of scale and scope for offering a diversified range of product 
lines for various market segments ranging from households, retail to corporate through extensive 
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branch networks (Vives, 2001). These operational differences between large and small banks can 
potentially alter the empirical relationship between bank competition and liquidity creation by these 
banks. Given that prior empirical studies have found that determinants of liquidity creation differ by 
bank size class, one of the main objectives of our study is to discover whether small and big banks also 
respond differently in liquidity creation when facing an increase in competition.  
 
Stein (2002) provided a great insight into systematic differences in the information production and 
capital allocation between banks with a decentralisation structure - small, single manager banks, and 
banks with a hierarchy structure – big banks with multiple layers of management. Stein’s model 
demonstrates that the advantage of decentralisation in a small bank entitles the loan officer to 
authorise capital allocation to loan applicants as he or she deems fit. This strengthens the loan officer’s 
incentive to devote efforts to evaluate loan applications of informationally-opaque firms (characterised 
by small business firms) by researching their soft information. Soft information acquisition is in fact very 
costly as huge personnel costs and efforts are required. It requires the loan officer’s personal 
communication over time with the firm, its stakeholders and the local community to gather information 
about the firm owner’s character integrity and the local reputation of the firm’s reliability. Unlike hard 
information, soft information cannot be easily and credibly quantified and verified by anyone other than 
the agent who produces it. In contrast, owing to more intermediaries between top management and 
loan officers at large banks, soft information generated by loan officers cannot be credibly 
communicated across successive hierarchical layers within the banks and their recommended loans can 
be easily vetoed by the upper management of the banks. As loan officers in large banks have to bear the 
risk of their research effort into small business firms, their incentives to produce high quality soft 
information of small, opaque firms for the benefits of the bank and its shareholders are slashed. It is 
diseconomies of scale for large banks to support both large and small business lending functions that 
require different kinds of information. Thus, Stein (2002) argues that large banks favour lending 
technologies based on hard information that can be used across branches and personnel in a 
standardised manner that can mitigate the agency problem, while small banks have a comparative 
advantage over large banks in lending technologies based on soft information.  
 
Brickley et al. (2003) assert that small banks have an edge in the production of soft information, but the 
incentive for this activity is different from Stein’s finding (2002). While Stein emphasises  the incentive 
effects of the capital-allocation authority of loan officers, Brickley et al. (2003) suggest that substantial 
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and concentrated share ownership of small bank managers in the bank rewards the bank managers with 
significant decision-making authority and assists in mitigating agency problem. Based on 1998 data from 
the Texas banking industry, the share ownership held by bank officers and directors of small banks is 42 
percent higher than that of big banks. The ownership concentration of big banks is also significantly 
lower than small banks, where most of the block shareholders in the small banks are officers and 
directors. Brickley et al.’s results support the notion that the decision authority granted to small bank 
managers provides an incentive for the managers to act in line with the bank shareholders’ objectives, 
which also explains why small banks undertake more investment in soft information acquisition than do 
big banks. 
 
This study borrows some relevant small business lending studies to highlight the comparative advantage 
of large banks in hard lending technology and small banks in using soft lending technology. These 
studies employ data of small business firms because small firms are generally informationally-opaque 
and some are potentially fundamentally sound, for which the type of small business lending technology 
employed differs by bank size21.  
 
Berger et al. (2005b) see both the findings reported by Stein (2002) and Brickley et al. (2003) as 
complementary and provided empirical evidence to support those findings using data from the 1993 
U.S. National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF). The authors identified six key findings: (i) 
smaller banks have a comparative advantage in lending to smaller firms whose hard information, such as 
financial records, are not readily available; (ii) smaller banks lend at a shorter physical distance from 
their borrowing firms to facilitate soft information collection; (iii) smaller banks are more likely to have 
personal or face-to-face communication with their customers in contrast to large banks that rely on 
mundane technologies such as mail and telephone; (iv) small banks maintain longer relationships and (v) 
make exclusive relationships with their borrowing firms by being the firms’ only lender; (vi) small banks 
practise less credit rationing to their borrowing firms, as evidenced by  firms’ lower reliance on 
                                                          
21 Small business lending technologies use some combination of both hard and soft information, and in many 
cases, multiple lending technologies are employed for lending to the same firm (Berger, 2014; Berger & Black, 
2011; Berger & Udell, 2006). Among these, lending technologies primarily based on hard information are fixed-
asset lending, asset-based lending, financial statement lending and credit-scoring. On the contrary, lending 
technologies that are primarily based on soft information include relationship lending and judgment lending (see 
Berger, 2014 for details).  
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expensive trade credit. These findings support the notion that small banks specialise in relationship-
lending.  
 
Using the same dataset as Berger et al. (2005b), Cole et al. (2004) reported that credit extension by large 
banks is higher for small business firms that can provide financial records, but such lending decision is 
uninfluenced by any firm-bank relationship factors. On the other hand, firms that have prior deposit 
relationships with small banks are more likely to have loan applications approved by the banks. Their 
financial records do not play any significant role in the lending decisions of small banks. These findings 
imply that large banks favour lending technologies based on hard information, while small banks favour 
relationship-lending. Outside the U.S., Berger et al. (2001) found evidence consistent with large banks’ 
diseconomies of scale in relationship lending in Argentina. Large banks face greater obstacles in 
extending relationship loans to small and informationally opaque firms.     
 
Besides, some studies report that small banks devote more of their lending resources to small business 
lending than larger banks22 (Berger & Udell, 1995; DeYoung et al., 2004; Strahan & Weston, 1998). As a 
bank becomes larger and more complex in its organisational structure and offerings of financial products 
and services, the share of credit supplied to small business firms falls in relation to total assets (Berger & 
Udell, 1995; Strahan & Weston, 1998) and within the loan portfolio (DeYoung et al., 2004). Moreover, 
Strahan and Weston (1998) provide evidence that an increase in the average size of subsidiaries, that is 
diversification of small banks leads to a greater share of small business lending in the asset portfolio, 
while diversification of large banks is associated with a greater share of large business lending in the 
asset portfolio.   
 
Both the organisational form and traditional small business lending research strands have collectively 
reported that external financing to small or opaque firms can only be provided by soft lending 
technologies in which small banks have the competitive advantage. Large banks, on the other hand, 
specialise in hard lending technologies for large and transparent firms. This argument, however, may no 
longer be fully supported in recent banking environments because financial sector development, 
                                                          
22 A limitation of the studies of Berger and Udell (1995), DeYoung et al. (2004) and Strahan and Weston (1998) is 
that their studies do not not explicitly control for opacity and relationship-related factors of borrowing firms. A 
larger share of small business loans in small banks’ asset and loan portfolios is arguably to support the comparative 
advantage of small banks in soft information processing and relationship-lending; however, such portfolios can 
also be explained by small banks’ policy of maintaining a well-diversified loan portfolio (Strahan, 2008). For a small 
bank, a large business loan will crowd out some small business loans and reduce its loan diversification.  
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particularly due to advances in technology, may have altered the way banks traditionally lend and the 
inter-bank competition they face.  
 
Previous studies have documented that, owing to high fixed and sunk entry costs, large banks adopt 
new technologies earlier than small banks and enjoy economies of scale in the technology adoption 
(Akhavein et al., 2005; Berger et al., 2005a; Frame et al., 2001; Furst et al., 2002; Petersen & Rajan, 
2002). Akhavein et al. (2005) found that large banks adopt small business credit scoring technology 
earlier than small banks. Large banks that adopt small business credit scoring tend to increase loan 
issuance to small business firms because credit scoring improves the ability of banks to price the risk by 
charging higher loan premiums on small business loans (Berger et al., 2005a; Frame et al., 2001). Thus, 
information and underwriting costs traditionally faced by large banks in small business lending lessen 
(Frame et al., 2001). Credit scoring also allows banks to issue riskier small business loans and reduce 
credit rationing on these firms as the problem of under-pricing of risky loans is diminished. In addition, 
large banks are more likely to adopt Internet banking relative to small banks and gain from a significant 
improvement in profitability and efficiency (Furst et al., 2002). The benefits of Internet banking, 
however, do not exist in small banks. 
 
Some small business lending studies have gone beyond the traditional research paradigm and found 
results contradictory to the the traditional paradigm. Petersen and Rajan (2002) argued that advances in 
technology have improved the diseconomies scale of large banks in small business lending as new 
technologies cut down the cost of expensive information acquisition about small firms, reducing the 
importance of soft information in small business lending in which small banks traditionally have an edge. 
Petersen and Rajan concluded that the physical distance as well as the personal communication 
between small firms and their lenders has become less important over time in the U.S. Also rejecting the 
traditional paradigm that concludes that large banks are ill-equipped lenders to small firms, Berger et al. 
(2007) reported that large banks have neither competitive advantage nor disadvantage in providing 
loans to informationally-opaque small businesses. They explain that large banks deploy some forms of 
transactions lending technologies that analyse the creditworthiness of business firms based primarily on 
data about the small business owner rather than business data. 
 
Berger and Black (2011) analysed the comparative advantages of large and small banks in using different 
lending technologies for U.S. small business firms of varying sizes. A key finding shows that large banks 
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have comparative advantages of using hard lending technologies when lending to large and small firms. 
Berger and Black (2011) argued that large banks take the advantage of some lending technologies based 
on hard information, such as valuations of fixed-assets that are pledged as collateral, in lending to small 
firms. Besides, small banks indeed have a comparative advantage in relationship lending, but this 
advantage is strongest for larger firms. The findings of Berger and Black (2011) help to explain why some 
studies, like those of Jayaratne and Wolken (1999), did not find any significant effect of the existence of 
small banks on the credit availability of small firms operating in the U.S. A possible explanation is that 
large banks are better at employing some forms of hard technologies to lend to small, opaque firms.  
 
Nevertheless, both traditional and new paradigms in small business lending research agree that that 
large banks favour using hard information in lending, while small banks have an advantage in lending 
technologies based on soft information, such as relationship lending, for opaque firms. We, thus, expect 
that liquidity creation by small banks is more affected by bank competition in the way specified by the 
“fragility channel” hypothesis. Small banks must possess market power  to some degree to be 
incentivised to invest in opaque or risky customers by providing soft lending, because market power 
allows the banks to lock in the customers and share in their surplus. An increase in competition will spur 
customers’ switching problem and prevent the banks recovering from costly information production and 
monitoring from investing in opaque or risky customers, thereby dissuading banks from creating 
liquidity. In contrast, the role that competition plays in the liquidity creation of large banks is uncertain. 
While diseconomies of scale and the agency problem discourage large banks from using soft 
information, large banks are not at a disadvantage in lending to informationally opaque customers. This 
is because there are various transaction lending technologies that large banks may deploy in small 
business lending, which include asset-based lending, leasing and small business credit scoring (Berger et 
al., 2007). Combining the economies of scale in extensive branch networks and early technology 
adoption, large banks may have greater capacity that enables them to expand their liquidity creation 
activities in new and existing market segments when facing an increase in competition.  
 
Previous bank liquidity creation studies that control bank market competition in their models may also 
provide implications for the bank competition-liquidity creation relationship by bank size classes. In 
Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) study for the U.S., liquidity creation by small banks is positively associated 
with their market power, measured by bank-level HHI on deposits, implying the “fragility channel” 
dominates over small banks. They did not find significant links between bank market power and liquidity 
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creation for medium-sized and large banks. Besides, Berger et al. (2010) found that an increase in bank 
market concentration, indicated by loan concentration index, leads to higher liquidity creation by small 
banks, but there was no significant effect found for large banks in Germany. Xu (2010) reported that 
bank market power, measured by market share of liquidity creation at bank-level, increases the liquidity 
creation of large banks in both European countries and Switzerland and small banks only in the 
developed European countries. Furthermore, a robustness test in Joh and Kim’s (2012) cross-country 
study for 25 OECD countries showed that large banks increase liquidity creation as the banking industry 
becomes more concentrated. Bank market concentration, however, is not significantly linked to liquidity 
creation in the case of small banks. We regard these previous evidences as weak and inconclusive 
because the use of structural measures of bank competition in these studies has been criticised by new 
industrial organisation advocators for not reflecting banks’ behaviour that drives their market power.  
 
It is apparent that banks of varying size classes conduct their business very differently, but how the 
operational differences alter the effect of bank competition on liquidity creation is vague. Thus, our 
study attempts to address this issue by examining the relationship between bank competition and 
liquidity creation of commercial banks by bank size. 
 
3.5 Influence of stock market liquidity on bank liquidity creation 
Generally, stock market liquidity is defined as the extent to which market participants can quickly and 
easily trade large volumes of their equity securities without causing much fluctuation in the security 
prices (Borio, 2000; Committee on the Global Financial System, 1999; Sarr & Lybek, 2002). This notion of 
liquidity also embodies the cost of converting a stock into money, or in other words, the transaction cost 
for stock investors (ECB, 2012). To establish a liquid stock market, substitutability among the various 
securities traded in the market as well as the liquidity of each of these assets play an important role 
(Sarr & Lybek, 2002).  
 
A liquid stock market generally exhibits five characteristics: (i) tightness, (ii) depth, (iii) breadth, (iv) 
resiliency and (v) immediacy (Borio, 2000; Committee on the Global Financial System, 1999; Kyle, 1985; 
Sarr & Lybek, 2002). Tightness refers to the costs of turning around a position in a short period of time, 
usually captured by the difference between buy and sell prices, and the implicit costs. Depth denotes 
the existence of abundant orders at the prevailing market prices, while breadth refers to numerous and 
large volumes of orders with minimal impact on prices. Resiliency represents the speed with which new 
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orders flow corrects order imbalances that result in an idiosyncratic shock to security prices. Immediacy 
refers to the speed with which orders can be executed and settled, or in other words, the efficiency of 
the trading, clearing and settlement systems (Sarr & Lybek, 2002). These characteristics are to some 
extent overlapping, and incorporated in the general definition of market liquidity. For example, a deep, 
broad and efficient stock market is usually accompanied by low transaction costs (tightness). 
 
The theories of bank liquidity creation highlighted in Section 3.1 show that demand deposit is an 
important source of funds for banks to carry their liquidity creation role under a key assumption that 
investors (savers) engage only in intermediated investments through banks and firms seek external 
funds only from banks. However, as the financial system evolves and gets more liberalised, the incentive 
problems related to the investment choices of depositors, corporate financing choices as well as banks’ 
supply of liquidity, have changed. These issues have been considered in some studies which are 
reviewed here to demonstrate how a liquid stock market can potentially crowd out or enhance banking 
arrangements through both supply and demand sides of bank liquidity creation.  
 
3.5.1 Market-bank liquidity crowding out hypothesis 
Jacklin (1987) was the first to extend the Diamond-Dybvig model by studying the risk sharing mechanism 
of demand deposits in relation to equity shares. The study shows that demand deposits better facilitate 
risk sharing among depositors with different consumption patterns than equity shares only when there 
are trading restrictions imposed on the deposits. Such advantage, however, is lost when the market 
becomes frictionless with greater trading opportunities. In this case, equity shares provide identical risk 
sharing opportunities as demand deposits. Investors then have an incentive to invest directly in illiquid 
assets and not via banks, because the investors can reap the higher, long-term returns on their 
investments if they do not encounter liquidity shocks, and they can trade their shares for liquid assets – 
cash – quickly when they are stricken by liquidity shocks. While the focus of Jacklin’s (1987) study is risk 
sharing of demand deposits, the findings reveal that a liquid equity market has the ability to compete 
with commercial banks for demand deposits and constrain their cross-subsidising ability for savers who 
have different patterns of liquidity need, hence, reducing the amount of liquidity created by banks. 
 
In addition, Wallace (1988) finds that investors are better off with direct investments regardless of their 
random consumption patterns if they are not isolated - an environment that resembles the capital 
market today where investors are brought together by technology over the counter or centralised 
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exchange. Without isolation, investors would want to invest in assets directly, and when they need to 
withdraw money before the investment matures, they borrow short-term from other investors in a 
credit market by pledging their share in real investment as collateral. This result implies that a capital 
market should be viewed as a substitute trading mechanism for banks’ deposit arrangements if the 
market is easily accessed by investors. Similar findings about the diminishing liquidity creation role of 
banks as a consequence of increasing capital market liquidity are also documented by Haubrich and King 
(1990) and von Thadden (1998). Both studies argue that the presence of banks is not rationalised in an 
economy where the capital market is completely liquid to offer insurance to investors against liquidity 
risk. 
 
Extending beyond the competition with banks in providing insurance against idiosyncratic shocks for 
investors, Levine (1991) and Bencivenga et al. (1995) have demonstrated that a liquid stock market 
accompanied by low transaction costs alleviates liquidity risks of investors and incentivises firms to 
finance their long-term productive investment projects directly from investors on the market. Like other 
theoretical papers, Levine (1991) and Bencivenga et al. (1995) characterised that investors are 
discouraged from investing in the illiquid firm capital owing to the fear of premature liquidation of 
productive investments in the case of liquidity shock and the resulting low liquidation returns. They 
argue that a liquid stock market alleviates the long-term capital commitment of investors by allowing 
them to change their portfolios quickly and cheaply with other investors who do not receive liquidity 
shock. The investors can also cash in their shares in the firms for a value greater than the premature 
liquidation value. Meanwhile, liquidity-constrained firms are insured from productivity risk as premature 
liquidation of productive assets can be avoided, encouraging longer-term firm investment and economic 
growth. Although Levine (1991) and Bencivenga et al. (1995) did not focus on the competitive pressure 
of liquid stock markets on commercial banks, their findings indicate that liquid stock markets reduce 
firms’ reliance on banks for capital funding and encourage more savings to be channelled to stock 
markets. 
 
Diamond (1997) has theoretically shown that the magnitude of liquidity creation by banks and the 
capital structure of banks are dependent on the liquidity of the capital market. In an economy with an 
imperfectly liquid financial market, banks create liquidity in two fundamental ways: (i) by holding some 
of the economy's assets for which funds cannot be raised in the market, and (ii) by cross-subsidizing 
investors (depositors) with higher short-term returns than the market. However, as more investors 
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participate in the financial markets, the improved market liquidity will attract a greater amount of funds 
being placed on financial asset investment in the markets, which would otherwise be saved in banks. 
Furthermore, highly liquid financial markets allow firms to issue longer-maturity securities for capital 
and narrow the maturity gap between the securities and the physical investments. The maturity gap 
approaches zero as the market approaches full liquidity. As such, Diamond (1997) concluded that a fully 
participated (or liquid) capital market does not only slash the scope of cross-subsidisation for depositors, 
but also causes the banks' holdings of long-term assets (term loans) to drop more rapidly than their 
holdings of shorter-term loans. The magnitude of liquidity created by banks and the whole banking 
system shrinks as a consequence. 
 
While a large body of theoretical studies predicts a negative link between stock market liquidity and 
bank liquidity creation, it is surprising that not many empirical studies have been conducted and even 
fewer studies have supported the prediction. Dey and Flaherty (2005) examined the determinants of 
stock market liquidity and bank credit using a panel dataset of 32 exchanges from 27 countries over a 
period of 40-84 months during 1995-2001. They showed that bank credit and stock market liquidity, 
measured by stock market turnover ratio, are inversely related, indicating that a liquid stock market may 
be a substitute for banks from the aspect of firms’ external financing sources. Firms may find raising 
capital on a liquid equity market substantially cheaper than bank loans because, after accounting for the 
lower investment banks’ fees and liquidity risk to investors, the under-pricing problem of equity and the 
required return on equity drop (Acharya & Pedersen, 2005; Butler et al., 2005). 
 
3.5.2 Market-bank liquidity enhancement hypothesis 
Built upon the traditional theory discussed in Section 3.5.1, a standard view has been that an increase in 
stock market liquidity exerts a competitive pressure on commercial banks and increasingly replaces 
banks’ liquidity creator role in the economy. The “market-bank liquidity crowding out” hypothesis may 
hold if one merely focuses on the traditional products offered by commercial banks, specifically demand 
deposits and commercial loans, and overlooks the changes in the microeconomics of banking along with 
the development of the liquid stock market, for instance, the dynamic pool of borrowers and depositors, 
the risk-bearing capacity of banks and their off-balance sheet innovations. Acknowledging these, some 
studies have suggested and documented an “enhancement effect” of stock market liquidity on bank 
liquidity creation. 
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A theoretical analysis by Song and Thakor (2010) has argued that, without introducing bank equity (an 
interaction vehicle) into the model, a liquid stock market indeed grows at the expense of banks – a 
finding that supports the “market-bank liquidity crowding out” hypothesis in the existing theoretical 
literature that views banks and capital markets in isolation. As financing cost is one of the key frictions 
impeding borrowers from raising funds, it becomes a key determinant of borrowers’ financing choices 
between banks and capital markets. Increased stock market liquidity reduces the financing friction of 
firms on a stock market and attracts firms to opt for market over banks for financing sources. In 
contrast, when the bank equity element is introduced, an “enhancement effect” flowing from the stock 
markets to banks is observed, which implies that stock market liquidity enhances the magnitude of 
liquidity creation by publicly-listed banks. As stock market liquidity reduces the bank’s cost of equity 
capital, the bank may find it optimal to raise additional equity capital from the liquid stock market to 
meet the higher capital requirements associated with greater lending scope to potentially creditworthy 
yet previously unserved borrowers. This means that additional loans can be originated by banks for a 
greater scope of borrowers if the banks are able to raise additional capital at attractive prices from the 
liquid stock market to maintain their solvency. 
 
Like some theoretical studies, Mattana and Panetti (2014) characterised an economic growth model 
where banks and stock markets compete in offering depositors with insurance against idiosyncratic 
consumption shocks and profitable investment opportunities, but their analysis goes beyond the 
traditional issue and finds that greater stock market liquidity indeed encourages banks to engage in 
more illiquid asset investment. As previously assumed, there is a trade-off between liquidity insurance 
and return on illiquid capital, and depositors decide on either market or bank channel to invest their 
deposits based on the expected welfare that they can achieve within the two channels. To maintain 
banks’ ability to offer the cross-subsidisation of impatient depositors, banks must retain a fraction of 
liquidity in their own portfolio before investing in illiquid assets. However, as the income level of 
depositors rises beyond the stock market participation threshold, stock market participation increases 
and banks reduce their investment in liquid reserves required to meet the consumption of impatient 
depositors and shift their asset portfolio towards illiquid assets. In other words, increased stock market 
liquidity diverts some demand for liquidity away from banks and creates an opportunity for banks to 
reduce their liquidity holdings on the balance sheet and to channel more liquidity towards capital 
investments. 
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Extending beyond the traditional products like demand and savings deposits and loans, the positive 
influence of stock market liquidity on bank liquidity creation can be observed through the bank’s 
provision of off-balance sheet products, such as guarantees, commitments and similar contractual 
arrangements that the banks must provide liquidity to the customers upon demand. By offering off-
balance sheet products, commercial banks attain optimal liquidity allocation because a unit of liquid 
reserve can be used to back the liquidity needs of multiple firms in a stable economic state, as opposed 
to direct bank lending for which one unit of liquid reserves serves only a single firm (Holmstrom & Tirole, 
1998; Kashyap et al., 2002).  While a liquid stock market motivates large firms to raise capital directly 
from investors, the firms also seek bank guarantees and commitments that serve as a primary backup 
source of corporate financing in case the firms fail to raise sufficient funds to their expected level (Rajan, 
1998). In other words, despite competing with banks, liquid stock markets also stimulate greater use of 
off-balance sheet commitments, creating an opportunity for banks to create more liquidity and achieve 
efficient liquidity allocation.  
 
Empirical studies that have examined the influence of stock market liquidity on bank liquidity creation 
explicitly are very limited. Using the quarterly U.S. commercial bank data from 1984 to 2010 and time-
series regressions, Chatterjee (2015) found that stock market liquidity positively explains aggregate bank 
liquidity creation growth as well as liquidity creation growth of large banks. The author argued that, as 
stock market liquidity implies the cost of capital in the marketplace, increased stock market liquidity 
smoothes the financial constraints of banks, particularly those of large banks that employ relatively 
larger amounts of non-deposit funding to support their asset investments. Furthermore, Chatterjee 
(2015) found that stock market liquidity has a higher impact on off-balance sheet bank liquidity creation 
than on-balance sheet liquidity creation – a finding that supports the argument that liquid stock markets 
stimulate greater use of off balance sheet commitments. In Chatterjee’s study, stock market liquidity is 
measured by proportional quoted bid-ask spread, Amihud’s illiquidity ratio and Roll’s implied 
spread23. 
 
Empirical studies that have examined the development of the stock market and the banking sector also 
provide useful insights for our study. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) have argued that corporate 
                                                          
23 Our study also employs proportional quoted bid-ask spread and Amihud’s illiquidity ratio to proxy for stock 
market liquidity. We do not use Roll’s implied spread because the underlying assumptions of the measure, such as 
an informationally efficient stock market and stationary price change of stocks, are not satisfied in Malaysia’s 
illiquid stock market. 
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finance choices vary with the development of the stock market24. In developed stock markets, further 
market development leads to a crowding out effect of equity financing on bank lending. In contrast, in 
developing stock markets, large firms’ debt to equity ratio increases as the market develops, while the 
financing choices of small firms are unaffected by the market development. In developing stock markets, 
large firms’ borrowing capacity tends to increase with their equity financing ability as they are 
increasingly “certified” by the market. Thus, for these firms, stock market development stimulates the 
demand for bank loans. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996b) studied stock market and financial 
intermediary development for forty four developing and industrial countries. A key finding of the 
authors’ study is that stock market liquidity, measured by stock market trading value to GDP and 
turnover ratio, is positively correlated with both bank credit to GDP and claims of deposits on banks to 
GDP, which implies a positive relationship between stock market liquidity and bank liquidity creation. 
 
As none of the existing empirical studies has yielded strong and unambiguous findings on the effect of 
stock market liquidity on bank liquidity creation, we are not able to generalise previous findings to the 
Malaysian financial environment positively. 
                                                          
24 In Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996), stock market development is measured by the average ratio of stock 
market capitalization to GDP, the ratio of total value of traded shares to GDP, the ratio of total value of traded 
shares to market capitalization and a pricing indicator. 
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Chapter 4 
Data and Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter comprises three sections and begins by describing the sample selection and data collection 
procedures in Section 4.2. Next, Section 4.3 details the methods this study employs to calculate bank 
liquidity creation, bank competition, stock market liquidity and other explanatory variables. Section 4.4 
presents the regression model and describes the estimation procedure of the fixed-effects estimator 
used in this study.  
 
4.2 Sample and data 
The study sample covers almost all commercial banks operating in Malaysia during the 2001 to 2013 
period. Our sample years begin from the year 2001 to avoid massive mergers, acquisitions and exits of 
commercial banks in the late 1990s due to repercussions of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, making our 
dataset more representative of today’s bank market structure in Malaysia25. Besides, only banks that 
have data available for at least three consecutive years are included in our sample. During the sample 
period, three mergers and acquisitions of domestic commercial banks took place. In all cases, the banks 
were merged into one of the pre-merger bank counterparts26. Hence, we treat each pre-merger bank as 
a separate bank, with one bank continuing to operate after the merger. Further, eliminating outliers is 
an important task in bank competition measurement since outliers can have serious influences on the 
estimation of banks’ marginal costs and the resulting banks’ market power (Coelli et al., 2005). We, thus, 
eliminated the observations whose output and input prices are zero or more than ±2.5 times the 
standard deviation, following de Guevara and Maudos (2011). The sampling process results in an 
unbalanced panel of 27 commercial banks with a total of 294 observations, which account for over 96 
percent of total industry assets during the sample period. Furthermore, this study categorises small 
banks as banks holding total assets of up to MYR20 billion and large banks as banks holding total assets 
                                                          
25 The choice of the year 2001 can be supported by Abdul-Majid and Sufian (2006) who argue that the year 2001 
marks the structural break in the Malaysian commercial banking industry due to the consolidation exercise 
announced in 1999. 
26 To specify, Bank Utama (Malaysia) Berhad was merged into RHB Bank Berhad in 2003, Southern Bank Berhad 
was absorbed into CIMB Bank Berhad in 2006 and EON Bank Berhad was merged into Hong Leong Bank Berhad in 
2011. 
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exceeding MYR20 billion. A breakpoint of MYR20 billion is used because a substantial leap of about 27 
percent in total assets between the banks before and after this value is observed, that is, from MYR 16 
billion to MYR 21 billion. The full sample banks and their size classification are listed in Appendix A. 
 
In addition, this study uses the data of Islamic banks to incorporate their behaviour in the measurement 
of competition facing commercial banks. A total of 18 fully fledged Islamic banks were in business during 
the sample period. After deleting bank observations with insufficient and outlier data, 16 Islamic banks 
with 103 observations were left for the measurement.  
 
All the bank data used in this study were drawn from banks’ annual reports and are checked against 
Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope database. The aggregate stock market data were obtained from Bursa 
Malaysia database, while individual stock data were obtained from DataStream database. Before 
applying data filters specific to individual stock market liquidity measures, preliminary criteria were 
imposed on stock data. This study restricted stock data to only common stocks listed on Bursa Malaysia 
Main and ACE markets (previously secondary board). Exchange-traded funds, warrants, closed-end fund, 
preferred stocks as well as suspended stocks were excluded. Stocks with missing stock data were also 
deleted. This left us with 1,265 stocks trading in the sample period. Further data filters were also applied 
specifically to individual stock market liquidity measure and are detailed in each stock market liquidity 
measurement section.  
 
Macroeconomic data were obtained from the Department of Statistics Malaysia and the Central Bank of 
Malaysia databases. Country-level economic freedom and governance indicators of Malaysia were 
obtained from the Heritage Foundation and the World Bank databases. All financial values are expressed 
in real 2013 MYR using the GDP price deflator sourced from IMF.  
 
4.3 Measurements of variables 
This section discusses the variables used in the study and their measurements. The dependent variable 
is bank liquidity creation, and the explanatory variables of interest are bank competition and stock 
market liquidity. A wide range of control variables are also included in our regression models.  
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4.3.1 Measurement of bank liquidity creation  
To measure bank liquidity creation at bank level, this study employs the three-step procedure 
developed by Berger and Bouwman (2009). The Berger and Bouwman framework allows researchers to 
construct their own liquidity creation measures using information on product category (Cat) or maturity 
(Mat) of bank balance sheet items or a mix of both “Cat” and “Mat” information, depending on the 
nature of the balance sheet data availability27. Four alternative liquidity creation measures were 
developed by Berger and Bouwman (2009) in their study, namely “Cat fat” and “Mat fat” for liquidity 
creation measures including both on- and off-balance sheet items and “Cat nonfat” and “Mat nonfat” 
for liquidity creation measures including on-balance sheet items and excluding off-balance sheet items.  
 
Because our dataset does provide a maturity breakdown of two major bank liquidity creation activities – 
loans and deposits, we are able to construct “Mat” liquidity creation measures, in addition to “Cat” 
measures. Table 4.1 summarises the three-step procedure employed to construct our “Cat” and “Mat” 
liquidity creation measures. 
                                                          
27 For example, Fungacova and Weill (2012), Fungácová et al. (2013b) and Hackethal et al. (2010) employed only 
“Cat nonfat” and “Mat nonfat” liquidity creation measures and excluded off-balance sheet items from their 
measurement due to data restriction. Horvath et al. (2013, 2014) classified all on- and off-balance sheet items 
purely based on “Mat”, while Berger and Bouwman (2012) and Joh and Kim (2012) ) classified all items based 
entirely on “Cat”. 
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Table 4.1 Berger and Bouwman (2009) liquidity creation measure 
Step one: Classify all bank activities as liquid, semi-liquid or illiquid based on product category (Cat) or maturity (Mat) 
Step two: Assign weights to the activities classified in step one 
 
Assets 
Illiquid (weight =
1
2
) 
Semi-liquid (weight = 0) 
Liquid (weight =
1
2
 ) 
Cat 
Commercial, industrial and business loans 
Other loans 
Property, plant and equipment  
Investment in subsidiaries, joint ventures and 
associates 
Intangible assets 
Deferred taxation 
Other non-current assets 
 
Cat 
Consumer/retail loans 
Residential mortgage loans 
Interbank loans 
Loans to governments and statutory bodies 
Cat / Mat 
Cash and short-term funds 
Deposits and placements with banks and other 
financial institutions 
Securities 
Derivative assets at fair value 
Mat 
Loans, advances and financing with a 
remaining maturity of more than one year 
Property, plant and equipment  
Investment in subsidiaries, joint ventures and 
associates 
Intangible assets 
Deferred taxation 
Other non-current assets 
Mat  
Loans, advances and financing with a 
remaining maturity of less than one year 
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Liabilities and equity 
Liquid (weight =
1
2
) 
Semi-liquid (weight = 0) 
Illiquid (weight =
1
2
 ) 
Cat 
Transaction deposits 
Saving deposits 
Money market deposits 
Deposits from banks  
Derivative liabilities at fair value 
 
Cat 
All term deposits 
Other deposits 
Repos 
Cat 
Subordinated debts 
Bonds and debentures 
Other non-current liabilities 
Equity 
Mat 
Term deposits maturing within six months 
Transaction deposits 
Saving deposits 
Money market deposits 
Deposits from banks  
Derivative liabilities at fair value 
Mat  
Term deposits with a remaining maturity of 
between six months and one year 
Repos 
Mat 
Term deposits with a remaining maturity of 
more than one year 
Subordinated debts 
Bonds and debentures 
Other non-current liabilities 
Equity 
Off-balance sheet items 
Illiquid (weight =
1
2
) 
Semi-liquid (weight = 0) 
Liquid (weight =
1
2
 ) 
Cat / Mat 
Direct credit substitutes 
Standby letters of credit 
Unutilised credit card lines 
Forward purchase commitments 
Contingent liabilities 
Cat / Mat 
Unconditionally cancellable credit 
commitments 
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Step three: Combine bank activities as classified in step one and weighted in step two to construct four alternative liquidity creation measures 
CATFAT = 
+ 
1
2
*illiquid assets (Cat) 
+ 0*semiliquid assets (Cat) 1
2
  *liquid assets (Cat) 
 
+ 
1
2
*liquid liabilities (Cat) 
+ 0*semiliquid liabilities (Cat) 1
2
  *illiquid liabilities and equity (Cat) 
 
+ 
1
2
*illiquid off-balance sheet items 
+ 0*semiliquid off-balance sheet items 1
2
  *liquid off-balance sheet items 
CATNONFAT = 
+
1
2
 *illiquid assets (Cat) 
+ 0*semiliquid assets (Cat) 1
2
  *liquid assets (Cat) 
 
+ 
1
2
*liquid liabilities (Cat) 
+ 0*semiliquid liabilities (Cat) 1
2
  *illiquid liabilities and equity (Cat) 
MATFAT = 
+
1
2
 *illiquid assets (Mat) 
+ 0*semiliquid assets (Mat) 1
2
  *liquid assets (Mat) 
 
+ 
1
2
*liquid liabilities (Mat) 
+ 0*semiliquid liabilities (Mat) 1
2
  *illiquid liabilities and equity (Mat) 
 
+ 
1
2
*illiquid off-balance sheet items 
+ 0*semiliquid off-balance sheet items 1
2
  *liquid off-balance sheet items 
MATNONFAT = 
+
1
2
 *illiquid assets (Mat) 
+ 0*semiliquid assets (Mat) 1
2
  *liquid assets (Mat) 
 
+ 
1
2
*liquid liabilities (Mat) 
+ 0*semiliquid liabilities (Mat) 1
2
  *illiquid liabilities and equity (Mat) 
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4.3.1.1 Step one: classify all bank activities as liquid, semi-liquid or illiquid 
All banks’ balance sheet activities  are classified as liquid, semi-liquid or illiquid based on the ease, 
cost and time rule. Specifically, all assets are classified as liquid, semi-liquid or illiquid based on the 
ease, cost and time for banks to dispose of their assets to obtain liquid funds upon customers' 
demands. Bank liabilities and equity are classified as liquid, semi-liquid or illiquid based on the ease, 
cost and time for customers and investors to obtain liquid funds from the bank. Off-balance sheet 
items are similarly treated using the ease, cost and time rule.  
a. Assets 
For the “Cat” liquidity creation measures, commercial and industrial loans are categorised as 
illiquid assets because these loans cannot be liquidated quickly without a fire sale or incurring a 
substantial loss. We classify loans that are relatively easier and less expensive to dispose of as 
semiliquid. For example, residential mortgages and consumer loans are relatively easy to sell to 
the national securitisation house, Cagamas. It is also relatively easy to sell loans made to other 
banking institutions, government and statutory bodies because the counterparties are generally 
established and informationally transparent. For the “Mat” liquidity creation measures, our 
dataset allows us to classify all loans with a remaining contractual maturity of less than one year 
as semiliquid, while loans with a remaining maturity of more than one year are classified as 
illiquid. 
 
As for other bank assets for which maturity is not applicable, we classify these items in the exact 
same way as the “Cat” approach. Similarly to loans, asset items that typically cannot be 
liquidated quickly without incurring a substantial cost are classified as illiquid. These illiquid 
assets include property and equipment, investment in subsidiaries, joint ventures and associates 
and intangible assets. Assets such as cash, due from banks, securities, derivative assets and other 
marketable assets are classified as liquid because these items can be converted to cash quickly 
without incurring a major loss.  
 
b. Liabilities and equity 
All transaction and savings deposits as well as money market deposits are classified as liquid 
liabilities as they can be withdrawn from banks almost instantly and cheaply, as compared to 
term deposits and other short-term borrowed money. Hence, for the “Cat” measures, term 
deposits are classified as semiliquid because all term deposits, regardless of their maturity, 
cannot be withdrawn without incurring a penalty. For the “Mat” measures, term deposits with a 
remaining contractual maturity of less than six months are grouped as liquid liabilities, between 
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six to twelve months are grouped as semiliquid liabilities, and greater than one year are treated 
as illiquid liabilities. We treat subordinated term loans, due to subsidiaries, equity and other 
liabilities that generally cannot be withdrawn from the bank without incurring a substantial cost 
as illiquid. Although some creditors and investors are able to sell their claims on the bank, the 
fund they retrieve is from new investors elsewhere, not from the bank. Thus, these liabilities and 
equity are illiquid from the bank’s perspective. 
 
c. Off-balance sheet activities 
Off-balance sheet credit-related commitments and contingencies become functionally similar to 
on-balance sheet business loans when the funds must be provided by the bank upon the 
customer’s demand. These illiquid bank commitments include direct credit substitutes, unutilised 
credit card lines, forward purchase commitments and contingent liabilities. Any loan 
commitments that can be unconditionally cancelled at any time by the bank are classified as 
semiliquid.  
 
4.3.1.2 Step two: assign weights to the activities classified in step one 
All balance sheet activities classified in step one are assigned a weight of 
1
2 , 0 or 
1
2

 in 
consistency with the liquidity creation theory that both sources and uses of funds contribute equally 
to liquidity creation (Berger & Bouwman, 2009). Maximum liquidity is created for the nonbank public 
when the bank finances its illiquid assets by liquid liabilities, so a positive weight of 
1
2  is assigned to 
illiquid assets and liquid liabilities, respectively, in order to attribute half of the total liquidity 
creation amount to the sources of funds and the other half to the uses of funds. For illustration, 
assume a bank does not maintain liquid reserves, the bank creates a maximum of one hundred 
dollars of liquidity for the public when one hundred dollars of demand deposit placed with the bank 
is used to fund one hundred dollars of commercial loan for borrowers. A mathematical expression of 
this liquidity creation activity is $100*
1
2 +$100*
1
2 = $100. The same logic applies whereby illiquid 
liabilities, equity and liquid assets are assigned a weight of 
1
2

 because when illiquid liabilities or 
equity is used to finance liquid assets, maximum liquidity is withdrawn by the bank from the public. 
A weight of 0 is assigned to semi-liquid assets and liabilities, assuming semi-liquid activities fall 
halfway between liquid and illiquid activities. In addition, illiquid off-balance sheet activities are 
weighted 
1
2  because they function similarly to on-balance sheet business loans when they are 
called on demand. 
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4.3.1.3 Step three: combine activities as classified in step one and as weighted in step two 
Lastly, the weights of 
1
2 , 0 or 
1
2

 assigned in step two are multiplied by the MYR values of the 
respective balance sheet items, then the weighted MYR values are summed up to arrive at the total 
MYR value of liquidity creation by each bank.  
 
This study normalises the MYR amount of liquidity creation by total assets for each bank before 
including them in the regression models. Normalisation by total assets is necessary to allow 
meaningful comparisons of liquidity creation across banks and to avoid giving undue weight to the 
large banks (Berger & Bouwman, 2009). Regressing liquidity creation without normalisation can 
amount to regressing bank size on bank competition and other explanatory variables. We label our 
four alternative bank liquidity creation measures after their respective construction approach as 
CATFAT_TA, CATNONFAT_TA, MATFAT_TA and MATNONFAT_TA. More specifically, CATFAT_TA 
indicates total bank on- and off-balance sheet liquidity creation measure based on “Cat” 
classification approach; CATNONFAT_TA is total bank on-balance sheet liquidity creation measure 
based on “Cat” classification approach; MATFAT_TA is total bank on- and off-balance sheet liquidity 
creation measure based on “Mat” classification approach; MATNONFAT_TA is total bank on-balance 
sheet liqudidity creation measure based on “Mat” classification approach. This study also uses 
OFFLC_TA as an additional measure of bank liquidity provision through off-balance sheet 
components only.  
 
We agree with Berger and Bouwman (2009) that “CATFAT_TA” provides a more precise bank 
liquidity creation approximation as compared with the other three measures for two main reasons. 
First, the “Cat” measures are preferred to the “Mat” measures because, in practice, banks create 
liquidity for the non-bank public mainly through a liquidity transformation mechanism, rather than 
through maturity transformation. For instance, a 10-year residential mortgage is more liquid than a 
10-year commercial loan from the bank’s point of view because the residential mortgage can be 
securitised and sold easily. Similarly, term deposits are not as liquid as transaction or savings 
deposits because a penalty can be imposed on early withdrawal of term deposits regardless of their 
maturity. Second, the “fat” measures are preferred over the “nonfat” measures because banks in 
this innovative financial era carry out their liquidity creator role not only through traditional on-
balance sheet activities, but also increasingly through off-balance sheet activities, such as through 
loan commitments that serve similarly to business loans when they are called on demand. Hence, 
“CATFAT_TA” is our preferred liquidity creation measure. 
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4.3.2 Measurement of bank competition 
There are two divisions of empirical approaches to measuring bank competition in the literature, 
namely the traditional industrial organisation (IO) method that focuses on the structural approach 
and the new empirical IO method that focuses on the non-structural approach (Degryse & Ongena, 
2008). The structural approach was popular in the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) and 
efficient-structure (ES) research until the early 1990s. The SCP hypothesis posits that high bank 
market concentration entitles incumbent banks to a certain degree of market power, allowing them 
to behave non-competitively and earn monopolistic profits. The ES hypothesis, on the other hand, 
suggests that bank efficiency is a determinant of bank performance which in turn affects the market 
share of the bank and bank market concentration. Both SCP and ES studies assume that greater bank 
market concentration is associated with greater market power or inversely related to bank 
competition, which is, however, not always the case. Examples of structural bank market power 
measures include the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and the market share of the n-largest banks 
in the banking sector.  
 
The use of the structural approach has been widely criticised by the new empirical IO researchers 
because it overemphasises the market structure over the bank’s behaviour that drives its market 
power (Aghion et al., 2005; Borenstein & Bushnell, 1999; Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009; Connor & 
Peterson, 1992; Dell’Ariccia, 2001).  Generally, the new empirical IO advocators assert that the non-
structural approach is superior to the structural approach in two main ways. First, the structural 
approach fails to consider the elasticity of demand for the bank’s products and services. With 
growing financial liberalisation, for instance, through relaxations of (foreign) bank entry and activity 
restrictions, bank competition has become less sensitive to market structure, but more sensitive to 
the bank’s contestability (Claessens & Laeven, 2004; Connor & Peterson, 1992; Borenstein & 
Bushnell, 1999). Carbó-Valverde et al. (2009) documented that the structural approach lacks 
consistency and robustness in measuring market power and does not produce similar results to the 
non-structural approach. However, after controlling for the elasticity of demand and market 
contestability, the conflicting results can be reconciled. Second, the structural approach relies 
heavily on the geographic and product market definitions of banks, thus, the bank competition 
measure is confined to the defined market at an aggregate level. Since banks today often operate 
across national borders and compete with banks in other countries, the non-structural approach 
overcomes this issue by measuring bank market power directly (Aghion et al., 2005; Joh & Kim, 
2012).  
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The commonly used non-structural bank competition measures are the Lerner index of market 
power, the Panzar-Rosse (PR) H-statistic and the Boone indicator. In this study, we employ the 
Lerner index as an inverse proxy for bank competition because the Lerner index of market power 
measures bank competition at the bank level, while the PR H-statistic and the Boone indicator 
measure bank competition at the aggregate market level (Berger et al., 2009; Horvath et al., 2013, 
2016). It is important to have this characteristic because our study is interested in bank-level 
investigation of the relationship between bank competition and liquidity creation28.  
  
The Lerner index of market power measures the difference between average price and marginal 
costs of output as a ratio to average price (Lerner, 1934). The Lerner index is the inverse of the 
elasticity of demand of a monopolist when the monopolist maximises its monopoly revenue in an 
equilibrium where marginal costs coincide with marginal revenues. However, as maximum 
monopoly revenue is not always obtained in practice, the Lerner index must be read “not as 
potential monopoly, but as monopoly in force” (Lerner, 1934, p.170)29. In the context of banking, the 
Lerner index of market power captures the exercised pricing power of the bank to mark up the price 
over the marginal cost of its output. In other words, the higher the Lerner index of a bank, the lower 
the competition facing the bank. The Lerner index is mathematically expressed as:  
it it
it
it
P MC
LERNER
P

                                                                                       (1)  
where Pit is the observed average price of bank output, measured by the total revenues divided by 
the total assets for bank i at time t, and MCit is the marginal cost of bank output for bank i at time t. 
Following Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), de Guevara et al. (2005), Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria 
                                                          
28 For brevity’s sake, we briefly introduce the concepts of the PR H-statistic and the Boone indicator. The PR H-
statistic captures the elasticity of bank revenues to input prices. Unlike the Lerner index, the PR H-statistic is 
not a continuous measure of market power with greater values implying higher levels of market power or 
lower bank competition. The PR H-statistic is only useful for diagnosing the competition regime of a banking 
industry (Shaffer, 2004). A banking market is characterised as monopoly if H < 0, as perfect competition if H = 
1, and as monopolistic competition if 0 < H < 1. 
On the other hand, the Boone indicator infers the level of bank market competition based on the elasticity of 
bank performance measured in terms of either profits or market share to marginal costs (Boone, 2008; Mirzaei 
& Moore, 2014; van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). The rationale behind Boone’s indicator is that the effect of 
output reallocation from less-efficient banks (banks with higher marginal costs) to more-efficient banks (banks 
with lower marginal costs) is stronger in an intensely competitive market. This implies that a competitive 
market improves the performance of more-efficient banks and impairs the performance of less-efficient banks. 
Thus, the stronger the effect of marginal costs on performance (the more negative the Boone indicator), the 
higher the degree of the market competition. 
29 A monopolist does not obtain maximum monopoly revenue in practice for numerous reasons, which may be 
accidental, as when the monopolist does not know the shape of its demand curve and his estimate of the 
elasticity of demand at the actual output is erroneous, or intentional in virtue of social or philanthropic 
reasons or for the purpose of avoiding political opposition or new competitors (Lerner, 1934). 
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(2010), Hainz et al., 2013; Shaffer (1993) and Turk-Ariss (2010), total assets is used to account for the 
aggregate output of the bank under the assumption that the heterogeneous flow of products and 
services produced by a bank is proportional to its total assets.  
 
MCit is derived from estimation of a translog cost function. This study employs the translog cost 
function of one output, three input prices and time trend, following existing studies of bank 
competition, such as Berger et al. (2009), de Guevara et al. (2005), de Guevara and Maudos (2011), 
Hainz et al. (2013), Horvath et al. (2013, 2016), Love and Martinez Peria (2013) and Turk-Ariss 
(2010). Input prices and output quantities are assumedly exogenous elements in a bank’s cost-
minimising decision process. A time trend variable is introduced into the cost function to capture the 
changes in the total cost and the slope coefficients of output and input prices over time resulting 
from the technological development. As given by equation (2), a cost function should be linear in the 
first-order exogenous input prices, output and trend factors and concave in the input prices, and 
should allow for U-shaped average cost and rotation of cost to changes in the exogenous factors 
(Murray & White, 1983; Shaffer, 1993). 
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      (2) 
where  
i denotes individual bank and t denotes specific year; 
TC = bank total operating costs measured by the sum of interest, operating, administrative and 
personnel expenses; 
Q = bank total output proxied by total assets; 
wj = input prices of deposits, fixed capital and labour;  
Trend = time trend; 
e = idiosyncratic error term; 
α, β, γ, δ, λ and π are coefficients to be estimated. 
 
Two theoretical restrictions are imposed on the cost function, namely linear homogeneity and 
symmetry restrictions on input prices (Benston et al., 1982; de Guevara et al., 2005; Hainz et al., 
2013; Horvath et al., 2013, 2016; Love & Martinez Peria, 2013; Murray & White, 1983; Turk-Ariss, 
2010). The bank’s cost function is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one in all input prices, that 
is, a proportional increase in all input prices increases the cost by the same proportion, holding other 
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exogenous factors constant. In this case, the sum of own and cross price elasticities of cost is equal 
to zero. Specifically, linear homogeneity assumption requires that: 
(a)
3
1
1j
j


 , 
(b)
3
1
0jq
j


 , 
(c)
3
1
0j
j


 , and 
(d)
3
1
0jk
j


 . 
Standard symmetry is imposed through the restriction γjk = γkj for all j ≠ k to allow for symmetric 
cross price response (Benston et al., 1982; Murray & White, 1983; Zardkoohi et al., 1986). We 
impose the restrictions by scaling total cost and input prices by one input price, following Adjei-
Frimpong et al. (2015), Hainz et al. (2013) and Turk-Ariss (2010). The restricted translog cost function 
is specified as: 
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   (3) 
where  
i denotes individual bank and t denotes specific year; 
TC* = total operating costs scaled by w3; 
Q = total outputs proxied by total assets; 
w1 = input price of deposits, measured as the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits for 
commercial banks or the ratio of income paid to depositors to total deposits for Islamic banks; 
w2 = input price of fixed capital, measured as the ratio of operating and administrative expenses 
(excluding personnel expenses) to total fixed assets; 
w3 = input price of labour, measured as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets; 
w1* = measured by w1/w3; 
w2* = measured by w2/w3; 
Trend = time trend; 
e = idiosyncratic error term; 
ρ, θ, τ, μ, φ and ϑ are coefficients to be estimated.  
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We estimate the restricted translog cost function (equation 3) using two different bank datasets:  (i) 
a combined dataset of 397 bank-year observations from 27 commercial banks and 16 fully fledged 
Islamic banks, and (ii) a dataset of 294 bank-year observations only from 27 commercial banks. We 
prefer the first dataset in the estimation of bank marginal cost given the consideration that Islamic 
banks that obey the Syariah-compliant commercial bank regulations are growing players in the 
commercial banking industry in Malaysia. Introducing Islamic banks into the cost function estimation 
provides more accurate knowledge about the cost behaviour of the industry, which allows more 
precise estimation of the market power of individual commercial banks. We assume that Islamic 
banks employ almost the same technology as conventional commercial banks and that it is 
appropriate to jointly assess the cost function of these banks, in line with the studies of Abdul-Majid 
et al. (2009), El-Gamal and Inanoglu (2005) and Love and Martinez Peria (2013). However, we also 
estimate the cost function using only conventional bank data (second dataset) to perform a 
robustness check for our empirical results in Chapter Five. A fixed effects estimator is used to 
estimate the restricted translog cost function (equation 3) to capture unobserved bank effects that 
may correlate with other explanatory variables and cause biases in the estimated coefficients. The 
regression is estimated with robust standard errors, clustered by bank, to control for cross-sectional 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation within the bank.  
 
Next, the marginal cost for each bank-year observation is calculated after taking the first derivative 
of the translog cost function with respect to Q as follows: 
*
* *
1 2 1 1 2 2 3
(ln )
ln ln ln
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                              (4) 
where coefficients ρ1, ρ2, μ1q, μ2q and θ3 are estimated from equation (3). Finally, the Lerner index for 
each bank-year observation is calculated using equation (1). We label the calculated Lerner index 
using a combined dataset of commercial and Islamic banks as LERNER and the calculated Lerner 
index using only commercial bank data as LERNER1. 
 
4.3.3 Measurement of stock market liquidity 
Financial market liquidity is an elusive concept and should exhibit the dimensions of tightness, 
immediacy, depth, breadth and resiliency which are always interrelated to some degree (Sarr & 
Lybek, 2002). No single measure has been able to capture all these dimensions, and very often, the 
information needed to measure these dimensions is not publicly available. Therefore, a wide range 
of substitute market liquidity measures have been developed, and in general, these measures can be 
categorised into transaction cost measures, volume-based measures, price impact measures and 
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other measures. These financial market liquidity measures usually capture a dimension of market 
liquidity and indirectly imply other dimensions.  
 
Since our study does not have intraday stock data for Malaysia, we make use of several low 
frequency liquidity measures that have been widely employed for developing or emerging stock 
markets (Lesmond, 2005; Kang & Zhang, 2014; Wang, 2013). These market liquidity measures 
include proportional quoted bid-ask spread, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio, turnover ratio and 
frequency of zero return days. Because liquidity of a financial market depends on the substitutability 
among the various assets traded on the particular market, the measurement of market liquidity is 
often derived from the average liquidity of the assets on the market (Lesmond, 2005; Kang & Zhang, 
2014; Pastor & Stambaugh, 2003; Sarr & Lybek, 2002; Wang, 2013). Hence, our annual stock market 
liquidity measures are constructed by taking the average of the liquidity measure across all the 
stocks traded in the year.  
 
4.3.3.1 Quoted bid-ask spread 
The quoted bid-ask spread is the most common transaction cost measure that captures the 
execution cost of completing a round-trip trade (buy and sell) of a financial asset (Bessembinder & 
Venkataraman, 2010; Fleming, 2003; Huang & Stoll, 1996). Although the bid-ask spread better 
reflects the transaction costs in a dealer market, particularly order-processing costs, asymmetric 
information costs and inventory-carrying costs, it is useful to apply the bid-ask spreads to a broker 
market like Bursa Malaysia to obtain approximations of the transaction costs that investors ought to 
recover on the market (Gabrielsen et al., 2011; Sarr & Lybek, 2002). A low bid ask spread of a stock 
implies that the stock allows investors to get in or out of the investment without losing substantial 
capital in the process. 
 
Daily quoted bid and ask prices of stocks obtained from the DataStream database are daily best bid 
and ask prices quoted at close of the market. Bid and ask prices are not reported on public days and 
weekends. The quoted bid-ask spread of a stock is expressed as a percentage of its bid-ask midpoint 
that represents the true underlying stock value for easier comparisons of transaction cost across 
stocks and time (Bessembinder & Venkataraman, 2010; Sarr & Lybek, 2002). 
( )
(( ) / 2)
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where PA is the quoted ask price and PB is the quoted bid price. The average QSPPROP of the stock 
market in a particular year is then calculated by averaging daily QSPPROP of all stocks over the year. 
Higher QSPPROP implies lower stock market liquidity. 
 
QSPPROP assumes that stock trades are executed at the quoted prices. This assumption, however, 
carries a limitation because stock trades may take place inside the quoted spread (Gabrielsen et al., 
2011; Huang & Stoll, 1996). The quoted spread will overestimate the actual transaction cost when 
trades are executed inside the spread. Given such consideration, it is important to remove extreme 
outliers (Sarr & Lybek, 2002). We define an extreme outlier as a proportional bid-ask spread that 
exceeds 80 percent, in consistency with Lesmond’s (2005) study of the emerging market. We also 
trim missing and unavailable ask or bid quotes and negative bid-ask spread quotes that could result 
from keypunching errors or other unusual cases, following Chordia et al. (2005), Huang and Stoll 
(1996), Lesmond (2005) and Kang and Zhang (2014). These filters affect about two percent of the 
total 2,969,913 daily bid-ask spread quotes in our stock sample. 
 
4.3.3.2 Turnover ratio 
Turnover ratio of a stock market measures the frequency at which outstanding shares are traded in 
the market (Lesmond, 2005; Sarr & Lybek, 2002). It is a ubiquitous but indirect measure of market 
liquidity that assumes that an actively traded market is associated with low trading costs in the 
market (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 1996a). In times when stock prices move smoothly, turnover ratio 
is useful to reflect the market breath as a high stock turnover ratio implies the existence of abundant 
and large orders in volume with minimal impact of stock prices. However, during periods of high 
stock price volatility, this measure no longer reflects changes in the trading costs because stocks 
change hands quickly and in large volume to adjust prices sharply in response to the arrival of new 
information, which impedes the market liquidity (Fleming, 2003; French & Roll, 1985; Lesmond, 
2005; Rouetbi & Mamoghli, 2014). 
 
Annual data of the turnover value and market capitalisation for the stock market are readily 
available on the BNM website (http://www.bnm.gov.my/). The stock market turnover ratio of the 
year is calculated as: 
VA
STURNOVER
AMC
   
where VA is the total value of shares traded over the year in MYR million and AMC is the average 
market capitalisation in MYR million at the beginning and end of the year. We then average the 
annual turnover ratio (STURNOVER) by the number of trading days (Dt) in the year to obtain the 
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average daily market turnover ratio (DTVR) for our empirical analysis. Higher DTVR implies higher 
stock market liquidity. 
  
4.3.3.3 Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio measures the daily price response of a stock to its order 
flow. Owing to the capability of Amihud’s illiquidity ratio in capturing the ability of stocks (or 
stock markets) to absorb large transactions without any significant price fluctuations, it is a 
useful measure of the breadth and depth of stocks (or stock markets). Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity ratio of a stock is defined as the average ratio of the absolute daily return (r) to 
the trading volume (VA) in MYR value on that day over all available trading days (Dt) of the 
stock in the year: 
1
1 Dt t
t tt
r
AMIHUD
D VA
    
Daily stock prices and volume are obtained from the DataStream database. Prior to calculating 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio for stocks, this study follows Lesmond et al (1999), Lesmond 
(2005), Chordia et al. (2001, 2005) and Huang and Stoll (1996) and applies the following data filters 
on our stock sample: 
(i) A stock in the year is excluded if its listing or delisting happened mid-year, meaning that only 
stocks that are listed on Bursa Malaysia for the entire year are included; 
(ii) Stock prices of the day and the prior day are excluded if the stock return of the day is above ±50 
percent (inclusive); and  
(iii) A stock in the year is discarded if the stock is traded less than 20 percent of total trading days 
during the year (about 50 trading days in a year). Every stock must have a sufficiently large number 
of observations in a year. 
 
After obtaining AMIHUD for all stocks, we trim the upper and lower one percent of the standardised 
AMIHUD’s distribution to remove the outliers (Amihud, 2002; Lesmond, 2005). To calculate the 
average market AMIHUD for a year, AMIHUD of stocks are averaged across all stocks in the year. The 
market AMIHUD is then multiplied by 106 to provide a common representation among the other 
stock market liquidity measures. The higher the market AMIHUD, the lower the stock market 
liquidity. 
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4.3.3.4 Zero returns 
The relative frequency of trading days with zero returns over a period was first used by Lesmond et 
al. (1999) to proxy for illiquidity and transaction costs of a stock, before it became widely employed 
in stock market liquidity studies, for instance, Bekaert et al. (2007), Charoenwong (2014), Goyenko 
et al. (2009) and Kang and Zhang (2014). The rationale behind the measure is that a stock with high 
transaction costs is more likely to have fewer trades or low trade volume, and thus, has less frequent 
price movements. Investors are intensively demotivated to acquire private information on stocks 
that are expensive to trade as they are willing to trade on new information of the stocks only when 
the value of the information outweighs the transaction cost to yield a positive net return from the 
trade. Thus, zero daily returns occur frequently on illiquid stocks as no new information about the 
stocks is reflected on the stock prices. 
        
       
numberof dayswith zeroreturnsina year
ZERORET
numberof stock trading daysina year
  
We calculate the percentage of zero return days in a year for all stocks and average them to obtain 
the average market illiquidity for the year. Similarly to the data filters (i) and (ii) applied to the 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio, a stock in the year is deleted if the stock’s listing or delisting 
happened mid-year. Higher ZERORET implies lower stock market liquidity. 
 
4.3.3.5 Aggregate stock market illiquidity index score 
To ensure that our empirical results for stock market liquidity are rigorous, we develop an aggregate 
stock market illiquidity index score with the aim of capturing all dimensions of market liquidity in a 
single measure, using the Paasche index technique. The rationale behind our market illiquidity index 
is credited to Choudhry (2010) who devised composite aggregate liquidity scores for bond markets 
using different methodologies including the Paasche index technique. Our aggregate market 
illiquidity index score is computed from the four market liquidity measures identified above, 
QSPPROP, AMIHUD, DTVR and ZERORET. Since QSPPROP, AMIHUD and ZERORET are stock market 
illiquidity measures and DTVR is a measure of stock market liquidity, we perform an inverse 
transformation of DTVR in order to attribute higher DTVR to greater market illiquidity. The 
calculation of the market illiquidity index score is undertaken as follows. We, first, calculate index 
scores for each market illiquidity measure over the sample period using the final year value as the 
base value. Next, these component index series are aggregated using an equal weighting to arrive at 
a composite index series for the market (PINDEX4). Equal weight is assigned to all component index 
series as we assume that each measure of stock market liquidity is of equal usefulness. Higher 
PINDEX4 implies lower stock market liquidity. 
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4.3.4 Measurements of control variables 
Our control variables can be classified into (i) bank-specific characteristics, (ii) domestic banking and 
stock market conditions and (iii) macroeconomic factors. The definitions of these control variables 
are tabulated in Table 5.1 in Chapter Five. 
 
4.3.4.1 Bank-specific control variables 
Bank-specific control variables used in the study include bank size, bank equity, bank risk, 
government ownership, merger and acquisition history and operation of the Islamic Banking 
Scheme. Berger et al. (2005a), Keeley (1990), Petersen and Rajan (2002) and Stein (2002) in the 
literature reported that the organisational form of the bank, which is determined by bank size, 
influences the kinds of activities the bank engages in and benefits from, such as information 
acquisition, lending technology specialisation and implicit government protection. Hence, we control 
for the effect of bank size, measured by the natural log of total assets (lnTA), on bank liquidity 
creation. Bank liquidity creation studies that include bank size in the regression models include Al-
Khouri (2012), Berger and Bouwman (2009), Hackethal et al. (2010), Joh and Kim (2012) and Lei and 
Song (2013). 
 
Controlling for bank equity capital ratio (EQR) measured by the total equity as a proportion to total 
assets, is important because prior literature has documented two opposing hypotheses for the effect 
of bank capital on liquidity creation (Berger & Bouwman, 2009; Diamond & Rajan, 2001; Horváth et 
al., 2014). Under the “financial fragility-crowding out” hypothesis, an increase in bank capital crowds 
out deposits that discipline a bank from withholding efforts to enhance depositors’ welfare, creating 
a less fragile capital structure in the bank. As a result, the bank has less incentive to issue credit and 
create less liquidity. In contrast, the alternative “risk absorption” hypothesis predicts a positive 
relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation because an increase in bank capital helps to 
expand the bank’s risk-bearing capacity.    
 
In addition, our study controls for bank risk using two risk measures. Following Berger and Bouwman 
(2009), Berger et al. (2009) and Horvath et al. (2013, 2016), the first measure is the distance to 
insolvency (ZSCORE), computed by dividing the sum of the return on assets (ROA) and the equity to 
asset ratios by the standard deviation of ROA, 
( / )
ROA
ROA Equity Assets
ZSCORE


 . ZSCORE can 
also be interpreted as an aggregate score of the bank’s profitability, capitalisation and return 
volatility. The higher the ZSCORE of a bank, the lower the bank’s insolvency risk. Berger and 
Bouwman (2009) documented a positive relationship between ZSCORE and bank liquidity creation 
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for large banks and an inverse relationship for small banks in the U.S. The findings imply that large 
banks create more liquidity when facing less default risk, while small banks are more active in 
creating liquidity when facing a higher default risk. Horvath et al. (2013, 2016) also found a negative 
relationship between ZSCORE and bank liquidity creation. The second risk measure is credit risk 
(CREDIT_RISK), measured as the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets of bank, following 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) and Horvath et al. (2013). CREDIT_RISK controls for the risk the bank is 
bearing when extending credit to borrowers. 
 
Almost all the domestic commercial banks in Malaysia have ownership claims by Malaysian 
government-linked investment companies (GLICs). Despite the government allegedly not interfering 
with the management of these government-linked banks, products offered by these banks may carry 
a perceived implicit guarantee or any political influence that can lead to an imbalanced development 
of the banking industry (Dinç, 2005; World Bank, 2013). Hence, this study controls for the proportion 
of shares held in a bank by government-linked companies and agencies (GLCOWN). 
 
Since there was a consolidation surge in the domestic banking industry in the early sample period, a 
dummy variable is introduced to control for the merger and acquisition history (MA) of the bank 
because the bank’s conduct, strategies, reserve holdings and asset portfolios often change 
substantially following merger and acquisition (Berger & Bouwman, 2009; Carletti et al., 2007; Joh & 
Kim, 2012; Sapienza, 2002). The MA dummy variable takes the value of one if the bank was involved 
in at least one merger or acquisition with other banking institutions over the past three years, and 
zero otherwise. 
 
Under the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013, Islamic banking businesses are operated either by 
fully-fledged Islamic banks or through the Islamic Banking Scheme (IBS) under a conventional 
commercial bank. Since several commercial banks in our sample provide IBS business, a dummy 
variable for IBS (IBSDUMMY) is introduced to control for the influence of IBS on liquidity creation by 
these commercial banks, although the influence is marginal. 
 
4.3.4.2 Banking and stock market-specific control variables 
To control for the structure of the local banking market, this study employs the Herfindahl–
Hirschman index of bank deposits (HHI_D) that measures the concentration level of the deposit 
market in which banks compete for deposits. Empirical works that have shown bank market 
concentration influences bank liquidity creation and credit availability to firms include Berger and 
80 
 
Bouwman (2009), Carbó-Valverde et al. (2009), Joh and Kim (2012), Love and Martinez Peria (2013) 
and Petersen and Rajan (1995).  
 
This study also employs stock market capitalisation to gross domestic product ratio (SCAPRATIO) to 
control for possible influence of the overall development of the Malaysian stock market. Bencivenga 
et al. (1995), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996), Dey and Flaherty (2005) and Levine (1991) have 
reported that stock market development exerts a setback for the development of the banking 
industry, for instance, in the aspects of firms’ financing choices and bank profitability. 
 
4.2.4.3 Macroeconomic control variables 
To control for interest rate environment, we use real overnight interbank rate to proxy for the 
monetary policy set by BNM (MP). It has been statistically shown that a tighter monetary policy 
reduces liquidity creation by banks, especially by smaller banks (Berger & Bouwman, 2012; 
Chatterjee, 2015; Fungácová et al., 2013a; Hackethal et al., 2010). A restrictive monetary policy 
implies that the short-term refinancing costs of banks become more expensive in the case of 
unanticipated liquidity strain. This prompts banks to maintain more liquid reserves within 
themselves and ration credit supply in the private sector, resulting in an overall drop of liquidity 
creation by banks (Hackethal et al., 2010). In addition, a restrictive monetary policy reduces 
economic activity and demand for bank credit as it subsequently affects a rise in market interest 
rates (ECB, 2012).  
 
Controlling for real macroeconomic growth (GDPRATE) is also important because economic growth 
can alter liquidity creation by banks through changes in the balance sheet activities (Beck et al., 
2004; Fung ́cová et al., 2013; Joh & Kim, 2012). Finally, this study includes a dummy variable to 
control for the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis (CRISISDUMMY) on bank liquidity creation. 
Since the crisis unfolded in late 2007 and lasted till late 2009, CRISISDUMMY takes the value of one 
for bank observations falling in the years 2007, 2008 and 2009, zero otherwise. 
 
4.4 Empirical model 
To examine the empirical relationships of interest, this study employs the fixed effects estimator, 
following existing bank liquidity creation studies, such as Berger and Bouwman (2009),  Joh and Kim 
(2012) and Xu (2010).  The fixed effects estimator is preferred over the random effects estimator 
because the fixed effects estimator is more consistent in estimating ceteris paribus effects in the 
presence of unobserved individual fixed effects (ai) that correlate with the explanatory variables. 
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Such a correlation can induce endogeneity bias to the estimation. By removing ai through a 
transformation, the fixed effects estimator is robust to the endogeneity bias (Wooldridge, 2013). 
Since the sample in this study covers most of the commercial banks in Malaysia, it is not a random 
sample representing a subset of the bank population. As such, we cannot confidently assert no 
correlation between ai and any explanatory variable as assumed by the random-effects estimator30.  
 
The baseline regression model of our study is written in equation (5). 
1 2 3it it it it i itSLIQLC LERN UIER XDITY a u      
                                           (5) 
where 
i denotes individual bank and t denotes specific year; 
LC = bank liquidity creation measures as a proportion of total assets; 
LERNER = bank market power as an inverse proxy for bank competition; 
SLIQUIDITY = stock market liquidity measures; 
X = a vector of control variables including EQR, lnTA, CREDIT_RISK, ZSCORE, GLCOWN, MA,  
IBSDUMMY, HHI_D, SCAPRATIO, MP, GDPRATE and CRISISDUMMY 
a = time-invariant unobserved individual effect; 
u = idiosyncratic error term; 
β = coefficients to be estimated. 
 
The fixed effects estimator uses the within transformation to eliminate unobserved individual fixed 
effects. The transformation, first, requires computation of the sample average of variables over time 
for each bank, as shown below: 
1 2 3i i i i i iSLIQUIDITYLC LERNER X a u      
                              (6) 
Equation (6) is then subtracted from equation (5) for each t to obtain time-demeaned equation (7): 
1 2 3it it it it itSLILC LERN QUIDITYER X u     
                        (7) 
where LC  denotes the time-demeaned liquidity creation, and the same notation is used for each 
explanatory variable and idiosyncratic error term. The most important thing about the transformed 
equation (7) is that the fixed effect (ai) drops out.  
 
We examine our first research objective by estimating our regression model (see equation 5) using 
two subsamples of Malaysian commercial banks - small banks and large banks. We examine research 
                                                          
30 We perform Hausman’s (1978) test, and the result confirms that the fixed-effects estimator provides more 
consistent estimates for this study than does the random-effects estimator. 
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objectives two and three simultaneously by running the regression model using the full sample 
banks. In consistency with previous bank liquidity creation studies, our regression model is 
estimated with robust standard errors, clustered by bank, to control for cross-sectional 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation within the bank. The usual standard errors reported by the 
fixed effects estimator are no longer valid in violations of the heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation assumptions of the estimator (Wooldridge, 2013). 
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Chapter 5 
Empirical Results and Discussions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter comprises four sections. Section 5.2 presents descriptive statistics of all variables used in 
this study and shows the changes of our variables of interest, particularly bank liquidity creation, 
bank competition and stock market liquidity. Section 5.3 shows the baseline regression results of the 
empirical models, and Section 5.4 reports the results of the additional tests. Section 5.5 discusses the 
results with the support of previous studies. 
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
This section presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in this study. Table 5.1 defines and 
summarises the bank liquidity creation measures and explanatory variables used in this study. 
Descriptions of these variables are in Chapter 4. Table 5.2 presents the average bank liquidity 
creation for the full bank sample and separately for large bank and small bank samples over the years 
2001 to 2013, based on CATFAT, CATNONFAT, MATFAT and MATNONFAT liquidity creation measures. 
The magnitude of bank liquidity creation is expressed both in real 2013 MYR and as a proportion of 
total assets. Table 5.2 also includes graphs of average bank liquidity creation over the sample period 
for the corresponding measures. Based on the results in Table 5.2, the MYR amount of liquidity 
creation computed using the “maturity” classification (MATFAT and MATNONFAT) is greater than the 
“category” classification (CATFAT and CATNONFAT). This is not surprising because the standard we 
use to classify the liquidity of banks’ balance sheet activities is more stringent with the “category” 
approach.  
 
Table 5.2 reveals several interesting facts about bank liquidity creation in Malaysia. Irrespective of 
liquidity creation measures, the average liquidity creation of all commercial banks, measured in real 
2013 MYR, increased precipitately from the year 2001 to 2013. For example, based on CATFAT, 
average bank liquidity creation increased by about 44 percent from MYR 13.7 billion in 2001 to MYR 
19.7 billion in 2013. When looking closely at the banks of different size classes, upward trends of 
liquidity creation are observed for large banks for all four liquidity creation measures throughout the 
period, as compared to small banks which exhibited rather erratic patterns and decreased from the 
year 2001 to 2013. The relative liquidity creation of large and small banks reflects that a majority of 
the liquidity in the non-bank sectors in Malaysia was created by large banks. 
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To avoid giving undue weight to large banks, Table 5.2 also presents bank liquidity creation as a 
proportion of bank total assets numerically and graphically. We find that, regardless of the bank 
size classes, all the proportional bank liquidity creation measures exhibited faltering movements 
throughout the years 2001 to 2013, except the less stringent proportional MATFAT and MATNONFAT 
liquidity creation of large banks that showed a moderate rise over the same period. In other words, 
the growth of proportional bank liquidity creation of small banks was as obscure as their liquidity 
creation in MYR amount, and the growth of proportional bank liquidity creation of large banks was 
stubbornly low as compared to their rapidly growing liquidity creation in MYR amount. These 
findings, thus, suggest that, on the average, bank liquidity creation had not grown as fast as bank 
total assets, which implies that the growth in bank total assets was increasingly supported by non-
liquidity creation activities such as cash reserves. 
 
Since business corporates have increasingly relied on banks’ credit contingent and commitment 
products, it is important to analyse the extent to which bank liquidity creation is attributable to 
banks’ off-balance sheet contingencies and commitments in relation to their on-balance sheet 
activities. Figure 5.1 displays the over-time changes of average bank liquidity creation by on-balance 
sheet (CATNONFAT and MATNONFAT) and off-balance sheet (OFFLC) components for (a) the full 
bank sample and separately for (b) large banks and (c) small banks. It is shown that off-balance sheet 
activities played a substantial role in the liquidity creation of banks over the sample period, but the 
extent of its contribution is dependent on the liquidity classification approach of bank activities. 
Based on our preferred “category” approach, the average contribution of OFFLC to total liquidity 
creation over the period ranges from 53 percent to 72 percent for the entire sample banks  and from 
52 percent to 71 percent for the large bank sample. However, based on the less stringent “maturity” 
approach, OFFLC contributed far less to the total liquidity creation of these banks, which was about 
37 percent on the average. In contrast to large banks, irrespective of the “category” or “maturity” 
approach, the liquidity creation of small banks was mostly attributed to their off-balance sheet 
activities. As indicated by negative average CATNONFAT and MATNONFAT in Figure 5.1(c), on-
balance sheet undertakings of small banks had been withdrawing liquidity in the non-bank sectors 
since the year 2004. 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics of variables for the sample period 2001 to 2013 
Variable Definition Mean Std. deviation 
Bank liquidity creation (LC) 
CATFAT_TA  
(preferred measure) 
 
Total bank LC calculated from both on- and off-balance sheet items using the category 
approach. LC is scaled by total assets of bank 
 
0.20 
 
0.21 
CATNONFAT_TA Bank LC calculated from on-balance sheet items using the category approach. LC is 
scaled by total assets of bank 
0.025 0.17 
MATFAT_TA Bank LC calculated from both on- and off-balance sheet items using the maturity 
approach. LC is scaled by total assets of bank 
0.33 0.27 
MATNONFAT_TA Bank LC calculated from on-balance sheet items using the maturity approach. LC is 
scaled by total assets of bank 
0.15 0.23 
OFFLC_TA Bank off-balance sheet LC calculated using the category approach. LC is scaled by total 
assets of bank 
0.18 0.090 
CATFATRM 
CATNONFATRM 
MATFATRM 
MATNONFATRM 
OFFLCRM 
Bank LC calculated using the same approach as above, except that LC is expressed in 
real 2013 MYR billions using the GDP price deflator 
15.1 
5.74 
25.8 
16.4 
9.35 
23.6 
12.2 
36.0 
25.2 
12.2 
    
Bank level market power 
 
LERNER 
LERNER1 
 
Lerner index: An inverse measure of bank competition that denotes the market power 
of bank in setting the mark-up price over the marginal cost 
Lerner index estimated using a dataset of commercial and Islamic banks 
Lerner index estimated using a dataset of commercial banks 
 
 
0.28 
0.26 
 
 
0.23 
0.23 
Bank capital ratio 
EQR 
 
Total equity capital as a proportion of total assets 
 
0.13 
 
0.090 
    
Bank size 
lnTA 
 
Natural log of total assets 
 
9.95 
 
1.59 
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Bank risk 
CREDIT_RISK 
ZSCORE 
 
Credit risk measure: Risk-weighted assets divided by total assets 
Distance to bankruptcy: The sum of return on assets ratio (ROA) and equity to assets 
ratio divided by the standard deviation of ROA 
 
 
0.62 
29.5 
 
0.17 
19.3 
Government ownership 
GLCOWN 
 
Proportion of shares held in a bank by government-linked companies and agencies 
 
 
0.098 
 
0.18 
Mergers and acquisitions  
MA 
 
A dummy that equals one if the bank was involved in any bank mergers and 
acquisitions over the past three years, zero otherwise  
 
0.12 
 
0.32 
    
Local banking market 
concentration 
HHI_D 
 
CR3 
 
 
Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) based on bank deposits: The sum of the squared 
deposit market share of each bank in the year 
Asset market share of the three largest banks in the year 
 
 
0.11 
 
0.47 
 
 
0.006 
 
0.029 
    
Islamic banking scheme 
IBSDUMMY 
 
A dummy variable that equals one if the bank operates Islamic Banking Scheme (IBS) 
business, zero otherwise 
 
0.37 
 
0.48 
    
Stock market liquidity 
QSPPROP 
AMIHUD 
DTVR 
ZERORET 
PINDEX4 
 
 
 
The average daily quoted bid-ask spread in the year, in percentage 
The average daily ratio of absolute price change to turnover value in the year 
The average daily turnover ratio in the year, in percentage 
Percentage of zero return days to total trading days in the year 
Paasche-based aggregate stock market illiquidity index score computed from the 
equally-weighted average of QSPPROP, AMIHUD, DTVR and ZERORET 
 
 
5.27 
11.3 
0.13 
38.4 
107 
 
2.35 
9.95 
0.033 
4.42 
39.0 
Stock market capitalisation  
SCAPRATIO 
 
Value of listed shares as a share of GDP in the year 
 
1.42 
 
0.20 
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Local economic environment  
MP  
GDPRATE  
 
Real overnight interbank rates  
Real GDP growth rate 
 
0.029 
0.048 
 
0.004 
0.023 
    
2008 financial crisis 
CRISISDUMMY 
 
A dummy variable that equals one for bank observations in 2007, 2008 and 2009; zero 
otherwise 
 
0.22 
 
0.42 
    
Elements for LERNER 
computation 
w1 
w2 
 
w3 
P 
 
 
Price of deposits: Ratio of interest expenses to total deposits 
Price of fixed capital: Ratio of operating and administrative expenses (excluding 
personnel expenses) to total fixed assets 
Price of labour: Ratio of personnel expenses to total assets 
Price of outputs: Ratio of total revenues to total assets 
 
 
0.025 
2.89 
 
0.007 
0.044 
 
 
0.011 
3.39 
 
0.002 
0.012 
    
Instrumental variable    
FINANCIALFREE Financial freedom score: A measure of independence from government control and 
interference in the financial sector 
38.7 8.74 
 
INVESTFREE Investment freedom score: A measure of regulatory restrictions on the flow of 
investment capital  
36.0 6.56 
POLITICSA Political stability and absence of violence: A measure of perceptions of political 
instability and politically-motivated violence, including terrorism 
0.21 0.19 
PROPERTYRIGHT Property rights score: A measure of the degree to which a country’s laws protect 
private property rights and are enforced effectively 
50.8 1.82 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 5.2 Summary statistics on average bank liquidity creation over the years 2001 to 2013 (in MYR billion and as a proportion of total assets) 
Liquidity creation (LC) measure 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 LC as a proportion of total asset 
MYR bn 
(by TA) 
MYR bn 
(by TA) 
MYR bn 
(by TA) 
MYR bn 
(by TA) 
MYR bn (by 
TA) 
MYR bn 
(by TA) 
MYR bn 
(by TA) 
CATFAT 
(preferred) 
 
All banks 
 
Large banks 
 
Small banks 
13.7 
(0.32) 
20.5 
(0.37) 
1.72 
(0.23) 
13.1 
(0.22) 
20.0 
(0.31) 
0.97 
(0.058) 
12.4 
(0.16) 
19.0 
(0.26) 
0.010 
(-0.023) 
15.1 
(0.19) 
23.7 
(0.28) 
0.19 
(0.034) 
16.8 
(0.18) 
27.2 
(0.26) 
-0.045 
(0.052) 
15.9 
(0.15) 
29.3 
(0.26) 
0.15 
(0.009) 
19.7 
(0.21) 
37.1 
(0.29) 
0.77 
(0.12) 
 
CATNONFAT All banks 
 
Large banks 
 
Small banks 
5.56 
(0.09) 
8.28 
(0.13) 
0.80 
(0.034) 
4.59 
(0.017) 
7.13 
(0.095) 
0.14 
(-0.12) 
3.81 
(-0.028) 
6.14 
(0.066) 
-0.58 
(-0.20) 
4.90 
(0.023) 
7.84 
(0.079) 
-0.24 
(-0.075) 
6.32 
(0.019) 
10.5 
(0.083) 
-0.53 
(-0.084) 
6.80 
(0.007) 
12.9 
(0.10) 
-0.35 
(-0.10) 
9.24 
(0.050) 
17.9 
(0.13) 
-0.10 
(-0.035) 
 
MATFAT All banks 
 
Large banks 
 
Small banks 
16.9 
(0.40) 
25.4 
(0.48) 
1.98 
(0.27) 
18.1 
(0.33) 
27.7 
(0.46) 
1.32 
(0.097) 
22.9 
(0.32) 
35.1 
(0.48) 
0.093 
(0.004) 
27.1 
(0.33) 
42.5 
(0.49) 
0.21 
(0.050) 
30.5 
(0.33) 
49.2 
(0.50) 
0.11 
(0.061) 
29.1 
(0.26) 
53.6 
(0.50) 
0.079 
-0.011 
35.3 
(0.33) 
67.1 
(0.54) 
0.75 
(0.11) 
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MATNONFAT All banks 
 
Large banks 
 
Small banks 
8.82 
(0.18) 
13.3 
(0.24) 
1.07 
(0.069) 
9.60 
(0.13) 
14.8 
(0.24) 
0.49 
(-0.08) 
14.3 
(0.13) 
22.2 
(0.29) 
-0.49 
(-0.18) 
16.9 
(0.17) 
26.6 
(0.30) 
-0.23 
(-0.06) 
20.0 
(0.17) 
32.6 
(0.32) 
-0.37 
(-0.08) 
20.0 
(0.13) 
37.2 
(0.34) 
-0.42 
(-0.12) 
24.8 
(0.17) 
47.8 
(0.37) 
-0.12 
(-0.045) 
 
Note: All variables are defined in Table 5.1. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 5.3 Characteristics of large banks versus small banks 
Variable Mean for large banks 
(>MYR20bn total assets) 
Mean for small banks 
(<MYR20bn total assets) 
Absolute 
t-statistic 
CATFAT_TA  0.29 0.072 9.60*** 
CATNONFAT_TA 0.093 -0.081 10.1*** 
MATFAT_TA 0.49 0.080 19.4*** 
MATNONFAT_TA 0.30 -0.073 21.4*** 
OFFLC_TA 0.19 0.15 3.83*** 
LERNER 0.39 0.12 12.2*** 
LERNER1 0.36 0.098 11.5*** 
LOANRATE 0.055 0.048 3.21*** 
w1 0.024 0.025      0.56 
TA 
EQR 
84.8 
0.079 
4.76 
0.20 
12.1*** 
14.1*** 
ZSCORE 25.6 35.7 4.54*** 
CREDIT_RISK 0.64 0.58 3.29*** 
GLCOWN 
MA 
0.16 
0.19 
0.003 
0.00 
8.06*** 
5.18*** 
Observations 179 115  
Note: All variables are defined in Table 5.1, except for TA which is defined as bank’s total assets in 
real MYR 2013 billion and LOANRATE which is defined as the ratio of interest income on loans to 
gross loans.  
*** denotes 1% significance level in two-tailed t-tests 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
A main objective of this study is to compare the relationship between bank competition and liquidity 
creation between small banks and large banks, hence, it may also be important to shed some light on 
the characteristic differences of these banks. The means of bank-specific variables are compared 
using the simple two-tailed t-tests (see Table 5.3). Based on our benchmark of bank size (MYR 20 
billion of total assets), a total of 179 bank observations in our sample fall into the large bank sample, 
while 115 bank observations are in the small bank sample. Table 5.3 shows that large banks create 
substantially more liquidity for the economy and enjoy significantly higher market power (LERNER 
and LERNER1) than small banks. Large banks also tend to set higher interest rates on loans 
(LOANRATE) than small banks by about 0.7%, implying that small banks compete more aggressively in 
terms of loan pricing. In terms of deposit pricing (w1), large banks do not behave differently from 
small banks, which suggests that prices of deposits are relatively competitive and uniform across 
banks.  
 
Besides, the average total assets of large banks amount to MYR 84.8 billion in real 2013 MYR, which 
is about 17 times larger than those of small banks. The significant mean differences in EQR, ZSCORE 
and CREDIT_RISK between large and small banks also suggest that small banks are more financially 
solvent and resilient and generally hold less risky asset portfolios compared to large banks, perhaps 
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because small banks are not perceived to be too big to fail. They are less likely to be bailed out in 
case of bank failures. Besides, large banks have a greater proportion of shares held by Malaysian 
government-linked companies and agencies, as indicated by GLCOWN. None of the small banks in 
our sample was involved in merger and acquisition activities during the sample period. 
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Table 5.4 Summary statistics on bank competition and stock market liquidity over the years 2001 to 2013 
Panel A: Bank competition  
Bank market power measure 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 Bank market power, 2001-2013 
LERNER 0.29 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.25 
 
HHI_D 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 
CR3 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.48 0.51 0.49 0.51 
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Panel B: Stock market liquidity  
Stock market liquidity 
measure 
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 Stock market liquidity, 2001-2013 
DTVR 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.22 0.14 0.13 0.12 
 
 
QSPPROP 4.70 3.36 4.17 3.46 10.4 5.95 4.54 
AMIHUD 3.45 3.27 9.33 4.70 32.0 12.4 10.2 
ZERORET 36.1 34.0 41.4 29.9 44.8 39.0 38.4 
PINDEX4 98.5 73.0 102 63.7 185 112 100 
Note: All variables are defined in Table 5.1. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 5.4 shows the evolution of bank market competition and stock market liquidity in Malaysia 
over the sample period in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. Panel A of Table 5.4 shows that the 
market concentration measures (HHI_D and CR3) and the average market power (LERNER) of banks 
exhibit contradictory trends of bank market competition. The average LERNER of banks has been 
weakening since the year 2004  and reached particularly low levels from the year 2010. The 
decreasing LERNER over the years can be translated as the intensifying level of competition 
encountered by commercial banks, which can be partly attributable to the pro-competition initiatives 
implemented under the FSMP, including the issuance of new Islamic banking licences, relaxation of 
bank branching restrictions and introduction of new foreign banks (BNM, 2001). Given the LERNER 
index of the banking industry falls within zero (perfect competition) to one (pure monopoly) and is 
closer to zero, the LERNER index suggests the market structure of monopolistic competition for 
commercial banks in Malaysia, which is consistent with the findings of Abdul-Majid and Sufian (2006) 
based on Panzar and Rosse’s (1987) H-statistic. On the flip side, both HHI_D and CR3 show that the 
bank market concentration level has increased, although marginally over the years. HHI_D suggests 
that the deposit market of commercial banks is competitive as the average HHI_D (1,100 points if 
expressed in percentage) falls in the region of low market concentration (below 1,500 points) 
classified by the United States Department of Justice (2015). Nevertheless, CR3 shows that the bank 
market in Malaysia is highly concentrated as the total market share of the three largest banks 
marginally increased by 5 percent from 46 percent to 51 percent during the sample period. The 
increase does not necessarily suggest a decrease in bank competition as it merely reflects market 
structural adjustments caused by three consolidation events in the industry. These results based on 
LERNER, HHI_D and CR3 unveil an interesting phenomenon about the Malaysian bank market 
competition. That is, the playing field for commercial banks has been levelled since the year 2001, 
despite the bank market being increasingly dominated by a few large banks. This highlights the 
marginal usefulness of bank market structural measure in measuring competition in today’s financial 
environment. 
 
Panel B of Table 5.4 demonstrates that the stock market in Malaysia did not show any evident and 
consistent improvement of liquidity over the years 2001 to 2013, despite undergoing capital market 
reform since 2001. The market liquidity was heavily shattered by the 2007-2009 global financial 
crisis, as indicated by all four stock market illiquidity measures (QSPPROP, AMIHUD, ZERORET and 
PINDEX4) which reached their peaks during the crisis. The average daily turnover ratio (DTVR), on the 
other hand, was at high during the crisis, which could send a wrong message about the market 
liquidity if one solely looks at the market turnover ratio. All measures have exhibited similar 
fluctuating patterns of stock market liquidity throughout the years, except for DTVR that did not 
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move in a similar trend with other measures especially since the onset of the financial crisis. The 
correlation analysis shown in Table 5.5 confirms that QSPPROP, AMIHUD, ZERORET and PINDEX4 are 
good alternative stock market illiquidity measures for each other as their pairwise correlation 
coefficients are at least as high as 0.77. On the contrary, DTVR has relatively lower correlations with 
other stock market illiquidity measures. DTVR is significantly correlated only with ZERORET - another 
stock market trading frequency measure - and with the composite stock market illiquidity index 
(PINDEX4). 
 
Table 5.5 Correlation between stock market liquidity variables 
 QSPPROP AMIHUD DTVR ZERORET PINDEX4 
QSPPROP 1.00     
AMIHUD 0.97*** 1.00    
DTVR -0.029 0.071 1.00   
ZERORET 0.77*** 0.77*** -0.43*** 1.00  
PINDEX4 0.97*** 0.96*** -0.15*** 0.85*** 1.00 
Note: *** denotes significance at one percent level. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
5.3 Baseline results 
This section presents the regression results for research objectives one to three: (i) compare the 
relationship between bank competition and liquidity creation of small banks in relation to that of 
large banks in Malaysia, (ii) examine the dominant effect of bank competition on liquidity creation in 
the Malaysian commercial banking industry, and (iii) examine the relationship between stock market 
liquidity and bank liquidity creation in Malaysia. All regression models are statistically significant at 
the one percent level.  
 
5.3.1 Research objective one 
We begin with the first research objective by reporting the regression results of the relationship 
between bank competition and liquidity creation separately for the small bank sample in Panel A of 
Table 5.6 and for the large bank sample in Panel B of Table 5.6. In both Panel A and Panel B, the 
regression models based on the four bank liquidity creation measures, including CATFAT_TA 
(preferred measure), CATNONFAT_TA, MATFAT_TA and MATNONFAT_TA, and the off-balance sheet 
liquidity creation component (OFFLC_TA) are estimated and reported in both Panels A and B. Panel A 
of Table 5.6 demonstrates that, for small banks, the relationship between bank competition and 
bank liquidity creation is generally negative, as indicated by the positive coefficients on LERNER 
across all the five models reported in the columns. For our preferred liquidity creation measure, 
CATFAT_TA, the  magnitude of the coefficient on LERNER is 0.23, which means that for every one 
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percent decrease in bank market power, small banks decrease their liquidity creation by 0.23 
percent, ceteris paribus. The effect of LERNER on on-balance sheet liquidity creation, 
CATNONFAT_TA, for small banks is 0.14 and significant at the one percent significance level. Besides, 
based on the less stringent “maturity” specification of liquidity creation measures, the result shows a 
negative relationship between bank competion and total liquidity creation of small banks as LERNER 
is positively related with MATFAT_TA and significant at the five percent level, while the impact of 
bank competition on MATNONFAT_TA is insignificant. The results further show that small banks are 
likely to create less liquidity off their balance sheets when facing higher competition, as indicated by 
the LERNER coefficient of 0.091 which is significant at the five percent level in the OFFLC_TA model. 
Combining these findings leads to a conclusion that bank competition impacts the liquidity creation 
activities of small banks adversely both on the balance sheet and off the balance sheet. A “fragility 
channel” effect is, thus, observed for small banks. 
 
As opposed to the “fragility channel” effect of LERNER reported for small banks, the results reported 
in Panel B in Table 5.6 indicate a weak “price channel” effect for large banks. For the “category” 
specification of liquidity creation measures, the effect of LERNER on CATFAT_TA is negative and 
insignificant, while the effect of LERNER on CATNONFAT_TA is significantly negative at the ten 
percent significance level. It is also found that the OFFLC_TA coefficient is negative but insignificant 
for large banks. These findings imply that large banks tend to cut down their liquidity creation, 
particularly through on-balance sheet activities when they possess greater market power or 
encounter lower bank competition. The insignificant coefficients on LERNER for “maturity” 
specification of liquidity creation measures, MATFAT_TA and MATNONFAT_TA, do not change our 
conclusion that the “price channel” effect observed for large banks is weak.  
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Table 5.6 Effect of bank competition on bank liquidity creation for small banks versus large banks 
Panel A: Regression results for small banks (<MYR20 billion total assets)a 
Variable CATFAT_TA CATNONFAT_TA MATFAT_TA MATNONFAT_TA OFFLC_TA 
LERNER 0.23 
(5.59)*** 
0.14 
 (4.00)*** 
0.15 
(2.88)** 
0.063 
(1.34) 
0.091 
(2.36)** 
PINDEX4b -0.002 
(-1.82)* 
-0.001 
(-1.61) 
-0.001 
(-1.42) 
-0.001 
(-1.26) 
-0.001 
(-1.31) 
lnTA 
 
-0.14 
(-2.02)* 
-0.011 
(-0.19) 
-0.14 
(-1.96)* 
-0.006 
(-0.12) 
-0.13 
(-3.30)*** 
EQR -0.76 
(-1.63) 
-0.78 
(-1.65) 
-1.00 
(-3.01)** 
-1.02 
(-3.41)*** 
0.015 
(0.08) 
GLCOWN 3.74 
(4.19)*** 
2.20 
(1.97)* 
4.32 
(5.33)*** 
2.77 
(2.66)** 
1.55 
(2.82)** 
ZSCORE -0.004 
(-1.33) 
-0.001 
(-0.43) 
-0.003 
(-1.24) 
-0.0004 
(-0.19) 
-0.003 
(-1.82)* 
CREDIT_RISK 0.46 
(3.46)*** 
0.27 
(2.60)** 
0.40 
(3.50)*** 
0.21 
(2.53)** 
0.19 
(3.25)*** 
IBSDUMMY -0.24 
(-3.63)*** 
-0.17 
(-3.68)*** 
-0.18 
(-2.44)** 
-0.12 
(-2.28)** 
-0.065 
(-1.86)* 
HHI_D 9.61 
(1.78)* 
7.79 
(1.67) 
6.81 
(1.25) 
4.99 
(1.11) 
1.82 
(0.67) 
SCAPRATIO -0.16 
(-1.53) 
-0.12 
(-1.57) 
-0.11 
(-0.94) 
-0.076 
(-0.89) 
-0.036 
(-0.75) 
MP 1.65 
(0.71) 
1.99 
(0.81) 
3.61 
(1.33) 
3.96 
(1.33) 
-0.35 
(-0.20) 
GDPRATE -1.14 
(-2.43)** 
-0.76 
(-2.06)* 
-1.53 
(-2.88)** 
-1.15 
(-1.92)* 
-0.39 
(-1.47) 
CRISISDUMM
Y 
-0.013 
(-0.30) 
0.013 
(0.56) 
-0.020 
(-0.51) 
0.006 
(0.36) 
-0.026 
(-0.79) 
Constant 0.65 
(0.76) 
-0.52 
(-0.76) 
0.83 
(1.07) 
-0.34 
(-0.52) 
1.18 
(2.89)** 
Observations 115 115 115 115 115 
R2 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.37 
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Panel B: Regression results for large banks (>MYR20 billion total assets) 
Variable CATFAT_TA CATNONFAT_TA MATFAT_TA MATNONFAT_TA OFFLC_TA 
LERNER -0.31 
(-1.63) 
-0.24 
(-1.91)* 
0.015 
(0.07) 
0.094 
(0.39) 
-0.079 
(-0.52) 
PINDEX4b -0.001 
(-3.26)*** 
-0.001 
(-4.43)*** 
-0.0005 
(-1.92)* 
-0.0005 
(-2.12)* 
-0.00004 
(-0.23) 
lnTA 
 
-0.13 
(-2.27)** 
-0.039 
(-1.55) 
-0.032 
(-0.75) 
0.056 
(1.66) 
-0.088 
(-2.01)* 
EQR -2.53 
(-1.55) 
-1.13 
(-1.34) 
-0.61 
(-0.43) 
0.80 
(0.51) 
-1.40 
(-1.16) 
GLCOWN -0.035 
(-0.54) 
-0.071 
(-3.10)*** 
0.11 
(2.29)** 
0.077 
(0.86) 
0.036 
(0.55) 
ZSCORE 0.002 
(0.41) 
-0.001 
(-0.28) 
-0.002 
(-0.40) 
-0.004 
(-1.05) 
0.002 
(0.65) 
CREDIT_RISK 0.28 
(1.99)* 
0.082 
(1.23) 
0.26 
(1.90)* 
0.067 
(1.02) 
0.19 
(2.36)** 
MA -0.043 
(-1.65) 
-0.021 
(-1.29) 
0.004 
(0.21) 
0.026 
(1.53) 
-0.022 
(-1.27) 
IBSDUMMY -0.029 
(-1.17) 
-0.020 
(-1.35) 
-0.036 
(-1.57) 
-0.027 
(-1.11) 
-0.009 
(-0.43) 
HHI_D 3.90 
(2.17)** 
4.01 
(4.57)*** 
3.29 
(2.09)* 
3.41 
(2.27)** 
-0.11 
(-0.08) 
SCAPRATIO -0.080 
(-1.79)* 
-0.092 
(-2.99)*** 
-0.069 
(-1.26) 
-0.080 
(-2.08)* 
0.012 
(0.54) 
MP -1.59 
(-0.66) 
-2.58 
(-2.34)** 
-2.44 
(-1.19) 
-3.43 
(-3.75)*** 
0.99 
(0.61) 
GDPRATE -0.14 
(-0.47) 
0.037 
(0.20) 
0.080 
(0.27) 
0.26 
(0.98) 
-0.17 
(-0.84) 
CRISISDUMM
Y 
-0.008 
(-0.41) 
-0.007 
(-0.56) 
0.0003 
(0.02) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
Constant 1.68 
(2.51)** 
0.57 
(1.86) 
0.65 
(1.31) 
-0.46 
(-1.18) 
1.10 
(2.20)** 
Observations 179 179 179 179 179 
R2 0.41 0.36 0.32 0.44 0.41 
Note: t-statistics based on cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  
***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
a MA is omitted from the regression models for small banks because none of the small banks in our 
sample was involved in merger and acquisition activities during the sample period. 
b PINDEX4 is used to proxy for aggregate stock market illiquidity because it is a composite index of 
QSPPROP, AMIHUD, inverse DTVR and ZERORET. 
All variables are defined in Table 5.1.  
Source: Author’s calculations 
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5.3.2 Research objectives two and three 
The second and third research objectives of this study are to examine the dominant relationship 
between bank competition and liquidity creation in the Malaysian commercial banking industry, and 
the relationship between stock market liquidity and bank liquidity creation in Malaysia. We examine 
these research objectives simultaneously in a model because they both employ the full sample 
banks. In Table 5.7, five panels are created for our four bank liquidity creation measures, namely 
CATFAT_TA (preferred measure), CATNONFAT_TA, MATFAT_TA and MATNONFAT_TA, and the off-
balance sheet liquidity creation component (OFFLC_TA). Since we have five alternative measures of 
stock market liquidity, five regression models are analysed and reported in the columns (1) to (5) in 
each panel, with each column representing a model using the specific stock market liquidity 
measure.  
 
The results in Panel A of Table 5.7 indicate a positive and significant relationship between LERNER 
and CATFAT_TA collectively for all commercial banks, supporting the “fragility channel” view that 
higher bank competition is associated with lower liquidity being created by banks. The magnitude of 
the coefficient on LERNER ranges from 0.16 to 0.18 across all the five models, which implies that, on 
average, banks that enjoy a one percent higher market power create 0.16 to 0.18 percent more 
aggregate liquidity for the economy, ceteris paribus. The significant and positive effects of LERNER 
are also evident for on-balance sheet liquidity creation (CATNONFAT_TA) in Panel B and for off-
balance sheet liquidity creation (OFFLC_TA) in Panel E of Table 5.7, with the positive effect of LERNER 
stronger in the earlier case, that is, the LERNER coefficient ranges from 0.090 to 0.10 for 
CATNONFAT_TA as compared to 0.069 to 0.073 for OFFLC_TA. With regards to bank liquidity creation 
based on the “maturity” specification, it is found that the magnitude of the LERNER coefficient drops 
slightly for MATFAT_TA in Panel C compared to CATFAT_TA in Panel A. The LERNER coefficient for 
MATFAT_TA ranges from 0.12 to 0.13 and is highly significant. However, the LERNER coefficient for 
MATNONFAT_TA, which ranges from 0.052 to 0.061, is insignificant, as indicated in Panel D. The 
overall findings lead to a conclusion that, on average, Malaysian commercial banks, when facing 
increased competition, tend to create less liquidity both on and off their balance sheets and thus less 
total liquidity creation. The “fragility channel” effect of bank competition dominates the Malaysian 
commercial banking industry.  
 
As for the third research objective, QSPPROP, AMIHUD and ZERORET show negative coefficients in 
CATFAT_TA and CATNONFAT_TA models in Panels A and B of Table 5.7, respectively. Since QSPPROP, 
AMIHUD and ZERORET are inverse measures of stock market liquidity, the negative coefficients on 
these measures suggest that, on average, an increase in aggregate stock market liquidity enhances 
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on-balance sheet liquidity creation and total liquidity creation by individual commercial banks. The 
stock market liquidity measure, DTVR, on the other hand, shows an inverse relationship with bank 
liquidity creation, which this study argues to be doubtful because stock market turnover ratio has 
been found to be positively correlated to price volatility and has been widely criticised for not 
reflecting changes in the transaction costs on the market (Fleming, 2003; Karpoff, 1987; Lesmond, 
2005; Rouetbi & Mamoghli, 2014). Nevertheless, based on the aggregate stock market illiquidity 
index score (PINDEX4), the estimated coefficient on PINDEX4 in CATFAT_TA and CATNONFAT_TA 
models is negative and highly significant at the one percent level, confirming that, on average, an 
increase in stock market liquidity boosts liquidity creation by individual commercial banks in 
Malaysia. In addition, based on the regression results for both MATFAT_TA and MATNONFAT_TA in 
Panels C and D, the coefficients on stock market illiquidity measures (QSPPROP, AMIHUD, ZERORET 
and PINDEX4) are also negative and significant except for ZERORET. The results reaffirm a negative 
effect of stock market illiquidity on bank liquidity creation. Panel E of Table 5.7 indicates that stock 
market illiquidity generally does not have a significant relationship with off-balance sheet liquidity 
creation, OFFLC_TA, although the sign is negative. Only QSPPROP appears to be negatively related to 
OFFLC_TA at the five percent significance level, which suggests that an increase in stock market 
liquidity, measured by lower transaction cost on the stock market, is associated with a higher off-
balance sheet liquidity creation of Malaysian commercial banks. 
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Table 5.7 Effect of bank competition and stock market liquidity on bank liquidity creation 
Panel A: Regression results based on CATFAT_TA (preferred) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LERNER 0.17 
(5.25)*** 
0.18 
(5.58)*** 
0.16 
(4.73)*** 
0.16 
(5.00)*** 
0.17 
(5.33)*** 
SLIQUIDITY 
QSPPROP 
 
AMIHUD 
 
DTVR 
 
ZERORET 
 
PINDEX4 
 
 
-0.015 
(-2.91)*** 
 
 
 
-0.004 
(-2.79)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.15 
(-2.28)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.009 
(-2.43)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(-2.94)*** 
lnTA -0.14 
(-4.10)*** 
-0.14 
(-3.85)*** 
-0.13 
(-3.47)*** 
-0.13 
(-3.72)*** 
-0.14 
(-4.04)*** 
EQR -1.16 
(-2.57)** 
-1.08 
(-2.30)** 
-1.16 
(-2.62)** 
-1.05 
(-2.16)** 
-1.12 
(-2.44)** 
GLCOWN -0.055 
(-0.53) 
-0.054 
(-0.53) 
-0.041 
(-0.41) 
-0.066 
(-0.65) 
-0.053 
(-0.50) 
ZSCORE -0.001 
(-0.47) 
-0.002 
(-0.66) 
-0.001 
(-0.39) 
-0.002 
(-0.66) 
-0.001 
(-0.54) 
CREDIT_RISK 0.36 
(3.82)*** 
0.36 
(3.93)*** 
0.36 
(3.93)*** 
0.36 
(3.93)*** 
0.36 
(3.85)*** 
MA -0.044 
(-2.11)** 
-0.033 
(-1.48) 
-0.046 
(-2.24)** 
-0.027 
(-1.18) 
-0.040 
(-1.92)* 
IBSDUMMY -0.072 
(-2.00)* 
-0.073 
(-2.04)* 
-0.073 
(-2.07)** 
-0.075 
(-2.09)** 
-0.073 
(-2.03)* 
HHI_D 5.27 
(1.98)* 
4.94 
(1.89)* 
3.24 
(1.38) 
5.07 
(1.89)* 
4.99 
(1.91)* 
SCAPRATIO -0.084 
(-2.61)** 
-0.10 
(-2.38)** 
0.13 
(2.14)** 
-0.15 
(-2.20)** 
-0.11 
(-2.60)** 
MP 1.23 
(0.78) 
0.44 
(0.26) 
4.75 
(2.50)** 
-0.12 
(-0.06) 
0.89 
(0.51) 
GDPRATE -0.44 
(-1.37) 
-0.36 
(-1.08) 
0.32 
(0.85) 
-0.42 
(-1.27) 
-0.53 
(-1.61) 
CRISISDUMMY 0.003 
(0.13) 
0.011 
(0.50) 
0.062 
(1.61) 
-0.049 
(-2.56)** 
-0.009 
(-0.44) 
Constant 1.18 
(2.78)*** 
1.20 
(2.75)** 
0.84 
(1.77)* 
1.53 
(3.33)*** 
1.26 
(2.92)*** 
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 
R2  0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 
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Panel B: Regression results based on CATNONFAT_TA 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LERNER 0.095 
(2.51)** 
0.10 
(2.67)** 
0.090 
(2.31)** 
0.092 
(2.50)** 
0.098 
(2.54)** 
SLIQUIDITY 
QSPPROP 
 
AMIHUD 
 
DTVR 
 
ZERORET 
 
PINDEX4 
 
-0.007 
(-1.84)* 
 
 
 
-0.003 
(-2.71)** 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.77 
(-1.89)* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.009 
(-2.88)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0008 
(-3.40)*** 
lnTA -0.054 
(-1.41) 
-0.053 
(-1.33) 
-0.046 
(-1.15) 
-0.046 
(-1.14) 
-0.053 
(-1.40) 
EQR -1.11 
(-2.82)*** 
-1.04 
(-2.60)** 
-1.11 
(-2.86)*** 
-1.00 
(-2.42)** 
-1.08 
(-2.71)** 
GLCOWN -0.11 
(-3.56)*** 
-0.11 
(-3.73)*** 
-0.10 
(-3.58)*** 
-0.12 
(-4.01)*** 
-0.11 
(-3.50)*** 
ZSCORE 0.0001 
(0.03) 
-0.0004 
(-0.17) 
0.0002 
(0.09) 
-0.0006 
(-0.27) 
-0.0002 
(-0.08) 
CREDIT_RISK 0.17 
(2.24)** 
0.16 
(2.28)** 
0.17 
(2.31)** 
0.16 
(2.29)** 
0.16 
(2.24)** 
MA -0.032 
(-2.22)** 
-0.021 
(-1.42) 
-0.032 
(-2.37)** 
-0.012 
(-0.75) 
-0.026 
(-1.81)* 
IBSDUMMY -0.047 
(-2.04)* 
-0.049 
(-2.08)** 
-0.049 
(-2.11)** 
-0.051 
(-2.14)** 
-0.049 
(-2.09)** 
HHI_D 4.88 
(2.58)** 
5.07 
(2.74)** 
3.81 
(2.31)** 
5.44 
(2.93)*** 
5.19 
(2.87)*** 
SCAPRATIO -0.045 
(-1.65) 
-0.086 
(-2.55)** 
0.078 
(1.46) 
-0.15 
(-2.94)*** 
-0.10 
(-3.00)*** 
MP 1.10 
(0.72) 
-0.25 
(-0.20) 
2.96 
(1.86)* 
-1.49 
(-1.02) 
-0.10 
(-0.07) 
GDPRATE -0.11 
(-0.48) 
-0.088 
(-0.35) 
0.37 
(1.33) 
-0.16 
(-0.62) 
-0.24 
(-0.94) 
CRISISDUMMY 0.005 
(0.38) 
0.018 
(1.19) 
0.050 
(1.54) 
-0.033 
(-2.79)*** 
0.004 
(0.35) 
Constant 0.15 
(0.37) 
0.22 
(0.55) 
-0.036 
(-0.08) 
0.59 
(1.43) 
0.29 
(0.69) 
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 
R2 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.38 
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Panel C: Regression results based on MATFAT_TA 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LERNER 0.13 
(2.90)*** 
0.13 
(3.11)*** 
0.12 
(2.66)** 
0.12 
(2.72)** 
0.13 
(2.96)*** 
SLIQUIDITY 
QSPPROP 
 
AMIHUD 
 
DTVR 
 
ZERORET 
 
PINDEX4 
 
-0.015 
(-2.60)** 
 
 
 
-0.003 
(-1.93)* 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.03 
(-2.10)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.006 
(-1.34) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0007 
(-1.94)* 
lnTA -0.071 
(-2.03)* 
-0.066 
(-1.88)* 
-0.057 
(-1.56) 
-0.062 
(-1.74)* 
-0.066 
(-1.92)* 
EQR -1.06 
(-2.74)** 
-1.00 
(-2.43)** 
-1.06 
(-2.79)*** 
-0.99 
(-2.34)** 
-1.03 
(-2.59)** 
GLCOWN 0.10 
(2.19)** 
0.10 
(2.13)** 
0.12 
(2.25)** 
0.096 
(2.00)* 
0.10 
(2.20)** 
ZSCORE -0.0005 
(-0.20) 
-0.0008 
(-0.35) 
-0.0002 
(-0.10) 
-0.0008 
(-0.32) 
-0.0006 
(-0.25) 
CREDIT_RISK 0.28 
(3.62)*** 
0.28 
(3.71)*** 
0.28 
(3.75)*** 
0.28 
(3.70)*** 
0.28 
(3.64)*** 
MA 0.003 
(0.18) 
0.010 
(0.58) 
0.0004 
(0.02) 
0.010 
(0.55) 
0.004 
(0.24) 
IBSDUMMY -0.090 
(-2.67)** 
-0.091 
(-2.69)** 
-0.091 
(-2.72)** 
-0.091 
(-2.71)** 
-0.090 
(-2.69)** 
HHI_D 3.91 
(1.53) 
3.28 
(1.32) 
1.92 
(0.90) 
3.18 
(1.25) 
3.29 
(1.33) 
SCAPRATIO -0.093 
(-2.31)** 
-0.081 
(-1.80)* 
0.11 
(1.79)* 
-0.093 
(-1.28) 
-0.086 
(-1.77)* 
MP -0.26 
(-0.14) 
-0.22 
(-0.13) 
3.17 
(1.52) 
-0.079 
(-0.04) 
0.17 
(0.09) 
GDPRATE -0.48 
(-1.49) 
-0.38 
(-1.14) 
0.22 
(0.63) 
-0.41 
(-1.18) 
-0.50 
(-1.46) 
CRISISDUMMY 0.005 
(0.27) 
0.005 
(0.27) 
0.056 
(1.54) 
-0.036 
(-1.68) 
-0.01 
(-0.59) 
Constant 0.82 
(1.92)* 
0.78 
(1.84)* 
0.49 
(1.02) 
0.96 
(2.15)** 
0.82 
(1.95)* 
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 
R2 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 
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Panel D: Regression results based on MATNONFAT_TA 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LERNER 0.056 
(1.23) 
0.061 
(1.35) 
0.052 
(1.11) 
0.054 
(1.17) 
0.058 
(1.27) 
SLIQUIDITY 
QSPPROP 
 
AMIHUD 
 
DTVR 
 
ZERORET 
 
PINDEX4 
 
-0.007 
(-1.74)* 
 
 
 
-0.002 
(-1.86)* 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.66 
(-1.55) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.005 
(-1.60) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0006 
(-2.18)** 
lnTA 0.017 
(0.53) 
0.019 
(0.57) 
0.025 
(0.72) 
0.023 
(0.68) 
0.019 
(0.59) 
EQR -1.01 
(-3.05)*** 
-0.96 
(-2.79)*** 
-1.01 
(-3.08)*** 
-0.94 
(-2.66)** 
-0.98 
(-2.93)*** 
GLCOWN 0.045 
(0.41) 
0.045 
(0.40) 
0.053 
(0.46) 
0.038 
(0.34) 
0.046 
(0.42) 
ZSCORE 0.0009 
(0.46) 
0.0006 
(0.29) 
0.001 
(0.54) 
0.0005 
(0.24) 
0.0007 
(0.38) 
CREDIT_RISK 0.086 
(1.50) 
0.086 
(1.51) 
0.087 
(1.56) 
0.086 
(1.51) 
0.085 
(1.49) 
MA 0.0148 
(0.93) 
0.021 
(1.31) 
0.014 
(0.93) 
0.026 
(1.44) 
0.018 
(1.13) 
IBSDUMMY -0.066 
(-2.45)** 
-0.066 
(-2.46)** 
-0.066 
(-2.49)** 
-0.068 
(-2.48)** 
-0.066 
(-2.47)** 
HHI_D 3.52 
(1.81)* 
3.41 
(1.81)* 
2.50 
(1.44) 
3.55 
(1.88)* 
3.49 
(1.88)* 
SCAPRATIO -0.055 
(-1.77)* 
-0.067 
(-2.03)* 
0.057 
(1.05) 
-0.10 
(-1.77)* 
-0.078 
(-2.11)** 
MP -0.39 
(-0.20) 
-0.92 
(-0.63) 
1.38 
(0.74) 
-1.44 
(-1.05) 
-0.81 
(-0.48) 
GDPRATE -0.15 
(-0.45) 
-0.11 
(-0.32) 
0.28 
(0.96) 
-0.15 
(-0.42) 
-0.21 
(-0.59) 
CRISISDUMMY 0.007 
(0.60) 
0.012 
(0.90) 
0.044 
(1.34) 
-0.020 
(-1.34) 
0.003 
(0.24) 
Constant -0.21 
(-0.52) 
-0.19 
(-0.49) 
-0.38 
(-0.89) 
0.014 
(0.04) 
-0.15 
(-0.38) 
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 
R2 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.36 
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Panel E: Regression results based on OFFLC_TA 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LERNER 0.072 
(2.43)** 
0.073 
(2.50)** 
0.069 
(2.29)** 
0.071 
(2.36)** 
0.072 
(2.42)** 
SLIQUIDITY 
QSPPROP 
 
AMIHUD 
 
DTVR 
 
ZERORET 
 
PINDEX4 
 
-0.008 
(-2.59)** 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(-1.46) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.37 
(-2.00)* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0003 
(-0.17) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0002 
(-1.01) 
lnTA -0.088 
(-2.92)*** 
-0.085 
(-2.86)*** 
-0.082 
(-2.74)** 
-0.085 
(-2.83)*** 
-0.085 
(-2.83)*** 
EQR -0.051 
(-0.27) 
-0.033 
(-0.17) 
-0.053 
(-0.28) 
-0.051 
(-0.25) 
-0.047 
(-0.24) 
GLCOWN 0.057 
(0.63) 
0.058 
(0.64) 
0.062 
(0.70) 
0.058 
(0.64) 
0.058 
(0.64) 
ZSCORE -0.001 
(-1.16) 
-0.001 
(-1.20) 
-0.001 
(-1.07) 
-0.001 
(-1.05) 
-0.001 
(-1.12) 
CREDIT_RISK 0.19 
(3.97)*** 
0.19 
(4.03)*** 
0.19 
(4.00)*** 
0.192 
(4.02)*** 
0.19 
(4.00)*** 
MA -0.012 
(-0.81) 
-0.011 
(-0.75) 
-0.014 
(-0.92) 
-0.015 
(-0.93) 
-0.014 
(-0.90) 
IBSDUMMY -0.024 
(-1.28) 
-0.024 
(-1.29) 
-0.024 
(-1.31) 
-0.024 
(-1.27) 
-0.024 
(-1.28) 
HHI_D 0.39 
(0.27) 
-0.13 
(-0.09) 
-0.58 
(-0.41) 
-0.37 
(-0.24) 
-0.20 
(-0.13) 
SCAPRATIO -0.039 
(-1.75)* 
-0.014 
(-0.69) 
0.050 
(2.04)* 
0.008 
(0.24) 
-0.008 
(-0.39) 
MP 0.13 
(0.14) 
0.69 
(0.74) 
1.79 
(1.80)* 
1.36 
(1.23) 
0.99 
(1.03) 
GDPRATE -0.33 
(-2.07)** 
-0.27 
(-1.69) 
-0.054 
(-0.31) 
-0.26 
(-1.68) 
-0.30 
(-1.89)* 
CRISISDUMMY -0.002 
(-0.19) 
-0.007 
(-0.56) 
0.012 
(0.93) 
-0.016 
(-1.32) 
-0.013 
(-1.04) 
Constant 1.03 
(3.41)*** 
0.97 
(3.33)*** 
0.88 
(2.89)*** 
0.94 
(3.32)*** 
0.97 
(3.26)*** 
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 
R2 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.34 
Note: t-statistics based on cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 All variables are defined in Table 5.1. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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5.4 Additional tests 
In this section, we conduct several additional tests to  test the three main research objectives of this 
study and show that the findings support our baseline findings reported in Section 5.3. The additional 
tests (i) use an alternative dataset to compute bank-level Lerner index; (ii) examine the effect of 
banking deregulation and liberalisation; (iii) account for the impact of the 2008 financial crisis by 
excluding observations in the years 2007 to 2009 from the estimations; (iv) use alternative 
benchmarks to classify sample banks into large banks and small banks; (v) examine the threshold 
effect of bank competition on liquidity creation; (vi) examine the dynamic effect of bank competition 
and stock market liquidity on bank liquidity creation; and (vii) include an endogeneity test in the 
context of instrumental variable estimation. 
 
5.4.1 Using an alternative bank competition measure 
Recalling that the LERNER index of market power used in the regressions in Section 5.3 is estimated 
based on a combined dataset of commercial banks and Islamic banks, we now estimate an 
alternative bank market power measure using a dataset of commercial banks only. The alternative 
bank market power measure is labelled as LERNER131. The purpose of this additional test is to ensure 
our findings for the first and second research objectives are robust to the use of LERNER1. Table 5.8 
shows the effect of LERNER1 on total bank liquidity creation (CATFAT_TA) separately for small banks, 
large banks and the entire bank sample. The LERNER1 coefficients for the three sets of sample banks 
are of similar magnitude to the LERNER coefficients reported in the main results. The coefficients on 
LERNER1 remain positive and significant at the one percent level for small and full sample banks, 
which are 0.20 and 0.16, respectively. As for large banks, the relationship between LERNER1 and 
total bank liquidity creation remains insignificant. Thus, this additional test confirms our baseline 
regression results for research objectives one and two that the “fragility channel” effect of bank 
competition occurs among small banks and dominates the Malaysian commercial banking industry. 
 
 
                                                          
31 A paired t-test is conducted to compare LERNER and LERNER1 of our sample banks. The result shows that the 
mean of LERNER1 (0.26) is lower than  LERNER (0.28) at the one percent significance level, which implies that 
excluding Islamic banks from the cost function estimation could result in an underestimation of the market 
power of commercial banks in the Malaysian dual banking system. 
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Table 5.8 Effect of bank competition on CATFAT_TA based on an alternative bank competition 
measure 
Variable Small banks Large banks All banks 
LERNER1 0.22 
(5.58)*** 
-0.31 
(-1.62) 
0.16 
(5.03)*** 
PINDEX4a -0.002 
(-1.81)* 
-0.001 
(-3.26)*** 
-0.001 
(-2.94)*** 
lnTA -0.14 
(-2.00)* 
-0.13 
(-2.28)** 
-0.14 
(-4.02)*** 
EQR -0.76 
(-1.62) 
-2.53 
(-1.55) 
-1.12 
(-2.43)** 
GLCOWN 3.75 
(4.22)*** 
-0.034 
(-0.53) 
-0.053 
(-0.50) 
ZSCORE -0.004 
(-1.32) 
0.002 
(0.41) 
-0.001 
(-0.54) 
CREDIT_RISK 0.46 
(3.43)*** 
0.28 
(1.99)* 
0.35 
(3.84)*** 
MAb - -0.043 
(-1.65) 
-0.040 
(-1.92)* 
IBSDUMMY -0.24 
(-3.61)*** 
-0.029 
(-1.19) 
-0.073 
(-2.02)* 
HHI_D 9.56 
(1.77) 
3.91 
(2.18)** 
4.96 
(1.90)* 
SCAPRATIO -0.16 
(-1.52) 
-0.079 
(-1.79)* 
-0.11 
(-2.59)** 
MP 1.66 
(0.72) 
-1.58 
(-0.65) 
0.90 
(0.52) 
GDPRATE -1.15 
(-2.45)** 
-0.13 
(-0.45) 
-0.54 
(-1.63) 
CRISISDUMMY -0.014 
(-0.32) 
-0.008 
(-0.41) 
-0.009 
(-0.46) 
Constant 0.65 
(0.75) 
1.66 
(2.52)** 
1.26 
(2.91)*** 
Observations 115 179 294 
R2 0.49 0.41 0.41 
Note: t-statistics based on cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
a PINDEX4 is used to proxy for aggregate stock market illiquidity because it is a composite index of 
QSPPROP, AMIHUD, inverse DTVR and ZERORET. 
b MA is omitted from the regression models for small banks because none of the small banks in our 
sample was involved in merger and acquisition activities during the sample period. 
All variables are defined in Table 5.1.  
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
 
109 
 
5.4.2 Effect of banking deregulation and liberalisation  
While our findings of bank competition offer policy implications for bank-based financial systems, we 
further evaluate whether regulatory-induced competition in banking affects liquidity creation of 
banks in Malaysia. This enables us to shed more light on banking deregulation policies in Malaysia. 
Since our sample period (2001 to 2013) covers the implementation of a series of far-reaching reforms 
governed by the Financial Sector Masterplan (FSMP) from the period 2001 to 2010, we are able to 
take into account for the regulatory-induced competition in our regression model. In particular, the 
year 2004 marks the beginning of Phase two of the FSMP (2004-2005) during which deregulation and 
liberalisation initiatives that add further competition to the banking industry were implemented, for 
example, interest rate deregulation, relaxation of bank branching restrictions and issuance of new 
licenses to foreign and Islamic banks.  
 
Hence, the baseline equation (5) is modified by including a dummy variable that equals one for the 
banking deregulation and liberalisation initiatives implemented since the year 2004, zero otherwise. 
The dummy variable is labelled as COMPOLICY. 
1 2 3it it it i itLC LERNER COMPOLICY X a u                (8) 
In addition, we include an interaction term between LERNER and COMPOLICY to evaluate the effect 
of bank competition on bank liquidity creation during the banking deregulation and liberalisation 
period. 
1 2 3 4*it it it i itLC LERNER COMPOLICY LERNER COMPOLICY X a u        
     (9) 
Because the LERNER*COMPOLICY interaction term is highly correlated with LERNER and COMPOLICY 
competition measures, all these variables are orthogonalised using the Stata command “orthog”. For 
simplicity, we use the terms LERNER, COMPOLICY and LERNER*COMPOLICY instead of orthogonalised 
LERNER, orthogonalised COMPOLICY and orthogonalised LERNER*COMPOLICY throughout. Equations 
(8) and (9) are estimated for the small bank, large bank and full bank samples, and the results are 
reported accordingly in Table 5.9. 
 
Table 5.9 shows for small banks in columns (1) and (2) that the estimated coefficients on LERNER are 
significantly positive at the one percent level, confirming that small banks reduce their total liquidity 
creation when facing an increase in competition. It is also found that the estimated coefficients on 
COMPOLICY are -0.052 and -0.040 and are significant at the five percent level. The results indicate 
that banking deregulation and liberalisation initiatives have a negative impact on liquidity creation of 
small banks in Malaysia, which implies that regulation-induced competition discourages bank 
liquidity creation. As for large banks, banking deregulation and liberalisation initiatives also exert a 
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negative impact on bank liquidity creation, but the impact is relatively weaker compared to small 
banks, as indicated by the estimated negative coefficient on COMPOLICY (-0.024) in column (4) which 
is significant at the ten percent level. When looking at the results for the Malaysian commercial 
banking industry as a whole in columns (5) and (6) in Table 5.9, it is found that the estimated 
coefficients on LERNER are significantly positive, COMPOLICY are significantly negative and the 
LERNER*COMPOLICY interaction term is positively significant at the five percent level. The results 
suggest that banks respond to higher competition by cutting their total liquidity creation and that 
banking deregulation and liberalisation initiatives destroy liquidity creation of the industry as well as 
banks that possess lower market power as a whole. The results also offer important policy 
implications that the banking deregulation and liberalisation initiaves implemented since the year 
2004 do not help to improve liquidity access of the public, in general. 
 
111 
 
Table 5.9 Effect of banking deregulation and liberalisation on CATFAT_TA 
Variable Small banks 
(1) 
Small banks 
(2) 
Large banks 
(3) 
Large banks 
(4) 
All banks 
(5) 
All banks 
(6) 
LERNER 0.053 
(6.17)*** 
0.049 
(4.08)*** 
-0.069 
(-1.51) 
-0.051 
(-1.00) 
0.039 
(5.27)*** 
0.036 
(3.86)*** 
COMPOLICY 
 
-0.052 
(-3.02)** 
-0.040 
(-2.69)** 
-0.013 
(-1.39) 
-0.024 
(-2.08)* 
-0.028 
(-2.81)*** 
-0.029 
(-3.50)*** 
LERNER* 
COMPOLICY 
 0.020 
(1.61) 
 0.017 
(1.53) 
 0.022 
(2.68)** 
PINDEX4a -0.001 
(-0.88) 
-0.001 
(-0.76) 
-0.001 
(-3.32)*** 
-0.001 
(-3.16)*** 
-0.001 
(-2.73)** 
-0.001 
(-2.35)** 
lnTA -0.12 
(-1.51) 
-0.12 
(-1.43) 
-0.10 
(-1.84)* 
-0.099 
(-1.69) 
-0.12 
(-3.17)*** 
-0.12 
(-3.15)*** 
EQR -0.64 
(-1.82)* 
-0.73 
(-1.74) 
-2.32 
(-1.43) 
-2.23 
(-1.53) 
-1.03 
(-2.30)** 
-1.19 
(-2.45)** 
GLCOWN 2.18 
(2.60)** 
0.57 
(0.32) 
-0.032 
(-0.51) 
-0.046 
(-0.82) 
-0.053 
(-0.57) 
-0.085 
(-1.05) 
ZSCORE -0.005 
(-2.11)* 
-0.004 
(-1.73) 
0.001 
(0.33) 
0.001 
(0.36) 
-0.002 
(-0.74) 
-0.001 
(-0.53) 
CREDIT_RISK 0.48 
(4.43)*** 
0.52 
(5.09)*** 
0.27 
(1.92)* 
0.27 
(1.93)* 
0.36 
(3.98)*** 
0.41 
(4.35)*** 
MAb - - -0.033 
(-1.16) 
-0.032 
(-1.16) 
-0.018 
(-0.81) 
-0.029 
(-1.33) 
IBSDUMMY -0.25 
(-4.19)*** 
-0.26 
(-4.41)*** 
-0.033 
(-1.26) 
-0.036 
(-1.49) 
-0.080 
(-2.23)** 
-0.077 
(-2.12)** 
HHI_D 7.13 
(1.49) 
6.20 
(1.18) 
3.25 
(1.81)* 
2.98 
(1.59) 
4.03 
(1.64) 
3.44 
(1.39) 
SCAPRATIO -0.028 
(-0.41) 
-0.003 
(-0.05) 
-0.067 
(-1.60) 
-0.065 
(-1.54) 
-0.068 
(-2.10)** 
-0.044 
(-1.23) 
MP 0.89 
(0.39) 
0.49 
(0.19) 
-1.96 
(-0.78) 
-1.85 
(-0.73) 
-0.20 
(-0.10) 
-0.075 
(-0.04) 
GDPRATE -0.25 
(-0.59) 
-0.027 
(-0.05) 
-0.014 
(-0.05) 
0.038 
(0.15) 
-0.13 
(-0.45) 
0.015 
(0.05) 
CRISISDUMMY -0.004 
(-0.09) 
-0.002 
(-0.04) 
-0.003 
(-0.17) 
-0.0001 
(-0.01) 
0.0004 
(0.02) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
Constant 0.46 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.53) 
1.38 
(2.26)** 
1.31 
(2.12)* 
1.10 
(2.44)** 
1.11 
(2.33)** 
Observations 115 115 179 179 294 294 
R2 0.53 0.53 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.46 
Note: t-statistics based on cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
a PINDEX4 is used to proxy for aggregate stock market illiquidity because it is a composite index of 
QSPPROP, AMIHUD, inverse DTVR and ZERORET. 
b MA is omitted from the regression models for small banks because none of the small banks in our 
sample was involved in merger and acquisition activities during the sample period. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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5.4.3 Removing observations during the 2007-2009 financial crisis year 
Since the 2008 financial crisis caused financial market and monetary liquidity squeezes in some 
Western economies such as the U.S. and Iceland, it is important to perform an additional test that 
ensures the crisis does not contaminate our main findings. Hence, bank observations in the years 
2007 to 2009 are excluded from estimations in the additional test. Table 5.10 shows the results of 
the additional test. As shown in column (1), the marginal effect of LERNER on total liquidity creation 
(CATFAT_TA) by small banks drops slightly from 0.23 in the main estimation to 0.21 in the additional 
test, but the effect of LERNER remains significant at the one percent level, confirming the “fragility 
channel” effect for small banks. For large banks, bank competition does not have a significant impact 
on their liquidity creation, as indicated by the insignificant LERNER coefficient of -0.14 in column (2). 
The additional test results for the second and third research objectives are reported in the columns 
(3) to (7), with each column representing a model using the specific stock market liquidity measure. It 
is shown that the magnitude of the coefficient on LERNER increases slightly and remains highly 
significant at the one percent level, confirming the “fragility channel” effect in the Malaysian 
commercial banking industry as a whole. As for the relationship between stock market liquidity and 
bank liquidity creation, the coefficients on stock market illiquidity measures (QSPPROP, AMIHUD and 
ZERORET) as well as the coefficient on stock market turnover ratio (DTVR) remain significantly 
negative. The aggregate stock market illiquidity index score (PINDEX4), again, confirms that a liquid 
stock market is positively associated with bank liquidity creation. Thus, we can conclude that our 
main findings are not influenced by the 2008 global financial crisis. 
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Table 5.10 Effect of bank competition and stock market liquidity on CATFAT_TA during non-crisis years 
 Small banks Large banks All banks 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
LERNER 0.21 
(4.58)*** 
-0.14 
(-0.66) 
0.17 
(4.79)*** 
0.18 
(5.07)*** 
0.17 
(4.66)*** 
0.17 
(4.58)*** 
0.17 
(4.87)*** 
SLIQUIDITY 
QSPPROP 
 
AMIHUD 
 
DTVR 
 
ZERORET 
 
PINDEX4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.002 
(-1.71) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(-2.25)** 
 
-0.018 
(-2.37)** 
 
 
 
-0.009 
(-3.95)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.35 
(-2.94)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.008 
(-2.15)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(-3.46)*** 
lnTA -0.14 
(-2.11)* 
-0.14 
(-1.94)* 
-0.15 
(-3.79)*** 
-0.15 
(-3.89)*** 
-0.13 
(-3.26)*** 
-0.13 
(-3.20)*** 
-0.15 
(-3.90)*** 
EQR -0.58 
(-1.59) 
-3.86 
(-2.20)** 
-1.21 
(-2.52)** 
-1.10 
(-2.40)** 
-1.17 
(-2.45)** 
-1.11 
(-2.21)** 
-1.16 
(-2.46)** 
GLCOWN 4.96 
(3.26)*** 
-0.13 
(-0.97) 
-0.13 
(-0.66) 
-0.11 
(-0.62) 
-0.12 
(-0.68) 
-0.13 
(-0.73) 
-0.12 
(-0.64) 
ZSCORE -0.004 
(-1.66) 
0.005 
(0.92) 
-0.0009 
(-0.30) 
-0.002 
(-0.62) 
-0.0009 
(-0.31) 
-0.001 
(-0.44) 
-0.001 
(-0.41) 
CREDIT_RISK 0.47 
(2.04)* 
0.21 
(1.81)* 
0.33 
(3.06)*** 
0.32 
(3.11)*** 
0.33 
(3.22)*** 
0.33 
(3.17)*** 
0.33 
(3.06)*** 
MAa - 
 
-0.061 
(-1.63) 
-0.050 
(-1.96)* 
-0.021 
(-0.77) 
-0.050 
(-1.92)* 
-0.035 
(-1.32) 
-0.040 
(-1.58) 
IBSDUMMY -0.28 
(-2.36)** 
-0.045 
(-1.86)* 
-0.083 
(-1.90)* 
-0.090 
(-2.09)** 
-0.085 
(-1.96)* 
-0.086 
(-1.96)* 
-0.086 
(-1.96)* 
HHI_D 7.64 
(1.83)* 
3.92 
(1.69) 
4.46 
(1.91)* 
5.75 
(2.37)** 
1.93 
(0.94) 
3.89 
(1.69) 
4.94 
(2.09)** 
SCAPRATIO -0.042 
(-0.37) 
-0.070 
(-2.11)* 
-0.020 
(-0.57) 
-0.017 
(-0.43) 
0.19 
(2.59)** 
-0.085 
(-1.12) 
-0.062 
(-1.47) 
MP -1.47 
(-0.33) 
-2.31 
(-0.77) 
-0.59 
(-0.24) 
-1.44 
(-0.57) 
2.18 
(0.92) 
-0.78 
(-0.29) 
-1.04 
(-0.41) 
GDPRATE -2.54 
(-2.43)** 
-0.47 
(-1.33) 
-1.18 
(-2.32)** 
-0.58 
(-1.44) 
-0.51 
(-1.17) 
-0.99 
(-2.19)** 
-1.18 
(-2.36)** 
Constant 0.79 
(1.00) 
1.88 
(2.41)** 
1.37 
(2.99)*** 
1.22 
(2.63)** 
1.14 
(2.41)** 
1.57 
(3.16)*** 
1.44 
(3.10)*** 
Observations 91 138 229 229 229 229 229 
R2 0.53 0.48 0.44 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.45 
Note: t-statistics based on cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  
***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
a MA is omitted from the regression models for small banks because because none of the small banks in 
our sample was involved in merger and acquisition activities during the sample period. 
All variables are defined in Table 5.1.  
Source: Author’s calculations 
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5.4.4 Using alternative cut-off points for classes of bank size  
The fourth additional test is conducted to examine whether our findings on the influence of bank 
competition on bank liquidity creation by bank size are robust to different benchmarks of classes of 
bank size. In this additional test, two alternative benchmarks are employed to classify banks into small 
and large banks, which are the median of banks’ total assets (MYR 34.5 billion) and the number of bank 
branches. In the latter benchmark, we set the cut-off point to be 16 branches to denote bank markets in 
all 13 states and 3 federal territories in Malaysia, given the consideration that large banks in Malaysia 
operate in multi-markets throughout the nation through extensive branch networks, while small banks 
generally operate about three branches concentrating in developed states or federal territories. Since 
data on bank branches are available from the year 2010 to 2013, we define large banks as banks that 
operate more than 16 branches at the end-year 2013, and small banks otherwise32.  
 
The regression results using the median banks’ total assets (MYR 34.5 billion) as the benchmark are 
reported in Table 5.11, while the results using 16 bank branches as the benchmark are reported in Table 
5.12. The results in Panel A in both Table 5.11 and Table 5.12 show that the LERNER coefficients are 
significantly positive for nearly all the liquidity creation measures, confirming that small banks create 
less liquidity when they have lower market power. On the other hand, the additional test results confirm 
that large banks tend to create more liquidity when they possess lower market power. However, the 
coefficient on LERNER is only significant for regressions based on the “category” specification of liquidity 
creation measures, as presented in the column for CATNONFAT_TA in Panel B of Table 5.11 and in the 
columns for CATFAT_TA and CATNONFAT_TA in Panel B of Table 5.12. These additional findings are 
qualitatively similar to our main findings reported in Section 5.3.1. 
                                                          
32 The classification of sample banks into large and small banks does not change if the cut-off of 16 branches at the 
end-year 2010 is used instead. 
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Table 5.11 Effect of bank competition on bank liquidity creation for small and large banks using 
median total assets as a cut-off point 
Panel A: Regression results for small banks (<MYR34.5 billion total assets) 
 
Variable CATFAT_TA CATNONFAT_
TA 
MATFAT_TA MATNONFAT_
TA 
OFFLC_TA 
LERNER 0.20 
(5.15)*** 
0.12 
(3.39)*** 
0.15 
(2.92)*** 
0.069 
(1.51) 
0.083 
(2.45)** 
PINDEX4a -0.001 
(-2.17)** 
-0.001 
(-1.78)* 
-0.001 
(-1.62) 
-0.001 
(-1.21) 
-0.001 
(-1.92)* 
lnTA 
 
-0.13 
(-1.65) 
-0.003 
(-0.05) 
-0.14 
(-1.85)* 
-0.006 
(-0.11) 
-0.13 
(-3.00)*** 
EQR -0.98 
(-1.76)* 
-0.92 
(-1.90)* 
-0.98 
(-2.64)** 
-0.92 
(-3.05)*** 
-0.065 
(-0.38) 
GLCOWN 0.42 
(2.17)** 
-0.089 
(-0.50) 
-0.13 
(-0.69) 
-0.64 
(-3.98)*** 
0.51 
(8.59)*** 
ZSCORE -0.003 
(-0.84) 
-0.0003 
(-0.12) 
-0.003 
(-1.17) 
-0.001 
(-0.34) 
-0.002 
(-1.87)* 
CREDIT_RISK 0.39 
(3.16)*** 
0.23 
(2.46)** 
0.31 
(3.16)*** 
0.15 
(2.11)** 
0.16 
(3.09)*** 
MA -0.029 
(-0.50) 
-0.027 
(-0.74) 
0.003 
(0.13) 
0.006 
(0.69) 
-0.002 
(-0.10) 
IBSDUMMY -0.14 
(-2.15)** 
-0.11 
(-2.74)** 
-0.18 
(-3.33)*** 
-0.14 
(-4.93)*** 
-0.035 
(-1.16) 
HHI_D 5.82 
(1.30) 
5.29 
(1.54) 
5.21 
(1.35) 
4.68 
(1.59) 
0.53 
(0.23) 
SCAPRATIO -0.16 
(-2.19)** 
-0.11 
(-1.81)* 
-0.14 
(-1.56) 
-0.086 
(-1.23) 
-0.050 
(-1.49) 
MP 1.06 
(0.50) 
2.04 
(1.01) 
0.88 
(0.35) 
1.87 
(0.75) 
-0.99 
(-0.73) 
GDPRATE -1.26 
(-3.07)*** 
-0.87 
(-2.90)*** 
-1.23 
(-2.91)*** 
-0.85 
(-1.79)* 
-0.39 
(-1.71) 
CRISISDUMMY -0.043 
(-1.02) 
-0.010 
(-0.45) 
-0.039 
(-1.07) 
-0.006 
(-0.33) 
-0.033 
(-1.18) 
Constant 1.08 
(1.13) 
-0.31 
(-0.46) 
1.26 
(1.55) 
-0.13 
(-0.21) 
1.39 
(3.03)*** 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 
R2 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.45 0.35 
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Panel B: Regression results for large banks (>MYR34.5 billion total assets) 
Variable CATFAT_TA CATNONFAT_
TA 
MATFAT_TA MATNONFAT_
TA 
OFFLC_TA 
LERNER -0.26 
(-1.63) 
-0.27 
(-1.97)* 
-0.14 
(-0.69) 
-0.15 
(-0.63) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
PINDEX4a -0.0004 
(-2.21)** 
-0.001 
(-4.14)*** 
-0.0002 
(-1.02) 
-0.0004 
(-2.00)* 
0.0002 
(1.13) 
lnTA -0.071 
(-1.39) 
-0.017 
(-0.68) 
0.019 
(0.36) 
0.073 
(1.75) 
-0.054 
(-1.36) 
EQR -0.26 
(-0.17) 
-1.08 
(-1.00) 
-0.78 
(-0.49) 
-1.60 
(-1.56) 
0.82 
(1.08) 
GLCOWN -0.10 
(-2.02)* 
-0.068 
(-1.77)* 
0.13 
(3.53)*** 
0.16 
(4.80)*** 
-0.034 
(-1.21) 
ZSCORE -0.002 
(-0.42) 
0.001 
(0.45) 
0.0001 
(0.02) 
0.003 
(1.51) 
-0.003 
(-1.06) 
CREDIT_RISK 0.60 
(3.83)*** 
0.21 
(1.88)* 
0.56 
(4.44)*** 
0.18 
(1.79)* 
0.39 
(6.62)*** 
MA -0.035 
(-1.23) 
-0.018 
(-0.82) 
-0.006 
(-0.03) 
0.011 
(0.56) 
-0.017 
(-0.90) 
IBSDUMMY -0.055 
(-2.69)** 
-0.032 
(-2.09)* 
-0.032 
(-1.32) 
-0.008 
(-0.37) 
-0.024 
(-1.65) 
HHI_D 1.67 
(0.97) 
2.44 
(2.99)*** 
0.74 
(0.35) 
1.51 
(0.96) 
-0.77 
(-0.52) 
SCAPRATIO -0.024 
(-0.59) 
-0.067 
(-2.36)** 
-0.002 
(-0.04) 
-0.044 
(-1.63) 
0.043 
(2.15)* 
MP -0.64 
(-0.26) 
-2.10 
(-1.72) 
-2.10 
(-0.98) 
-3.56 
(-2.97)** 
1.46 
(0.94) 
GDPRATE 0.29 
(0.93) 
0.20 
(1.12) 
0.29 
(0.75) 
0.20 
(0.71) 
0.089 
(0.46) 
CRISISDUMMY 0.008 
(0.47) 
-0.0003 
(-0.02) 
-0.0004 
(-0.03) 
-0.008 
(-0.65) 
0.008 
(1.39) 
Constant 0.82 
(1.37) 
0.29 
(1.00) 
0.035 
(0.06) 
-0.49 
(-1.11) 
0.52 
(1.20) 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 
R2 0.57 0.39 0.48 0.49 0.57 
Note: t-statistics based on cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  
***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
a PINDEX4 is used to proxy for aggregate stock market illiquidity because it is a composite index of 
QSPPROP, AMIHUD, inverse DTVR and ZERORET. 
All variables are defined in Table 5.1.  
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 5.12 Effect of bank competition on bank liquidity creation for small and large banks using 16 
bank branches as a cut-off point 
Panel A: Regression results for small banksa (<16 branches) 
 
Variable CATFAT_TA CATNONFAT_
TA 
MATFAT_TA MATNONFAT_
TA 
OFFLC_TA 
LERNER 0.22 
(5.63)*** 
0.14 
(4.06)*** 
0.16 
(2.88)** 
0.068 
(1.44) 
0.089 
(2.38)** 
PINDEX4b -0.002 
(-2.20)** 
-0.001 
(-2.02)* 
-0.001 
(-1.66) 
-0.001 
(-1.48) 
-0.001 
(-1.51) 
lnTA 
 
-0.14 
(-2.03)* 
-0.011 
(-0.21) 
-0.15 
(-2.09)* 
-0.017 
(-0.34) 
-0.13 
(-3.39)*** 
EQR -0.81 
(-1.78)* 
-0.76 
(-1.66) 
-1.21 
(-2.98)** 
-1.15 
(-3.14)*** 
-0.055 
(-0.33) 
ZSCORE -0.003 
(-1.36) 
-0.001 
(-0.50) 
-0.002 
(-0.81) 
0.001 
(0.33) 
-0.002 
(-1.63) 
CREDIT_RISK 0.42 
(3.54)*** 
0.21 
(2.29)** 
0.34 
(3.26)*** 
0.14 
(1.72) 
0.20 
(3.94)*** 
IBSDUMMY -0.24 
(-3.50)*** 
-0.17 
(-3.61)*** 
-0.19 
(-2.42)** 
-0.13 
(-2.30)** 
-0.061 
(-1.88)* 
HHI_D 10.4 
(2.15)* 
8.17 
(2.01)* 
8.33 
(1.68) 
6.14 
(1.55) 
2.19 
(0.91) 
SCAPRATIO -0.18 
(-1.90)* 
-0.14 
(-2.03)* 
-0.12 
(-1.10) 
-0.083 
(-1.09) 
-0.035 
(-0.76) 
MP 0.50 
(0.23) 
0.41 
(0.17) 
2.22 
(0.91) 
2.12 
(0.78) 
0.094 
(0.06) 
GDPRATE -0.75 
(-1.41) 
-0.42 
(-1.00) 
-1.04 
(-1.70) 
-0.70 
(-1.17) 
-0.33 
(-1.53) 
CRISISDUMMY -0.004 
(-0.11) 
0.019 
(0.82) 
-0.012 
(-0.34) 
0.012 
(0.63) 
-0.023 
(-0.78) 
Constant 0.72 
(0.83) 
-0.45 
(-0.67) 
0.90 
(1.13) 
-0.27 
(-0.41) 
1.17 
(2.86)** 
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 
R2 0.48 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.40 
118 
 
Panel B: Regression results for large banks (>16 branches) 
Variable CATFAT_TA CATNONFAT_
TA 
MATFAT_TA MATNONFAT_
TA 
OFFLC_TA 
LERNER -0.27 
(-1.70) 
-0.25 
(-2.29)** 
0.032 
(0.16) 
0.052 
(0.22) 
-0.020 
(-0.15) 
PINDEX4b -0.001 
(-3.10)*** 
-0.001 
(-4.34)*** 
-0.0005 
(-1.79)* 
-0.0005 
(-2.04)* 
-0.00002 
(-0.09) 
lnTA 
 
-0.12 
(-3.68)*** 
-0.073 
(-4.12)*** 
-0.048 
(-1.71) 
0.0005 
(0.01) 
-0.048 
(-1.56) 
EQR -2.37 
(-1.57) 
-1.61 
(-2.05)* 
-0.61 
(-0.42) 
0.15 
(0.11) 
-0.76 
(-0.59) 
GLCOWN -0.037 
(-0.57) 
-0.079 
(-3.18)*** 
0.11 
(2.13)* 
0.070 
(0.68) 
0.042 
(0.55) 
ZSCORE 0.001 
(0.17) 
-0.001 
(-0.30) 
-0.003 
(-0.68) 
-0.004 
(-1.19) 
0.001 
(0.29) 
CREDIT_RISK 0.28 
(1.63) 
0.11 
(1.30) 
0.24 
(1.50) 
0.067 
(0.81) 
0.17 
(1.83)* 
MA -0.044 
(-1.65) 
-0.019 
(-1.18) 
0.005 
(0.26) 
0.030 
(1.52) 
-0.025 
(-1.35) 
IBSDUMMY -0.029 
(-1.34) 
-0.016 
(-1.29) 
0.033 
(-1.68) 
-0.019 
(-0.96) 
-0.013 
(-0.70) 
HHI_D 3.61 
(2.26)** 
5.05 
(7.95)*** 
3.34 
(2.98)** 
4.77 
(2.85)** 
-1.43 
(-1.03) 
SCAPRATIO -0.090 
(-1.87)* 
-0.092 
(-2.94)** 
-0.076 
(-1.33) 
-0.078 
(-1.99)* 
0.002 
(0.09) 
MP -1.66 
(-0.77) 
-3.24 
(-3.13)*** 
-3.08 
(-1.43) 
-4.67 
(-3.58)*** 
1.59 
(1.16) 
GDPRATE -0.26 
(-1.01) 
0.064 
(0.46) 
0.080 
(0.36) 
0.40 
(1.31) 
-0.33 
(-1.66) 
CRISISDUMMY -0.009 
(-0.42) 
-0.010 
(-0.75) 
0.002 
(0.11) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
Constant 1.65 
(4.00)*** 
0.89 
(3.59)*** 
0.89 
(2.18)** 
0.13 
(0.28) 
0.76 
(2.36)** 
Observations 169 169 169 169 169 
R2 0.49 0.49 0.32 0.42 0.38 
Note: t-statistics based on cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  
***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
a GLCOWN and MA are omitted from the regression models for small banks because none of the 
small banks in our sample was owned by Malaysian government-linked companies and agencies nor 
involved in merger and acquisition activities during the sample period. 
b PINDEX4 is used to proxy for aggregate stock market illiquidity because it is a composite index of 
QSPPROP, AMIHUD, inverse DTVR and ZERORET. 
All variables are defined in Table 5.1.  
Source: Author’s calculations 
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5.4.5 Fixed-effect panel threshold model for the effect of bank competition on liquidity creation 
Next, we  adopt a fixed-effect panel threshold model introduced by Hansen (1999) to examine the 
non-linear threshold effect of bank competition on bank liquidity creation which is “structurally 
broken” or constrained by the size of banks. The model allows the sample data to endogenously 
decide the number of the threshold and the optimal threshold value by least squares method. Our 
baseline equation (5) is first extended to the single fixed-effect panel threshold model:  
 
1 2 3( ) ( )it it it it it it i itLC LERNER I TA LERNER I TA X a u          
       (10) 
where 
i denotes individual bank and t denotes specific year; 
 .I is the indicator function; 
TA is the bank size threshold variable which represents total assets expressed in real 2013 MYR 
billion; 
 is the value of the threshold variable; 
LC = bank liquidity creation measures as a proportion of total assets; 
LERNER = bank market power as an inverse proxy for bank competition; 
X = other explanatory variables including SLIQUIDITY, EQR, lnTA, CREDIT_RISK, ZSCORE, GLCOWN, 
MA, IBSDUMMY, HHI_D, SCAPRATIO, MP, GDPRATE and CRISISDUMMY 
a = time-invariant unobserved individual effect; 
u = idiosyncratic error term; 
β = coefficients to be estimated. 
 
If there are multiple thresholds, we fit the model sequentially. At the present, multiple-thresholds 
model permits dataset to be divided into four regimes by three thresholds, 1 , 2  and 3 . To 
determine the number of threshold in the model, it is important to determine whether the threshold 
effect is statistically significant. To do this, a threshold effect test is first conducted for the single-
threshold model under the null hypothesis of no threshold effect (linear model). If the null 
hypothesis of no threshold effect is rejected, then a subsequent threshold effect test will be 
conducted for the double-threshold model under the null hypothesis of single threshold effect 
(single-threshold model). If both the single- and double-threshold models reject the null hypotheses, 
then a threshold effect test is conducted for the triple-threshold model under the null hypothesis of 
double threshold effect (double-threshold model). 
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Given the five bank liquidity creation measures in our study, we estimate the single-threshold model 
(equation 10) for each of the measures and report the results in Table 5.13. However, the total bank 
observations drops from 294 to 260 when the fixed-effect threshold model is adopted. This is 
because estimating the model with Stata requires a balanced panel dataset, so banks that do not 
have data throughout the 2001 to 2013 period are dropped from the analyses.  
 
As indicated by the p-values of threshold effect tests across all the models in Table 5.13, all single-
threshold models fail to reject the null hypothesis of no threshold effect, except for the single-
threshold model of CATFAT_TA (model 1S) which passess the threshold effect test at the five percent 
significance level. Further, the double-threshold model of CATFAT_TA (model 1D) fails to reject the 
single-threshold effect with the p-value of 0.79. The results thus suggest a single-threshold model for 
the effect of LERNER on CATFAT_TA. Since CATFAT_TA is the preferred liqudity creation measure and 
since we are interested to examine the non-linear effect of bank competition on bank liquidity 
creation constrained by bank size, the results of Model 1S are used.  
 
Based on the results of Model 1S, it is found that the effect of bank competition on total bank 
liquidity creation changes direction at the bank size threshold value of MYR 7.49 billion. Two regimes 
are then formed from our sample: one containing 81 bank observations that hold less than MYR 7.49 
billion total assets (small bank regime), and the other containing 179 bank observations that hold at 
least MYR 7.49 billion total assets (large bank regime). Before reaching the threshold value, the 
estimated coefficient on LERNER is 0.24 and significant at the one percent level, indicating a negative 
effect of bank competition on total liquidity creation in the small bank regime, ceteris paribus. Upon 
reaching the threshold, the estimated coefficient on LERNER is -0.49 and is significant at the one 
percent level, suggesting that large banks increase their total liquidity creation when facing greater 
competition. In summary, the results based on the fixed-effect panel threshold model are consistent 
with the results using the split sample fixed-effect regression model and reaffirm that bank size is a 
moderating factor of the effect of bank competition on bank liquidity creation. 
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Table 5.13 Non-linear threshold effect of bank competition on bank liquidity creation 
Threshold model Single (1S) Double (1D) Single (2) Single (3) Single (4) Single (5) 
 CATFAT_TA CATFAT_TA CATNONFAT
_TA 
 MATFAT_TA MATNONFAT
_TA 
OFFLC_TA 
LERNER(TA< 1 ) 0.24 
(3.99)*** 
0.23 
(4.15)*** 
0.12 
(2.95)*** 
0.35 
(2.63)** 
-0.013 
(-0.19) 
0.12 
(3.58)*** 
LERNER( 1 ≤TA<
2 ) 
-0.49 
(-4.19)*** 
-0.51 
(-5.82)*** 
-0.38 
(-4.65)*** 
-0.003 
(-0.02) 
0.20 
(2.45)** 
-0.065 
(-0.74) 
LERNER(TA≥ 2 ) - -0.34 
(-2.71)** 
- - - - 
PINDEX4 -0.001 
(-2.19)** 
-0.001 
(-2.22)** 
-0.001 
(-2.73)** 
-0.001 
(-1.46) 
-0.0005 
(-1.70) 
-0.0001 
(-0.42) 
lnTA -0.097 
(-4.04)*** 
-0.11 
(-4.79)*** 
-0.021 
(-0.65) 
-0.045 
(-1.36) 
0.004 
(0.15) 
-0.079 
(-2.52)** 
EQR -1.12 
(-2.41)*** 
-1.20 
(-3.64)*** 
-1.02 
(-3.01)*** 
-1.32 
(-3.02)*** 
-1.04 
(-2.61)** 
-0.11 
(-0.55) 
GLCOWN -0.004 
(-0.04) 
-0.019 
(-0.26) 
-0.076 
(-3.39)*** 
0.098 
(2.12)** 
-0.014 
(-0.13) 
0.068 
(0.75) 
ZSCORE -0.001 
(-0.29) 
-0.0005 
(-0.26) 
0.0003 
(0.16) 
0.002 
(0.68) 
0.001 
(0.46) 
-0.001 
(-0.64) 
CREDIT_RISK 0.46 
(4.31)*** 
0.46 
(4.33)*** 
0.22 
(2.51)** 
0.37 
(3.52)*** 
0.098 
(1.37) 
0.23 
(4.27)*** 
MA -0.033 
(-1.78)* 
-0.033 
(-2.02)* 
-0.022 
(-1.51) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
0.008 
(0.56) 
-0.012 
(-0.76) 
IBSDUMMY -0.053 
(-2.02)* 
-0.060 
(-2.32)** 
-0.032 
(-1.74)* 
-0.097 
(-2.41)** 
-0.079 
(-2.72)** 
-0.025 
(-1.25) 
HHI_D 3.71 
(1.44) 
3.19 
(1.19) 
4.62 
(2.49)** 
2.49 
(0.90) 
3.14 
(1.45) 
-0.87 
(-0.57) 
SCAPRATIO -0.087 
(-2.00)* 
-0.090 
(-2.07)* 
-0.086 
(-2.76)** 
-0.061 
(-1.10) 
-0.064 
(-1.62) 
0.003 
(0.14) 
MP 0.078 
(0.05) 
-0.096 
(-0.07) 
-0.54 
(-0.45) 
0.66 
(0.35) 
0.19 
(0.12) 
0.92 
(0.94) 
GDPRATE -0.45 
(-1.58) 
-0.51 
(-1.72) 
-0.18 
(-0.78) 
-0.46 
(-1.34) 
-0.18 
(-0.48) 
-0.25 
(-1.74)* 
CRISISDUMMY -0.019 
(-1.09) 
-0.022 
(-1.27) 
-0.001 
(-0.11) 
-0.007 
(-0.40) 
0.009 
(0.76) 
-0.016 
(-1.33) 
Constant 1.04 
(2.92)*** 
1.27 
(3.23)*** 
0.076 
(0.19) 
0.59 
(1.32) 
-0.013 
(-0.03) 
0.96 
(3.16)*** 
Observations 260 260 260 260 260 260 
R2  0.49 0.50 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.39 
Threshold effect  
F-stat 
 
27.9** 
 
6.80 
 
20.0 
 
11.41 
 
9.88 
 
12.11 
(p-value) (0.040) (0.79) (0.14) (0.53) (0.72) (0.51) 
1  7.49 7.49 7.49 4.11 109 7.11 
2  n/a 150 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Note: t-statistics based on cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Source: Author’s calculations 
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5.4.6 Dynamic effects of bank competition and stock market liquidity 
All the regressions we analysed so far have implied instantaneous relationships between bank 
liquidity creation and bank competition and stock market liquidity, because we employ these 
variables from the same time period. Next, we test for the possibility that time might elapse between 
the changes in bank competition and stock market liquidity and the change in bank liquidity creation. 
We replace both LERNER and SLIQUIDITY from time period t in our baseline equation (5) by LERNER 
and SLIQUIDITY from t-1, as: 
1 1 2 1 3it it it it i itSLIQLC LERN UIER XY uIT aD       
       (11) 
In equation (11), our explanatory variables of interest are lagged by one year, and the relationships 
between bank liquidity creation and control variables remain instantaneous. 
 
Table 5.14 reports the regressions results on the dynamic effects of bank competition and stock 
market liquidity on bank liquidity creation. Based on the results for small banks presented in column 
(1), the marginal effect of LERNER on CATFAT_TA reduces from 0.23 to 0.11 and becomes significant 
at ten percent level when LERNER is lagged by one year. The results suggest that the dynamic effect 
of previous year’s bank competition on current year’s liquidity creation of small banks is weak. 
Further, based on the results for large banks presented in column (2), the estimated coefficient on 
one-year lagged LERNER is insignificant, suggesting that previous year’s bank competition does not 
have a significant influence on liquidity creation of large banks.  
 
Columns (3) to (7) in Table 5.14  show the results for full sample banks for which five stock market 
liquidity measures are employed alternatively in the regression model. It is found that the 
coefficients of l.LERNER across all the five models remain positive as in our main analyses, but 
become statistically insignificant. The findings suggest that when the competition faced by Malaysian 
commercial banks changes, banks adjust their liquidity creation for the non-bank sectors 
immediately or at least in the same time period, ceteris paribus. Generally, there is no dynamic effect 
of bank competition on liquidity creation in the Malaysian commercial banking industry. Besides, the 
impact of lagged stock market liquidity on bank liquidity creation becomes weak, as indicated by the 
negative coefficients on l.AMIHUD and l.ZERORET which are significant at ten percent level and 
l.QSPPROP, l.DTVR and l.PINDEX4 which are insignificant. This implies that current year’s bank 
liquidity creation is not affected by last year’s stock market liquidity as strongly as current year’s 
stock market illiquidity, ceteris paribus. In summary, the effects of bank competition and stock 
market liquidity on bank liquidity creation in Malaysia are instantaneous. The dynamics of these 
effects are not apparent.  
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Table 5.14 Dynamic effects of bank competition and stock market liquidity on CATFAT_TA 
 Small banks Large banks All banks 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
l.LERNER 0.11 
(2.09)* 
-0.41 
(-1.49) 
0.011 
(0.21) 
0.017 
(0.29) 
0.010 
(0.19) 
0.017 
(0.29) 
0.012 
(0.22) 
l.SLIQUIDITY 
l.QSPPROP 
 
l.AMIHUD 
 
l.DTVR 
 
l.ZERORET 
 
l.PINDEX4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.91) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0003 
(-1.44) 
 
-0.004 
(-1.08) 
 
 
 
-0.002 
(-1.82)* 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.50 
(-1.49) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.005 
(-1.93)* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0003 
(-1.26) 
lnTA -0.12 
(-1.78) 
-0.14 
(-1.44) 
-0.15 
(-4.57)*** 
-0.15 
(-4.87)*** 
-0.12 
(-3.44)*** 
-0.15 
(-4.84)*** 
-0.15 
(-4.64)*** 
EQR -0.94 
(-1.53) 
-1.72 
(-0.89) 
-1.45 
(-2.70)** 
-1.45 
(-2.64)** 
-1.38 
(-2.56)** 
-1.41 
(-2.55)** 
-1.45 
(-2.68)** 
GLCOWN 5.02 
(1.19) 
-0.017 
(-0.26) 
-0.073 
(-0.78) 
-0.076 
(-0.82) 
-0.054 
(-0.63) 
-0.085 
(-0.89) 
-0.073 
(-0.78) 
ZSCORE -0.0001 
(-0.03) 
-0.0001 
(-0.02) 
0.001 
(0.43) 
0.001 
(0.37) 
0.001 
(0.39) 
0.001 
(0.30) 
0.001 
(0.41) 
CREDIT_RIS
K 
0.44 
(2.83)** 
0.55 
(2.98)*** 
0.45 
(3.98)*** 
0.45 
(3.92)*** 
0.47 
(4.36)*** 
0.45 
(3.97)*** 
0.45 
(3.96)*** 
MAa - 
 
-0.049 
(-1.70) 
-0.053 
(-2.64)** 
-0.046 
(-2.26)** 
-0.045 
(-2.15)** 
-0.051 
(-2.74)** 
-0.053 
(-2.64)** 
IBSDUMMY -0.24 
(-2.95)** 
-0.022 
(-0.95) 
-0.065 
(-1.76)* 
-0.066 
(-1.80)* 
-0.067 
(-1.85)* 
-0.067 
(-1.83)* 
-0.065 
(-1.77)* 
HHI_D 6.42 
(1.11) 
3.33 
(0.92) 
2.85 
(1.05) 
3.29 
(1.22) 
1.34 
(0.59) 
4.58 
(1.40) 
3.01 
(1.09) 
SCAPRATIO 0.042 
(0.75) 
0.049 
(2.36)** 
0.035 
(1.51) 
0.045 
(1.88)* 
-0.019 
(-0.62) 
0.087 
(2.40)** 
0.041 
(1.72)* 
MP 0.55 
(0.12) 
-1.25 
(-0.50) 
0.94 
(0.45) 
0.039 
(0.02) 
0.63 
(0.38) 
1.92 
(1.17) 
1.17 
(0.61) 
GDPRATE 0.98 
(0.89) 
0.40 
(0.99) 
0.34 
(0.66) 
0.39 
(0.75) 
0.63 
(1.20) 
0.14 
(0.34) 
0.29 
(0.61) 
CRISISDUM
MY 
-0.010 
(-0.13) 
-0.015 
(-0.83) 
-0.008 
(-0.39) 
0.0005 
(0.02) 
0.006 
(0.26) 
-0.010 
(-0.50) 
-0.007 
(-0.36) 
Constant 0.15 
(0.16) 
1.40 
(1.51) 
1.18 
(3.09)*** 
1.22 
(3.20)*** 
1.18 
(2.76)*** 
1.11 
(2.78)*** 
1.17 
(3.04)*** 
Observation
s 
102 164 267 267 267 267 267 
R2 0.42 0.46 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.39 
Note: t-statistics based on cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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a MA is omitted from the regression models for small banks because none of the small banks in our 
sample was involved in merger and acquisition activities during the sample period. 
Small banks are defined as banks holding total assets of up to MYR20 billion and large banks are 
banks holding total assets exceeding MYR20 billion. 
All variables are defined in Table 5.1.  
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
5.4.7 Instrumental variable estimation and test for endogeneity  
This additional test is conducted to test and address possible endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables of our study interest, specifically bank competition and stock market illiquidity, for which 
the fixed-effect estimator may fail to account. A critical assumption of the fixed-effect estimator (or 
within estimator) is strict exogeneity of explanatory variables, that is E(uit|xit, ai)=0 for all t=1, …, T 
(Wooldridge, 2013). The assumption implies that the fixed effects estimator will not be consistent in 
the presence of time-varying omitted variables that are correlated with the explanatory variables, 
even after it takes out the unobserved fixed effects. Instrumental variables (IV) method has been a 
popular and consistent estimator in solving such endogeneity problem, however, the method comes 
with a costly efficiency loss when the explanatory variables are exogenous (Wooldridge, 2013). As 
such, it is useful and important to test for endogeneity of bank competition and stock market 
illiquidity to show whether the IV method is necessary in our study. We employ the robust Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity in the context of panel IV estimation with a two-stage least-
squares (2SLS) fixed-effects estimator33. The 2SLS fixed-effects estimator is obtained in two stages. 
The first stage regresses the potentially endogenous variable (bank competition or stock market 
illiquidity) on at least one excluded instrument and all other control variables. In the second stage, 
bank liquidity creation (using the preferred CATFAT_TA) is regressed on the predicted value for the 
specified endogenous variable obtained from the first stage and all the control variables. As with the 
fixed-effects estimator employed in our main analyses, a fixed effects transformation is imposed on 
the 2SLS estimations to control for unobserved bank fixed effects.  
 
The consistency of the IV method and its diagnostics tests for endogeneity and over-identifying 
restrictions is underpinned by several key assumptions. One of them is the homoscedasticity 
assumption for the usual 2SLS standard errors and tests statistics to be asymptotically valid 
(Wooldridge, 2013). We, thus, make these tests robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
using cluster-robust standard errors. Besides, an instrument (z) for the endogenous explanatory 
variable (x) must satisfy two assumptions: (i) instrument exogeneity or z is uncorrelated with the 
                                                          
33 In Stata version 11 (or later), endogeneity test statistics can be easily performed using “endog” option of 
xtivreg2. 
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unobserved error term (u), and (ii) instrument relevance or z is strongly correlated with x 
(Wooldridge, 2013). The instrument exogeneity requirement cannot be tested when the number of 
excluded instruments is equal to the number of specified endogenous regressors (the equation is 
exactly identified). In the over-identification case, over-identifying restrictions can be tested under 
the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid (exogeneous) instruments, which means 
that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and are correctly excluded from the 
estimated model. The robust test of over-identifying restrictions follows Hansen's J statistic. 
Whereas, the relevance requirement of instrument can be tested jointly using a F-test or individually 
using a t-test in the first stage regression (Wooldridge, 2013). 
 
In the IV estimations dealing with possibly endogenous bank competition, two country-level 
institutional factors and a bank-level variable are identified as valid and relevant instruments. The 
first institutional factor is financial freedom (FINANCIALFREE), an index score of independence from 
government control and interference in the financial sector ranging 0 (repressive) to 100 (negligible 
government interference) (The Heritage Foundation, 2016). Financial freedom is vital to ensure all 
financial institutions, including foreign institutions, operate freely and without government influence 
and are treated equally (Mirzaei & Moore, 2014). As such, financial freedom weakens the market 
power of banks and boosts bank competition.  
 
Property rights (PROPERTYRIGHT) is another institutional determinant of bank competition. The 
property rights index score measures the degree to which a country’s laws protect private property 
rights and the extent to which those laws are enforced effectively (The Heritage Foundation, 2016). 
Effective legal protection of property encourages banks to freely accumulate private property, 
designating boundaries in the banking sector within which innovative banks develop their market 
power and exert greater competitive pressure on less innovative competitors (Maskus & Lahouel, 
2000). Property rights index score ranges from 0 (private property is outlawed) to 100 (private 
property is government-guaranteed), and the data is available each year from the Heritage 
Foundation (2016). FINANCIALFREE is a valid instrument for bank competition facing the full sample 
banks and the large banks, while PROPERTYRIGHT is a valid instrument for competition facing small 
banks.  
 
Bank competition is measured at bank-level, thus it is important to have a bank-level instrument for 
bank competition to show sufficient variation across banks and over time. Since it is very difficult to 
find a valid instrument at bank-level, lagged bank competition is used as an instrument. The first 
stage F-statistic and the over-identification test reported in Panel A of Table 5.15 confirms that 
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lagged bank competition is strongly linked to current bank competition and is exogenous in the 
regression model. 
 
In addition, two instruments are identified for stock market liquidity, which are investment freedom 
(INVESTFREE) and political stability and absence of violence (POLITICSA). INVESTFREE captures the 
degree of regulatory restrictions imposed on investment capital, with the ideal score of 100 for 
constraints-free to the score of 0 for the maximal constraints (The Heritage Foundation, 2016). 
Previous cross-country studies have found that liberalisation of capital controls boosts stock market 
size, liquidity and international integration (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 1996a; Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 1996; Levine & Zervos, 1998). POLITICSA measures perceptions of the likelihood of 
political instability and politically-motivated violence, including terrorism (World Bank, 2015). The 
estimate ranges from -2.5 (weak governance performance) to 2.5 (strong governance performance). 
Due to the fear of capital loss, the adverse impact of political instability on stock market risk and 
performance has been found to be substantial, impeding the market liquidity and development 
(Asteriou & Siriopoulos, 2000; Roe & Siegel, 2011). 
 
Table 5.15 shows the regression results of the two stages in IV estimations, with Panel A of the table 
addressing possibly endogenous bank competition and Panel B addressing possibly endogenous stock 
market liquidity. The results of the first stage F-statistics and the Hansen’s J-statistics reported in 
both panels show that our excluded instruments for bank competition and stock market liquidity are 
jointly relevant and valid – important requirements for a valid and consistent endogeneity test and IV 
estimation. In addition, the signs of the coefficients on these instruments obtained in the first-stage 
regressions are as expected. 
 
As demonstrated in Panel A of Table 5.15, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test fails to reject 
the null hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressor is exogenous, which suggests that bank 
competition can be treated as exogenous and that the IV estimator is not necessary for our 
regression model. We also report the second-stage IV regression results in Panel A. In the regression 
for small banks, the coefficient on the LERNER coefficient increases from 0.23 in the fixed-effects 
estimation to 0.38 but becomes insignificant. The IV estimate of LERNER coefficient for large banks 
increases from -0.31 to -0.74 and improves slightly in terms of statistical significance. On the other 
hand, for the full sample banks, the IV estimate of the LERNER coefficient reduces to 0.048 from 0.17 
(the fixed-effects estimate) and becomes insignificant. We are not surprised by the less significant 
estimates of LERNER since the IV estimates always have very large standard errors. 
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Similarly, the results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test reported in Panel B of Table 5.15 
suggest that our stock market liquidity measures can be treated as exogenous in the model, except 
for DTVR. Using the IV estimator to address the endogenous DTVR, we note that the coefficient of 
DTVR changes to positive (1.71) as opposed to the negative coefficient (-1.15) reported by the fixed-
effects estimation. This finding indicates that the higher the stock market turnover ratio (greater 
stock market liquidity), the greater the magnitude of bank liquidity creation. The finding for DTVR is 
now consistent with the findings based on stock market illiquidity measures. We are, again, not 
surprised by the insignificant estimates of these stock market liquidity measures for the same reason 
discussed in the previous paragraph - IV estimates always have very large standard errors.  
 
To summarise, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity tests in the context of fixed-effects IV 
estimation fail to reject the exogeneity of bank competition and stock market liquidity, in most cases. 
Based on these results, it is fair to assert that any leftover neglected time-varying heterogeneity is 
not correlated with our explanatory variables of interest and the strict exogeneity assumption of the 
fixed effects estimator is satisfied. Hence, there is no need to resort to the less efficient IV approach 
as the asymptotic variance of the IV estimator is always larger (Wooldridge, 2013). The use of the 
fixed effects estimator that allows consistent estimation of the model in this study is, thus, justified. 
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Table 5.15 Fixed-effects IV analysis and test of endogeneity 
Panel A: Effect of LERNER on CATFAT_TA (corresponding to research objectives one and two) 
 Small banks Large banks All banks 
First-stage regression results 
l.LERNER 0.36 
(1.88)* 
0.59 
(11.9)*** 
0.41 
(3.62)*** 
FINANCIALFREE  -0.004 
(-5.49)*** 
-0.004 
(-1.97)** 
PROPERTYRIGHT 0.017 
(1.00) 
  
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
First stage F-statistic 7.14** 71.6*** 9.17*** 
Second-stage regression results 
LERNER (instrumented) 0.38 
(1.45) 
-0.74 
(-1.83)* 
0.048 
(0.39) 
PINDEX4 -0.002 
(-1.87)* 
-0.001 
(-2.58)** 
-0.0008 
(-2.12)** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Second stage F-statistic 2,583*** 23.1*** 9.73*** 
R2 0.43 0.45 0.40 
Hansen’s J-statistic 
(χ2 p-value) 
1.27 
(0.26) 
0.040 
(0.84) 
0.14 
(0.71) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic 
(χ2 p-value) 
0.60 
(0.44) 
1.66 
(0.20) 
0.49 
(0.48) 
Observations 101 164 266 
Panel B: Effect of stock market liquidity on CATFAT_TA (corresponding to research objective three) 
 QSPPROP AMIHUD DTVR ZERORET PINDEX4 
First-stage regression results      
POLITICSA -3.92 
(-13.8)*** 
-12.5 
(-8.25)*** 
-0.005 
(-0.68) 
-1.38 
(-2.32)** 
-51.6 
(-10.2)*** 
INVESTFREE -0.091 
(-7.74)*** 
-0.40 
(-6.38)*** 
0.0008 
(5.32)*** 
-0.083 
(-5.42)*** 
-1.63 
(-8.37)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
First stage F-statistic 312*** 148*** 19.0*** 14.7*** 194*** 
Second-stage regression results      
SLIQUIDITY (instrumented) -0.006 
(-0.59) 
-0.002 
(-0.78) 
1.71 
(0.94) 
-0.016 
(-0.92) 
-0.0006 
(-0.78) 
LERNER 0.17 
(5.18)*** 
0.17 
(5.28)*** 
0.17 
(5.46)*** 
0.16 
(4.70)*** 
0.17 
(5.24)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Second stage F-statistic 21.9*** 20.7*** 19.4*** 20.7*** 20.6*** 
R2 0.41 0.42 0.34 0.42 0.41 
Hansen’s J-statistic 
(χ2 p-value) 
0.88 
(0.35) 
0.76 
(0.38) 
0.020 
(0.89) 
0.47 
(0.49) 
0.75 
(0.39) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic 
(χ2 p-value) 
0.61 
(0.43) 
0.44 
(0.51) 
2.94 
(0.09)* 
0.067 
(0.80) 
0.40 
(0.53) 
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 
Note: t-statistics based on cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
All variables are defined in Table 5.1.  
Source: Author’s calculations 
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5.5 Result discussions 
This section discusses the empirical findings for the research objectives. 
 
5.5.1 Result discussion for research objective one 
The first research objective of this study is to examine and compare the relationship between bank 
competition and liquidity creation for small and for large commercial banks in Malaysia.  
 
Small commercial banks In Malaysia operate only three branches, on the average, usually in 
developed cities such as Kuala Lumpur and target niche markets based on high value corporate 
clients (BNM, 2001; The Association of Banks in Malaysia, 2016). For example, Bank of China 
(Malaysia) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Malaysia) have a niche in international 
trade financing business, particularly in Renminbi products, including trade loans, and as a one-stop 
provider of banking services related to business in China; Bank of Nova Scotia specialises in business 
banking to large and medium-sized corporations and retail banking to medium and high net worth 
individuals; BNP Paribas Malaysia and Mizuho Corporate Bank (Malaysia) target a segmented group 
of corporates including subsidiaries of multinationals, sovereigns and financial institutions. As these 
valued corporate clients embody the profitability and sustainability of small banks, they usually 
receive exclusive services and attention from the banks in the drive to deepen relationships to 
increase their share of the wallets of the clients. More importantly, in virtue of the flat organisational 
structure, small banks have a greater comparative edge than large banks in the processing and 
communication of information across hierarchy levels and the delegation of decision making 
authority. This allows soft-information, gathered during the course of the bank officers’ personal 
contact with their clients and local community, to play a role  in the small banks’ decisions related to 
product and service provision (Berger & Black, 2011; Berger & Udell, 2006; Berger et al., 2005b; Cole 
et al, 2004; Stein, 2002). In particular, the comparative edge of small banks in the use of soft 
information enables small banks to extend credit to informationally-opaque or riskier customers not 
served by large banks that prefer hard information such as financial statements and collateral. The 
benefits of extending relationship lending to these customers, including an ex post monopoly of 
information and the ability to hold on to customers, have been documented by Berger et al. (2005b), 
Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) and Rajan (1992).  
 
The empirical evidence in this study reveals that, regardless of the “category” or “maturity” 
specification of bank liquidity creation measures, bank competition has a negative relationship with 
liquidity creation by small banks, through both on-the balance sheet and off-the balance sheet 
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activities. This result is consistent with the “fragility channel” hypothesis that an increase in bank 
competition erodes banks’ incentives to create liquidity for the public because it becomes more 
difficult for banks to internalise the benefits of the banking relationships with their clients who face 
low switching cost as a result of bank competition (Petersen & Rajan, 1995; Dell’Ariccia & Marquez, 
2004; Hauswald & Marquez, 2006). Specifically, small banks are likely to cut down their soft lending 
to new, informationally-opaque or riskier borrowers to avoid bearing substantial informational and 
monitoring costs related to adverse selection in the early relationship period and free ride on the 
borrowers’ information by other lending competitors.  
 
More importantly, with the existence of the credit bureau in Malaysia, the value of borrowers’ 
information to banks diminishes substantially because the credit bureau allows banks to make 
informed lending decisions and compete for borrowers34 (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993; Padilla & Pagano, 
1997). In other words, the value of the bank-borrower relationship for both banks and borrowers 
suffers and the relationship breaks down easily. Greater competition imposes constraints on the 
ability of banks to capture the customers and to share in surpluses of borrowers, because borrowers 
are tempted to switch to a bank that offers better credit terms or to a capital market. Accounting for 
the monitoring cost borne for informationally-opaque customers, small banks that encounter strong 
competition may then find it less worthwhile to extend soft loans to informationally-opaque 
customers. This argument also explains our result that, when facing an increase in competition, small 
banks cut down their off-balance sheet credit commitments (a type of relationship lending 
arrangement)35.  
 
Instead of investing in more informationally opaque or risky customers, small banks that face greater 
competition may reallocate resources towards their existing captured customers by encouraging the 
existing customers to continuously utilize their products and services through strengthened 
customer relationship management. Such a phenomenon has been found and referred to as a “flight 
to captivity” by Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2004). 
 
 In addition, given a narrower business focus of small banks in Malaysia, their capacity to expand 
their liquidity creation is limited, amidst interest margin compressions on both asset and liability 
                                                          
34 The credit bureau in Malaysia, managed by BNM, has been in operation since 1982 (BNM, 2014b). The credit 
bureau centralizes and disseminates both positive and negative credit information and ratings on borrowers to 
all institutional members including banking institutions (BNM, 2014b). The supply of credit information by 
lending institutions is made compulsory, and the information must be timely and accurate.  
35 Off-balance sheet credit commitments, which constituted about 74 percent of total off-balance sheet 
liquidity creation by our sample banks, are often treated as a type of relationship lending arrangements by 
literature, such as Berger and Udell (1995), Boot and Thakor (2000) and Dinc (2000). 
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sides. Their capacity to attract greater sources of funding and demand for their financial products is 
constrained by small branch networks, narrow technology diffusion and limited business 
opportunities arising from the economic development, as customers often look for financial solutions 
with safe and dominant bank names and reputations (Siow, 2016). Thus, their liquidity creation role 
is hurt more than that of large banks when facing greater competition. 
 
On the other hand, this study finds evidence of the “price channel” effect for large banks in the 
regression models based on the preferred “category” specification of bank liquidity creation 
(CATFAT_TA and CATNONFAT_TA) because the estimated coefficient on LERNER is significantly 
negative. The “price channel” hypothesis asserts that bank competition is positively associated with 
bank liquidity creation (Hannan, 1991; Guzman, 2000; Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009). The empirical 
evidence does not show a significant relationship between bank competition and the off-balance 
sheet liquidity creation. Thus, it appears that an increase in competition facing large banks impacts 
their liquidity creation mainly through their balance sheet activities. This result can be possibly 
explained through specialisation in lending technologies based on hard-information and capacity of 
large banks in Malaysia. 
 
As suggested by organisational form studies, large banks generally specialise in hard-information-
based lending technologies, such as asset-based lending and credit-scoring, that help to mitigate the 
agency problem within the banks (Berger & Black, 2011; Berger & Udell, 2006; Berger et al., 2005; 
Cole et al, 2004; Stein, 2002). This comparative edge allows large commercial banks in Malaysia to 
serve mass consumers and corporate customers at arm’s length through extensive branch networks 
(152 branches, on average, from the year 2010 to 2013) throughout the country (BNM, 2001; The 
Association of Banks in Malaysia, 2016). Because large banks do not rely on soft information of 
customers as heavily as small banks when transacting with informationally-opaque or riskier 
customers, large banks are buffered against the “fragility channel” effect of bank competition on 
bank liquidity creation activities. The switching cost borne by large banks is not as severe as that for 
small banks in the face of greater bank competition.  
 
A large body of literature has also acknowledged that adoption of small business credit-scoring 
technology alleviates information and underwriting costs traditionally faced by large banks in small 
business lending and thus credit rationing on small firms (Akhavein et al., 2005; Berger et al., 2005a; 
Frame et al., 2001; Petersen & Rajan, 2002). As the problem of under-pricing risky loans is mitigated, 
large banks may allocate more credit to previously unserved borrowers, and the incentive to do so 
intensifies when competition increases. For instance, in the year 2012, the largest commercial bank 
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in Malaysia, Maybank, was reported to be applying the risk based pricing strategy to improve the 
bank’s margin and market share, amid increasing competition (Malayan Banking Berhad, 2013).  
 
In addition, the strong capacity of large commercial banks in Malaysia helps to explain why large 
banks are able to create more liquidity for the economy when facing increased competition. The 
capacity of Malaysian large banks is particularly evident in the forms of extensive branch operations 
and delivery channels, reputation, staff force and technology diffusion. Besides having extensive 
branch networks, some large banks form alliances with supermarkets and post offices to reach 
customers in the rural areas, as part of their branch network rationalisation exercise (BNM, 2001). In 
the midst of rising competition, large banks are able to tolerate lower pricing power and leverage 
their presence in new and existing markets at a faster pace by offering a bundle of innovative and 
competitive financial products and services to attract a different mix of customers. This in turn allows 
the banks to expand the pool of deposit funds available for greater loan demand. Over the years, the 
liquidity provider role of some DFIs has been becoming redundant as a result of greater participation 
of large banks in market segments served by the fringe Institutions (World Bank, 2013). For example, 
Bank Pembangunan Malaysia that provides medium to long term financing only to infrastructure, 
maritime, technology, oil and gas sectors and the SME Bank that targets only  Malaysian SMEs are 
losing their competitiveness as large commercial banks are already providing most  of the financing 
in these areas.  
 
Besides competing for local markets, some large banks have looked for business opportunities 
beyond the national border to help buffer the adverse impact of competition. For example, in the 
year 2013, United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) set up the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) advisory unit 
to assist foreign companies which are expanding their business into Malaysia by offering access to 
the bank’s full suite of corporate and personal banking products and borderless financial services. 
Through the advisory unit, the Bank expects to double its corporate loans to foreign companies 
investing in Malaysia in the next three years (UOB (Malaysia) Berhad, 2014). 
 
In addition, large banks have always been at the forefront of technology innovation for the financial 
services sector. Owing to high fixed costs, large banks generally adopt new technologies earlier than 
smaller banks, such as internet and mobile banking and small business credit-scoring technology, 
allowing them to serve a broad range of customers at arm’s length, gain a significant market share 
and enjoy economies of scale. A good example is the locally incorporated Citibank which has a 
comparative edge in bringing innovative technology to the market (Citibank Berhad, 2014). Citibank 
was the first bank to introduce a 10-minute home loan approval tool, cutting short the average 
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waiting period of five to seven days. The bank’s automated teller machines (ATM), known as Citibank 
Express, also offer most of the banking transactions including the opening of accounts to deliver 
efficient services and convenient processes for customers and expand the customer base. 
 
In sum, the disparities in the lending technology specialisation and capacity of banks may provide an 
explanation as to why an increase in competition leads to a fall in the liquidity creation of small 
banks, while an increase in competition improves the liquidity creation of large banks.  
 
5.5.2 Result discussion for research objective two 
The second research objective of this study examines the dominant effect of bank competition on 
liquidity creation by the Malaysian commercial banks. The overall empirical evidence for the second 
research objective shows that, on average, commercial banks cut down their liquidity creation for 
the economy when they face increased competition, ceteris paribus, pointing to the dominant 
“fragility channel” effect over the “price channel” effect in the industry. The result is consistent with 
Horvath et al. (2013, 2016), Jiang et al. (2016), Joh and Kim (2012) and Xu (2010) who supported the 
“fragility channel” hypothesis for banks in the Czech Republic, the U.S., 25 OECD countries and 26 
European countries, respectively. 
 
According to the “fragility channel” hypothesis, an increase in bank competition reduces bank 
liquidity creation, particularly, by imposing credit rationing on informationally opaque or risky 
borrowers, because it becomes more difficult for banks to internalise the benefits of banking 
relationships with their clients who are tempted to switch banks or to a capital market that offers 
better financing choices (Petersen & Rajan, 1995; Dell’Ariccia & Marquez, 2004; Hauswald & 
Marquez, 2006; Horvath et al., 2013, 2016). This means that banks that establish relationships with 
informationally opaque borrowers no longer benefit from the ex post monopoly on information of 
their borrowers developed during the course of the bank-borrower relationship. In fact, such a 
phenomenon is taking place in Malaysia, where SMEs - often regarded as informationally-opaque 
customers in the literature - face greater obstacles in obtaining bank financing via soft lending 
arrangements technologies which are more valuable to SMEs. Owing to severe asymmetric 
information problems, bank loan issuances to SMEs tend to be more transaction-oriented when 
facing increased competition, meaning that potentially viable customers may be rejected credit if 
they cannot provide adequate collateral and track records. Bank loan approvals for SMEs are mainly 
backed with collateral that includes property and fixed deposits - a form of hard information (SME 
Corporation Malaysia, 2016).  
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Besides, to ease bank credit constraints on viable yet informationally-opaque SMEs, the Credit 
Guarantee Corporation (established by BNM on July 5, 1972) has been expanding its SME outreach 
via strategic alliances with leading banks, more branch networks and  various guarantee schemes to 
provide guarantees for bank loans obtained by these SMEs (Credit Guarantee Corporation Malaysia, 
2014). While the findings of this study report a decrease in liquidity creation by commercial banks 
facing an increase in competition, the findings can be explained by the banks’ loan portfolio 
rebalancing strategy that favours customers who are backed by hard information36. Soft lending 
technology is not used massively for new, informationally opaque customers to alleviate costs 
related to informational asymmetry. The existence of an asymmetric information problem in the 
banking industry has substantial weight in explaining why the “fragility channel” effect of bank 
competition outweighs the “price channel” effect in Malaysia. 
 
Another possible explanation for the negative relationship between bank competition and liquidity 
creation found collectively for Malaysian commercial banks is that banks  reallocate funds towards 
liquid asset investment such as cash reserves and securities. As Carletti and Leonello (2011) suggest, 
the opportunity costs of holding reserves are low when an increase in bank competition makes bank 
lending activities less profitable. Hence, banks have greater incentive to invest less in illiquid loans 
and keep more liquid reserves within themselves. Investment in liquid assets also carries a benefit in 
shielding the banks from liquidity and credit risks during economic downturns.  
 
The negative relationship between bank competition and liquidity creation can further be explained 
by banks’ greater income diversification from interest-based towards non-interest-based (Amidu & 
Wolfe, 2013). It is evident that most banks in Malaysia, ranging from small to large banks, have 
placed more emphasis on increasing fee-based income in recent years to mitigate the heightened 
pressures on net interest margins as a result of the increased level of competition37. Although the 
principal source of banks’ income is still driven by liquidity creation activities in the form of interest 
income, the growing focus on fee-based activities will lead to a moderation of banks’ liquidity 
creation role. This is because fee-based activities, with the exception of off-balance sheet loan 
commitments, do not generally contribute to liquidity creation. Banks desire fee income-based 
activities, such as custody, wealth and cash management services and remittance business, as these 
                                                          
36 The explanation also implies that increased bank competition benefits banks that specialize in hard-
information-based technologies more, which explains the increase in liquidity creation by large banks, as has 
been observed for the first research objective. 
37 We found the evidence from banks’ annual reports in recent years. For example, Affin Bank, Public Bank, 
locally incorporated Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Bank and locally incorporated UOB Bank have reported intensifying 
their efforts to grow fee-based income as part of their business strategies to accommodate increasing 
competition. 
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activities do not alter the banks’ risk position and capital structure as much as interest-based 
activities do. 
 
5.5.3 Result discussion for research objective three 
The third research objective of this study is to examine the relationship between stock market 
liquidity and bank liquidity creation in Malaysia. The empirical evidence reveals that stock market 
liquidity has a significantly positive link with liquidity creation by commercial banks in Malaysia. It 
appears that a liquid stock market explains aggregate liquidity creation as well as on- and off-balance 
sheet liquidity creation of banks. The results are consistent with previous studies that provide various 
plausible explanations for the relationship.  
 
First, the positive relationship between stock market liquidity and bank liquidity creation can be 
explained through the risk-smoothing ability of a liquid stock market. As bank liquidity creation 
theory states, agents who have excess liquidity (savers) face a trade-off between liquidity insurance 
and return on illiquid asset investment as they are uncertain of their future consumption pattern 
(Bryant, 1980; Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Jacklin, 1987). A liquid stock market can, however, alleviate 
the trade-off problem for investors, because the market provides profitable investment 
opportunities for investors if they are patient enough to reap the return or ready exit-options if they 
face an idiosyncratic consumption shock (Mattana & Panetti, 2014). As investors are able to liquidate 
their claims on the liquid stock market at ease and at low transaction cost, their liquidity demand 
from banks can be diverted away to some degree. This permits banks to accept larger asset-liability 
mismatches, both liquidity and maturity, by channelling more liquidity from liquid reserves towards 
illiquid asset investments (Mattana & Panetti, 2014; Sarr & Lybek, 2002). In this way, stock market 
liquidity increases the liquidity creation of banks.  
 
Our result is also consistent with Chatterjee (2015) and Song and Thakor (2010) who document that 
stock market liquidity supports bank liquidity creation by relieving banks’ cost of equity capital. Their 
explanation is actually more viable if the bank is publicly listed or has access to the stock market. We 
do not rule out the explanation because most of the large Malaysian commercial banks are either 
publicly listed or subsidiaries of listed financial holding companies. In fact, we can observe the result 
being carried through to the liquidity creation of large banks in Panel B of Table 5.6 in Section 5.3.1 
(although this is not part of the research objectives). Chatterjee (2015) and Song and Thakor (2010) 
explained that, as a bank’s cost of equity capital decreases in a liquid stock market, the bank is more 
attracted to employing a larger amount of equity capital to meet the higher capital requirements, 
such as Basel III’s capital adequacy ratio, associated with greater lending scope for potentially 
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creditworthy yet previously unserved borrowers. This means that additional loans can be originated 
by the bank for greater scope of borrowers as the liquid stock market cuts down the bank’s cost in 
maintaining its solvency. 
 
The third possible explanation for the positive relationship between stock market liquidity and bank 
liquidity creation is that increased stock market liquidity encourages external inflows into Malaysia 
and thus stronger growth in deposit funding available for bank liquidity creation. Since foreign 
investors account for about a quarter of the total share ownership and trading value on the 
Malaysian stock market (24% and 26%, respectively, in the year 2013), the liquidity of the stock 
market can be a key driver of the country’s broad money growth, especially through portfolio 
investments, which is reflected in the growth of deposits placed by domestic non-bank financial 
institutions and business firms with domestic commercial banks (BNM, 2016c). As increased stock 
market liquidity is associated with greater deposit funding available, commercial banks are able to 
issue more credit and create more liquidity. 
 
While a liquid stock market motivates corporate firms to raise capital directly from investors, instead 
of through bank intermediaries, the firms often seek bank guarantees and commitments that serve 
as a primary backup source of corporate financing in the case that the firms fail to raise sufficient 
funds (Rajan, 1998; Dinc, 2000). In other words, despite the potential competition with banks for 
firms’ external financing, a liquid stock market stimulates greater use of off balance sheet credit 
commitments, creating an opportunity for banks to create more liquidity.  
 
Furthermore, our result can be supported by the literature in the strand of financial development 
and economic growth. For example, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine’s (1996a), Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & 
Levine, R. (1996b) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) found that, in a developing stock 
market, further increase in the market development (proxied by stock market capitalization and 
turnover) leads to a rise in large firms’ demand for bank loans. Large firms’ borrowing capacity tends 
to increase with their equity financing ability as they are “certified” by the stock market. Thus, we 
expect our result related to the positive association between stock market liquidity and bank liquidity 
creation can be partly explained by these previous findings since the Malaysian stock market is still 
striving to reach the status of full development. 
 
Our result does not quite agree with the conventional theory that suggests the “crowding-out effect” 
of a liquid stock market on the liquidity creation of banks (Diamond, 1997; Haubrich & King, 1990; 
Jacklin, 1987; von Thadden, 1998; Wallace, 1988). The “crowding-out effect” implies that increased 
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stock market liquidity exerts a competitive pressure on commercial banks and increasingly replaces 
the banks’ liquidity creator role in the economy. These theories often overemphasise the traditional 
products offered by commercial banks, specifically demand deposits and commercial loans, and 
overlook the changes in the micro-economy and the banks’ innovations along with the development 
of the liquid stock market, for instance, a dynamic pool of borrowers and depositors, the risk-bearing 
capacity of banks and the off-balance sheet offerings of banks. Thus, this study supports the 
hypothesis that stock market liquidity enhances the liquidity creation of commercial banks in 
Malaysia.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by reviewing the significance and method of the study in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 
summarises the empirical findings and suggests policy implications drawn from the findings. Section 
6.4 discusses the limitations of the study, before recommending possible future research avenues in 
Section 6.5. 
 
6.2 Study overview 
The extant literature has enhanced our understanding of the links between bank competition and 
bank liquidity creation and between stock market liquidity and bank liquidity creation, and very 
often, the links come from two contradictory directions and are inconclusive for other countries that 
have not been examined. By examining the issues using a novel dataset from Malaysia, this study fills 
the gaps in the literature and generates policy implications.  
 
The dataset from Malaysia is unique for several main reasons. First, the playing field for the large and 
small commercial banks is unequal due to substantial disparities in the branch network, technology 
specialisation and benefit from the government initiatives for economic development. Second, the 
adoption of dual-banking in Malaysia implies that commercial banks do not only encounter 
competition from other commercial banks, but also from Islamic banks. Specifically, with the 
supportive government initiatives, Islamic banking has been growing rapidly in recent years and has 
exerted direct competitive pressure on commercial banks in the consumer lending and deposit 
markets. Third, the Malaysian stock market has been large in terms of market capitalisation, but 
highly illiquid for a long time, which is a rare phenomenon compared to the large and liquid stock 
markets of the U.S. and U.K. It is interesting to investigate how the stock market liquidity is related to 
the liquidity creation of commercial banks in Malaysia and suggest implications for policy makers. 
 
The study sample comprised almost all commercial banks operating in Malaysia from the period 
2001 to 2013. We classified the sample banks into large and small banks using a cut-off point of 
MYR20 billion total assets expressed in real 2013 MYR for our main analysis, and other cut-off points 
of median total assets (MYR 34.5 billion expressed in real 2013 MYR) and of 16 bank branches for our 
additional tests. All the bank-level data were drawn from banks’ annual reports. The aggregate stock 
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market data were obtained from Bursa Malaysia, while individual stock data were obtained from 
DataStream database. Macroeconomic and other country-level data were obtained from the 
Department of Statistics Malaysia and the Central Bank of Malaysia, the Heritage Foundation and the 
World Bank databases.  
 
This study constructs four alternative measures of bank level liquidity creation following the three-
step procedure developed by Berger and Bouwman (2009). These measures denote total liquidity 
creation and on-balance sheet liquidity creation based on the category and maturity classification 
approaches. We also develop an additional measure of bank liquidity provision through off-balance 
sheet components only to offer a different perspective for the empirical relationships of interest. 
Besides, to allow the measurement of competition faced by individual banks at a particular point of 
time, this study employs a non-structural competition measure known as the Lerner Index of pricing 
power. Further, to offer a deeper insight into stock market liquidity in Malaysia, this study computes 
various alternative stock market liquidity measures, which are quoted bid-ask spread, Amihud’s 
illiquidity ratio, turnover ratio, frequency of trading days with zero returns and our own 
computation of aggregate stock market illiquidity index score. All regression analyses in this 
study are estimated using the fixed-effects estimator to account for bank heterogeneity that may 
contribute to the endogeneity issue for our findings. 
 
6.3 Summary of the findings for the research objectives 
6.3.1 Research objective one 
The first research objective aims to examine and compare the relationship between bank 
competition and liquidity creation of Malaysian commercial banks by bank size. The results show 
that, irrespective of the “category” or “maturity” specification of the bank liquidity creation measure, 
bank competition has a negative relationship with the on-balance sheet and total liquidity creation 
by small banks, supporting the “fragility channel” hypothesis. The result can be explained through 
soft lending in which the small banks have an edge but becomes less valuable for the banks when 
facing an increase in competition. Extending soft loans to informationally-opaque or riskier 
customers implies that the banks have to bear greater monitoring and informational costs related to 
adverse selection in the early relationship with the customers. However, with the existence of the 
credit bureau in Malaysia and the increase in competition from other lenders, these customers are 
encouraged to switch banks when they become established. As competition slashes the profit margin 
and customer retention of the small banks, the banks ration credit on informationally-opaque 
customers and reallocate the credit towards their incumbent (or captured) customers. Our 
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explanation through the soft lending activities of small banks can, in fact, be supported by additional 
evidence for the negative link between bank competition and the off-balance sheet liquidity creation 
of small banks, because the off-balance sheet activities largely comprise credit commitments which 
are treated as relationship lending arrangements by some literature, such as Berger and Udell (1995), 
Boot and Thakor (2000) and Dinc (2000). However, it is important to emphasise that the objective of 
this study is not to establish the link between bank competition and soft information-based lending. 
 
On the other hand, the study finds evidence in favour of the “price channel” hypothesis for large 
banks, suggesting that an increase in competition encourages large banks to increase their liquidity 
creation. The positive relationship is evident for the on-balance sheet liquidity creation of the large 
banks and does not carry through the banks’ off-balance sheet liquidity creation undertakings. The 
specialisation in hard lending technologies and the strong capacity of large banks, for example, in 
terms of extensive branch networks and delivery channels, technology diffusion and reputation, 
provide possible explanations for the scope and opportunities of the banks to create more liquidity 
(issue more illiquid loans and accept more liquid deposits) for the public when they encounter 
greater competition. A pragmatic way of achieving this is to serve fringe or underserved market 
segments by expanding into new markets locally or across borders and applying lending technologies 
that suit the markets.  
 
6.3.2 Research objective two 
The second research objective aims to examine the dominant bank competition-liquidity creation 
relationship in the Malaysian commercial banking industry. The results show that despite the 
opposite relationship between bank competition and liquidity creation reported for small and large 
banks, on average, Malaysian commercial banks cut down their liquidity creation both on- and off- 
balance sheet when they face an increase in competition, ceteris paribus, pointing to the “fragility 
channel” effect dominating in the industry. It appears that the informational asymmetry issue has a 
greater weight in the banks’ lending decisions to the public when competition increases, and as a 
result, banks reallocate credit towards customers who are backed by hard information such as 
collaterals and guarantees. 
 
Another possible and more direct explanation for the negative relationship between bank 
competition and liquidity creation found collectively for Malaysian commercial banks is that banks 
reallocate funding towards liquid asset investment such as cash reserves and securities as an increase 
in competition renders bank liquidity creation activities less profitable. In addition, greater income 
diversification from interest-based towards fee-based in the midst of rising bank competition may 
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also lead to a moderation of bank liquidity creation. This is because fee-based products, except for 
off-balance sheet loan commitments, do not generally contribute to liquidity creation as they come 
in the forms of professional services.  
 
6.3.3 Research objective three 
The third research objective aims to examine the relationship between stock market liquidity and the 
liquidity creation of Malaysian commercial banks. The results indicate that, for all our stock market 
liquidity measures except turnover ratio, increased stock market liquidity helps to enhance liquidity 
creation by Malaysian commercial banks, which is consistent with the “market-bank liquidity 
enhancement” hypothesis.  The positive relationship is stronger for on-balance sheet liquidity 
creation than off-balance sheet liquidity creation. Our finding based on stock market turnover ratio 
shows the contradictory relationship, which we believe to be doubtful because the turnover ratio has 
been widely criticised for not reflecting changes in the transaction costs on the market, especially 
during market volatility periods (Fleming, 2003; Karpoff, 1987; Lesmond, 2005; Rouetbi & Mamoghli, 
2014). 
 
We explain the positive relationship between stock market liquidity and bank liquidity creation in 
several ways. First, an increase in stock market liquidity allows investors to liquidate their share 
claims at ease with low transaction cost, which in turn diverts investors’ liquidity demand away from 
banks to some degree. This permits banks to accept larger asset-liability mismatches, both liquidity 
and maturity, by channelling more liquidity from liquid reserves towards illiquid asset investments. 
Second, a liquid stock market reduces the equity and solvency costs of banks that have access to the 
stock market, either by being publicly listed or subsidiaries of listed financial holding companies, 
which incentivises the banks to originate additional loans to serve a greater scope of borrowers. 
Third, since about a quarter of the total market capitalisation and trading value of the Malaysia stock 
market involves foreign investors, an increase in stock market liquidity encourages external inflows 
of capital into Malaysia (BNM, 2016c). Thus, with a greater pool of deposits placed by domestic non-
bank financial institutions and business firms with domestic commercial banks, more deposit funding 
is available for bank liquidity creation. Lastly, a liquid stock market motivates corporate firms to also 
seek bank guarantees and commitments that serve as a primary backup source of corporate 
financing, besides being motivated to raise capital directly from investors on the liquid market. This 
creates an opportunity for banks to create liquidity off the balance sheet.  
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6.3.4 Research objective four 
Since the year 2001, the Malaysian authorities have been embarking on far-reaching reforms of the 
financial system led by four 10-year masterplans, namely the Financial Sector Masterplan (FSMP) and 
the parallel Capital Markets Masterplan (CMP) 1 for the period 2001 to 2010, the Financial Sector 
Blueprint and CMP 2 for the period 2011 to 2020 (BNM, 2001, 2011a; SCM, 2001, 2011). The reform 
initiatives are implemented gradually in phases, of which deregulation and liberalisation of the 
banking sector and stock market have been highly focused on since the second phases of FSMP and 
CMP1 (2004-2005), as part of initiatives to promote a competitive, diversified and more market-
oriented financial system. Examples of banking deregulation and liberalisation measures are interest 
rate deregulation, relaxation of bank branching restrictions and issuance of new licenses to foreign 
and Islamic banks (BNM, 2001). In principle, the benefits of competition for efficiency, service quality 
provisions and innovation in banking are no different than in any other industry – which is probably 
the basis of the global trend towards greater competition in the banking industry (Allen & Gale, 2000; 
Vives, 2001). However, the  banking industry has some specificities that may affect the desirability of 
competition in the industry, for example, a fragile financial position and information asymmetry 
(Vives, 2001). Since the Malaysian economy relies on its banking system to provide and, thus, to 
create liquidity for economy financing, if the liquidity creator role of the banks is weakened due to 
any inconsiderate policy implemented, there are catastrophic real effects on the economy. Hence, 
the fourth research objective aims to draw policy implications from the findings in order to assist the 
ongoing formulation, implementation and monitoring of policies related to bank competition and 
stock market development. 
 
Commercial banks in Malaysia have been operating in a monopolistic competition environment, even 
before the FSMP implementation in 2001 (Abdul-Majid & Sufian, 2006). While supporting the 
monopolistic competition structure, the descriptive results based on the Lerner Index of pricing 
power of this study demonstrate that the average market power of individual Malaysian commercial 
banks has been receding since the year 2004, signalling the efficacy of deregulation and liberalisation 
initiatives implemented in the industry. The descriptive results also show that large Malaysian 
commercial banks possess significantly larger pricing power than small banks. The disparity in the 
pricing power appears to be more evident in the credit market than in the deposit market, owing to 
the competitive deposit market reported earlier in our study and the IMF (2014). The greater loan 
pricing of large banks than small banks can be explained through the types of market segments they 
serve because different market segments have different sources of competition. In Malaysia, large 
banks serve a wider scope of borrowers ranging from households and retail to business corporates, 
compared to corporate financing narrowly focused on by small banks. At the household and retail 
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banking levels, market contestability tends to be lower and locally-oriented owing to high entry 
barriers exerted by incumbent banks, such as reputations and the branch network, making room for 
large banks to exercise market power (Vives, 2001). On the other hand, the game in the business 
banking market tends to be competitively intense because business corporates have wider financing 
choices from banks, non-bank financial institutions and capital markets, both locally and globally 
(Vives, 2001). This explains why small banks that narrowly focus on corporate customers generally 
have relatively lower market power than large banks. 
 
Indeed, with the presence of information asymmetry in banking, the regression results of our study 
show that the repression effect of an increase in bank competition on liquidity creation is apparent in 
the Malaysian commercial banking industry today, and this effect carries through to small banks. 
According to the fragility channel view, some degree of market power in banking is desirable to 
address the liquidity needs of economic agents such as borrowers and depositors (Petersen & Rajan, 
1995; Dell’Ariccia & Marquez, 2004; Horvath et al., 2013, 2016). A bank with market power has 
greater incentive to invest in information acquisition about their customers and monitor them by 
granting loans and maintaining relationships with them, because the bank has greater ability to 
capture the customers and share in their wallets. This effect tends to reduce credit rationing to the 
public, which is especially valuable for informationally-opaque customers. Our study findings offer 
implications for policy makers that, some market power in banking is good, particularly when the 
economy is heavily reliant on the banking system for the liquidity supply and facilitation of the 
development of nascent industries and firms. Indeed, our additional results in Section 5.4.2 further 
indicate that the collective banking deregulation and liberalisation initiatives implemented in the 
Malaysian banking sector since the year 2004 has a negative effect on bank liquidity creation.   
 
Besides, our regression results also indicate that an increase in competition has the traditional 
industrial organisation effect of compressing interest margins on both the asset and liability sides of 
banks and increasing liquidity creation undertakings to gain greater market share. This effect is, 
however, mild and evident only for large banks with substantial capacity for liquidity creation, for 
example, banks that have large market share and extensive branch networks throughout the 
country. When facing an increase in competition, large banks with high market power at household 
and retail banking levels, such as Maybank, are able to tolerate a lower interest spread to leverage 
their liquidity creation business in existing and new consumer markets (Lim, 2015). The findings 
imply that a competition policy has a role to play at the retail banking level and may be desirable in 
improving underserved customers’ access to bank products and services. In this case, regulators 
should also monitor banks’ pricing policies to ensure the policies adhere to the approved risk 
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appetite and risk management framework of the banks and industry. Such a ‘risk-based pricing’ 
strategy helps to thwart banks’ unethical product mispricing through cross-subsidisation, protecting 
the welfare of bank customers (Vives, 2001). Owing to the size of large banks and the high social 
costs of failure, competition in the banking industry should be restricted when risk positions (for 
instance, the credit risk position) of banks are being compromised and there is failure to abide by the 
Basel Accord III on capital, leverage and liquidity requirements. Competition policies will certainly be 
exploited by large banks for excessive risk-taking undertakings because credit rationing to risky 
customers is reduced. While lower market power enhances liquidity creation by large banks, our 
findings suggest to policy makers that a higher level of market power can be more tolerated in 
banking than in other industries as competition is often associated with financial instability in 
banking (Berger et al, 2009; Fu et al., 2014; Kasman & Kasman, 2015; Vives, 2001).  
 
In addition, the different effect of bank competition on liquidity creation between small and large 
banks also raises interesting policy implications. Competition has reduced small banks to a process of 
value differentiation in the liquidity creation role. This implies that small banks that do not create 
liquidity when encountering a rise in competition are finding themselves increasingly marginalised 
from the mainstream of liquidity creation activity dominated by large banks. Without greater scale, 
small banks’ competitive position is not as compelling as bank customers seek financial solutions in a 
safe and steady name with a sustainable business in Malaysia. Hence, it is important for small banks 
to build scale, implement appropriate technological and value-added solutions and adapt their 
branding strategies and business models to weather the adverse impact of competition on their 
liquidity creation role in the economy, unless their shareholders are in for a long game of low 
margins to pursue other meaningful business objectives. While acknowledging the development of a 
competitive banking sector is a confluence of economic, technological and regulatory factors as well 
as the uprising Islamic banking in the context of Malaysian banking sector, this study suggests greater 
regulatory leeway and protection for small banks when designing banking competition policy for the 
highly concentrated Malaysian banking sector. This can be helpful in providing headroom for small 
banks to strengthen their competitiveness and in deterring heavyweight banks from abusing their 
market dominance in a way that smaller banks cannot. For instance, given the fact that small banks 
in Malaysia target niche markets and offer personalised products and services, their existence in the 
market can create a competition of service quality which prompts large banks to enhance their 
service quality. An inconsiderate competition policy can lead to an imbalanced development of the 
banking industry in the long term, as the liquidity creation function of small banks may not be 
sustainable in the competitive financial landscape.   
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In terms of the stock market liquidity, the descriptive results do not show any evident improvement 
of the market liquidity in Malaysia over the short time span from 2001 to 2013. The effectiveness of 
the reform measures on stock market liquidity requires a longer-term surveillance because the 
market has had a long history of illiquidity compared to other ASEAN peer averages and the world 
average. Besides, the correlation analysis shows that the turnover ratio, which is commonly used by 
regulators, is a weak proxy for the stock market liquidity because it does not have significant 
correlations with quoted bid-ask spread and Amihud’s illiquidity ratio which measure the transaction 
cost and the breadth and depth of the stock market, respectively. The regression results using 
turnover ratio also show  contradictory results to those using alternative stock market liquidity 
measures. As has been reported by previous studies, turnover ratio measures the trading activity on 
the market, but it does not necessarily reflect changes in the trading costs that correlate with stock 
price volatility which can impede the market liquidity (Fleming, 2003; French & Roll, 1985; Lesmond, 
2005; Rouetbi & Mamoghli, 2014). It is, thus, important for policy makers to look at a broad set of 
indicators when gauging stock market liquidity conditions, instead of relying solely on the market 
turnover ratio.  
 
Overall, the regression analyses show that an increase in stock market liquidity does improve 
liquidity creation by commercial banks in Malaysia. This finding implies that further policy initiatives 
that address the structural impediments on market liquidity and liberalise market access for 
intermediaries, issuers and investors are encouraged. This is because a liquid stock market does not 
only facilitate more effective mobilisation and allocation of funds through the role of the stock 
market, but also stimulates liquidity creation undertakings of banks for a wider scope of customers in 
catering for the nation’s growing financing needs. 
 
6.4 Limitations of the study 
There are several limitations in our study that may make the results less generalizable. The first 
limitation lies in the liquidity creation measures that provide only rough approximations of liquidity 
created by banks for the economy because the measures rely on the classification of banks’ balance 
sheet items into the “liquid”, “semiliquid” and “illiquid” baskets. For example, the liquidity creation 
measures based on the maturity classification approach are confined to the available maturity 
information of balance sheet items. This present study is able to classify loans maturing in less than 
one year as semi-liquid assets, loans maturing over one year as illiquid assets, term deposits 
maturing within six months as liquid liabilities, term deposits maturing between six months to one 
year as semiliquid liabilities and term deposits maturing greater than one year as illiquid liabilities. If 
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a more detailed maturity breakdown of these items was available, then the magnitude of liquidity 
creation would be smaller and a closer approximation to that computed using the “category” 
classification.  
 
This study also relies on daily stock trading data to compute stock market liquidity measures. We do 
not have access to intraday stock trading data, such as effective bid-ask spread and commission fees, 
to calculate the actual transaction cost that implies the stock market liquidity because the 
transaction cost varies with depth (quote size and trade size), timing, counterparties and market-
specific peculiarities. Measuring stock market liquidity and transaction cost is never simple. 
Therefore, this study employs numerous alternative measures to evaluate the market liquidity. 
 
Owing to the small sample size employed in this study, the fixed-effect estimator is the best 
estimation method available for us to examine the relationships of interest and deal with possible 
endogeneity issues. We were not able to systematically examine the dynamic process of the 
empirical relationships and address the ensuing endogeneity issues by using the more restrictive 
dynamic Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) that fits best with a short and wide panel dataset. 
The GMM estimator may not yield consistent and efficient estimates because the number of 
internally-generated instruments tends to increase with the number of time periods of our panel 
dataset and, as a result, the large instrument collection overfits endogenous variables and weakens 
the Hansen test of the instruments’ joint validity (Roodman, 2009). Nonetheless, the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman endogeneity tests in the context of fixed-effects IV estimation do not reject the exogeneity 
of the regressors of interest (bank competition and stock market liquidity). It is, thus, plausible to 
conclude that the strict regressor exogeneity assumption of the fixed-effect estimator is met and that 
the fixed-effect estimator is consistent. 
 
6.5 Future research 
This study offers several future research avenues. Since the Islamic banking industry is emerging in 
Malaysia and competes with commercial banks for liquidity creation activities in the same market, 
future research can extend this present study by also examining the effect of competition on the 
liquidity creation of Islamic banks and compare it with our findings for commercial banks. It will be 
interesting to see how conventional and Sharia-compliant business models for banking may exert 
different effects on the empirical relationship. 
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While the results bear significant policy implications, we leave future researchers with various 
possible analyses with respects to the deregulation and liberalisation policies that have been 
implemented in the banking sector and stock market over the past decade to assess the effects of 
these policies on bank liquidity creation. Specific policies that can be explored include cuts in the 
stock market transaction costs like clearing fee, trading fee and Securities Commission levy fee in 
2001, liberalisation of stockbroking commission rates in 2001 and change in the tick size regime in 
2009. It would also be an interesting reseach avenue to examine the influences on bank liquidity 
creation after the implementation of the Basel Accord III standards for liquidity coverage ratio and 
net stable funding ratio in Malaysia. This is because the Basel standards may present a greater hurdle 
for bank liquidity creation. Our findings, which shed light on the influences on bank liquidity creation 
in Malaysia for the 2001-2013 period (pre-Basel III implementation), offer a valuable reference for 
future studies subsequent to the period. 
 
Lastly, we recommend that future research use survey data to obtain insightful information about 
the impact of bank competition and stock market liquidity on bank liquidity creation in Malaysia. 
Specifically, future research can explore both the banks’ and the corporate and retail customers’ 
perspectives about how changes in competition and stock market liquidity have affected bank 
product pricing, the value of the bank-customer relationship for both banks and customers and the 
supply and demand for bank products and services. 
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Appendix A 
The List of the Commercial Banks Used in This Study 
Table A.1 List of the commercial banks used in this study 
No. Bank name Size classification 
1 Affin Bank Berhad Large 
2 Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad Large 
3 AmBank (M) Berhad Large 
4 Bangkok Bank Berhad Small 
5 Bank of America Malaysia Berhad Small 
6 Bank of China (Malaysia) Berhad Small 
7 Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Malaysia) Berhad Small 
8 BNP Paribas Malaysia Berhad Small 
9 CIMB Bank Berhad Large 
10 Citibank Berhad Large 
11 Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Berhad Small 
12 Eon bank berhad Large 
13 Hong Leong Bank Berhad Large 
14 HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad Large 
15 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Malaysia) Berhad Small 
16 J.P. Morgan Chase Bank Berhad Small 
17 Malayan Banking Berhad Large 
18 Mizuho Corporate Bank (Malaysia) Berhad Small 
19 OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Berhad Large 
20 Public Bank Berhad Large 
21 RHB Bank Berhad Large 
22 Southern Bank Berhad Large 
23 Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad Large 
24 Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation Malaysia Berhad Small 
25 The Bank of Nova Scotia Berhad Small 
26 The Royal Bank of Scotland Berhad Small 
27 United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Berhad Large 
Note: In this appendix, banks that usually hold total assets of up to MYR20 billion are classified as 
small banks, and banks that usually hold total assets exceeding MYR20 billion are classified as large 
banks. 
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